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The goal of the current thesis is to provide a framework for investigating and 
understanding visual processing of hierarchical structure (i.e., local parts nested in global 
wholes, such as trees nested in forests) under incidental processing conditions—that is, 
where processing of information at global and local levels is both uninformative (cannot 
aid task performance) and task-irrelevant (need not be processed to perform the task). To 
do so, a novel method combining two widely-used paradigms (spatial cueing and 
compound stimulus paradigms) is used for implicitly probing observers’ perceptual 
representations over the course of processing. This compound arrow cueing paradigm 
was used in five experiments to address a series of objectives. First, which level (global 
or local) is more dominant in the evolution of a percept? Relatedly, is the temporal 
structuring of global and local processing fixed or flexible? And what is the time course 
of level-specific advantages—do they occur earlier or later in the course of processing, 
and do they follow a transient or protracted time course? Finally, what controls level-
specific selection (sensory, perceptual, and/or attentional factors)? The results of the five 
experiments addressing these issues contribute to a greater understanding of visual 
perception by elucidating the nature of global and local processing under incidental 
processing conditions.
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CHAPTER 1 PREFACE: THESIS SUMMARY AND OUTLINE 
Visual environments (scenes, objects, faces) can be conceptualized as containing 
global and local information, where global information corresponds to overall form and 
local information to finer-grain detail. An important question concerns how information 
across levels contributes to scene understanding. To investigate this, a common approach 
is to present observers with compound stimuli (i.e., stimuli containing hierarchical 
structure such as larger figures constructed of smaller figures) and measure responses to a 
target presented at either the global or local level. The preponderant findings are global 
advantage (speeded responses to targets presented at the global versus local level) and 
global interference (greater difficulty ignoring global versus local distractors). On the 
basis of these findings, Navon (1977) proposed a perceptual global precedence 
hypothesis which states that identification of global aspects is a faster and obligatory 
process completed before identification of local aspects, which is a slower and optional 
process. As a result, global aspects are dominant in the percept (giving rise to global 
advantage) and their availability for selection is constant (together giving rise to global 
interference). Subsequent work has corroborated the empirical findings of global 
advantage and interference but ultimately rejected Navon’s claim that the nature of these 
effects is obligatory and their source perceptual. 
The current thesis reviews issues in global/local research (summarized in Table 
P.1), highlights some limitations of how previous work has addressed these issues, and 
then reports a series of experiments aimed at circumventing these limitations. It is argued 
that rejection of perceptual global precedence is premature—namely, because in all 
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previous studies observers have been required to process the imperative compound 
stimulus in a task- or stimulus-driven manner. Accordingly, the most important aspect of 
the current experiments is that visual processing of global and local levels was measured 
under incidental processing conditions—that is, where processing of global and local 
levels is uninformative (does not aid task performance) and task-irrelevant (need not be 
processed to perform the task). In these experiments, participants made simple detection 
responses to a peripheral target that was preceded by a centrally presented compound 
stimulus (big, global arrow composed of smaller, local arrows). Critically, the compound 
stimulus was irrelevant to the detection task (i.e., it did not need to be processed in order 
to respond to the peripheral target) and also spatially uninformative (i.e., the direction of 
global and local arrows did not predict target location). Thus, processing of the 
compound arrow was not necessary to perform the task and could not be used for making 
reliable inferences regarding the location of the target, meaning any evidence that it was 
processed can be taken as incidental. 
Table P.1. Summary of the main issues in global/local research addressed in the current 
experiments. 
Main Issues Addressed in the Current Experiments 
Issue #1: Temporal organization in the percept (global-to-local or local-to-global)? 
Issue #2: Temporal availability in percept (stationary or variable)?  
Issue #3: Nature of global/local precedence effects (obligatory or voluntary)? 
Issue #4: Source of global/local precedence effects (perceptual or attentional)?  
 
Experiment 1 was a multi-experiment study that examined global and local 
processing under incidental processing conditions. The critical manipulation was 
processing duration (operationalized as stimulus-onset-asynchrony; SOA). The rationale 
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was that the priming potency of a level (i.e., global or local) should vary with SOA in 
correspondence with how early that level was processed (Kimchi, 1998; Navon, 1991). 
Accordingly, the finding of a level-specific spatial cueing effect would reflect a 
processing advantage for that level, and a non-significant interaction with SOA would 
reflect a stationary advantage of that level over the course of processing. Experiment 2 
replicated Experiment 1 using a more widely-tuned and finer-grained manipulation of 
processing duration in order to characterize precisely the functional form of change in 
level-specific advantage over time. The finding of significant “jumps” in the size of level-
specific advantage in the course of processing would reflect discrete change in the 
availability of that percept, whereas non-significant “jumps” and smooth or no change 
would reflect gradual change in the availability of that percept. Experiments 3-5 modified 
the compound arrow cueing paradigm in order to examine control of level-specific 
selection in perception of hierarchical structure. To examine the role of attention in level 
selectivity, Experiment 3 manipulated the task-relevance of a level via task instructions 
that called for processing of either a global or local aspect of a compound arrow. The 
finding of a task-compatible, level-specific advantage (i.e., a local advantage in the local 
orienting task and a global advantage in the global orienting task) that was independent of 
processing duration would reflect an influence of top-down attentional control. 
Experiment 4 examined the role of bottom-up salience in level selectivity. To do so, the 
local level was modified to include a color singleton. The finding of a larger and more 
rapidly arising local advantage with cues containing a local color singleton compared 
with those that are homogenously colored would reflect a bottom-up attentional source of 
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level-specific advantage. Finally, Experiment 5 examined the role of attentional focusing 
and adjustments in level selectivity. To do so, the compound arrow cueing paradigm was 
modified to include a go/no-go component, which served as a manipulation of attentional 
focus. The finding of a window-compatible, level-specific advantage regardless of 
processing duration may suggest an alternative account of global/local processing 
phenomena, one predicated on the focusing an attentional window rather than availability 
in the percept. 
Table P.2. Summary of the primary research question in each experiment and the main 
finding addressing it. 
Exp. Primary Question Addressed Main Finding 
1.1-
1.4 
Is global precedence observed in incidental 
perception of hierarchical structure? 
Global-to-local shift in 
advantage over time. 
   
2 Does change in availability of global/local 
features proceed gradually, or discretely? 
Gradual, as opposed to 
discrete, shift in advantage 
in over time. 
   
3 Does top-down task set control level selectivity? 
In particular, will a global orienting task cause 
global precedence and a local orienting local 
precedence? 
Task-compatible, level-
specific advantage with 
conflict cues; global 
advantage with task-
incompatible, level-specific 
neutral cues. 
   
4 Does bottom-up salience control level 
selectivity? 
Local salience reduces, but 
does not reverse, global 
advantage. 
   
5 Do top-down and bottom-up factors interact to 
control level selectivity--e.g., if advantage 
depends on salience, is such bottom-up influence 
contingent on the focal scope of attention 
(focused or diffuse)?  
Focal scope of attention 
modulates global 
advantage, though, not 
independent of physical 
salience. 
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 The main finding in each of the five experiments, and the research question it 
addressed, are summarized in Table P.2. The emerging picture is that something like 
global precedence guides perceptual microgenesis (i.e., the time course of development in 
the percept) in incidental perception of hierarchical structure: processing of the global 
level was obligatory, whereas processing of the local level was somewhat optional. In 
short, the experiments show that interactions between task demands and the structure of 
the input information selectively modulate the relative needs of visual information at 
different levels of stimulus structure. It seemed that a global-to-local shift in advantage 
was obligatory when there was conflict between levels and processing was incidental, as 
well as that processing could be restricted to a task-relevant global level but not to a task-
relevant local level. These findings suggest that level-specific advantages may not have 
been due to top-down task set per se but rather to conflict between levels, with the effect 
of task set serving to modulate the availability of level-specific information, effectively 
prolonging (in the case of task-relevant global information) or expediting (in the case of 
task-relevant local information) the advantage at a given level. To select symbols at 
different levels of structure, therefore, the current thesis concludes that at least two 
factors need to be considered: the observer’s current task, which specifies the demands of 
visual information from the input, and the globality of this visual information across the 
percept, which specifies the availability of the percept for selection. 
In sum, a novel compound arrow cueing paradigm was used in five experiments 
to examine fundamental issues of broad theoretical interest (entry point of visual 
perception and its flexibility; selection of competing symbols at different levels of 
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stimulus structure). The results of these experiments contribute to a greater understanding 
of visual perception by elucidating the nature of global/local processing under incidental 
processing conditions, which closely reflect the manner in which a great deal of 
information is processed in the real world. Though attention, perception, and action can 
be strongly influenced by goals and intentions, processing of stimuli routinely occurs in a 
passive manner given the overwhelming number of inputs available at any given time. As 
such, the results reported have broad implications for the study of attentional control in 
general and perception of hierarchical structure in particular. 
Thesis Outline 
Chapter 1 (Overview of Global and Local Processing) reviews fundamental issues 
in the study of visual perception and how contemporary theories have addressed these 
issues. Chapter 2 (Thesis Objectives, Methods, and Hypotheses) describes the primary 
objectives of the current thesis, the methods used to achieve these objectives, and the 
hypotheses underlying each experiment. Chapters 3-7 are empirical chapters, with 
chapters 3-4 reporting experiments that investigate global/local processing in incidental 
perception, and chapters 5-7 reporting experiments that investigate control of level-
specific selection. Chapter 3 (Experiments 1.1 through 1.4: Global and Local Processing 
in Incidental Perception) introduces the compound arrow cueing paradigm and incidental 
viewing procedure designed to investigate the role of globality (i.e., an item’s relative 
position—more global or local—in hierarchical space) in perception of hierarchical 
structure under incidental processing conditions. Chapter 4 (Experiment 2: Capturing 
Time Sensitive Effects) investigates the time course of the availability of global and local 
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information in the microgenesis of the percept. Chapter 5 (Experiment 3: Role of Top-
Down Task Set) investigates top-down mechanisms of level selection. Chapter 6 
(Experiment 4: Role of Bottom-Up Salience) investigates bottom-up mechanisms of level 
selection. Chapter 7 (Experiment 5: Role of Attentional Focusing and Adjustments) 
investigates hybrid mechanisms of level selection. Finally, Chapter 8 (General 
Discussion) summarizes and discusses the experiments reported in the preceding 
chapters, as well as identifies current issues in the study of global/local processing and 
makes recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF GLOBAL AND LOCAL PROCESSING 
1.0 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of fundamental issues in global/local research 
(focusing primarily on the visual domain), highlights a number of limitations in how 
previous work has addressed these issues, and concludes with a discussion of how the 
experiments reported in the current thesis circumvent these limitations. To introduce the 
concepts involved in the issues at hand, Chapter 1 begins with an example illustrating 
some of these. 
1.1 Challenges to Visual Perception 
1.1.1 An Illustrative Example 
Figure 1.1 shows two common visual symbols with hierarchical structure, a STOP 
sign and an EXIT sign. An important question is how does the visual system know that 
the word (“STOP” or “EXIT”) and form (octagon or rectangle) should be paired to 
represent a STOP sign and an EXIT sign, respectively? In cases of a busy intersection, a 
red sign with big, bold, white block letters is critical to driver safety. Similarly, in cases 
of a fire, a red sign with big, bold, white block letters will guide one to safety. Of course, 
the effect of these two symbols on behavior are polar opposite, with the latter activating a 
behavior (to move toward the exit) and the former suppressing a behavior (to stop 
moving toward the intersection). Thus, with the exception of form, a “STOP” sign is 
perceptually equivalent to an “EXIT” sign, yet cues an opposing behavior (to ‘stop’ 
rather than to ‘go’). Moreover, the cueing properties of each are also similar, as each sign 
likely has relatively automatic or effortless effects on behavior. How, then, does the same 
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basic symbol elicit two opposing, automatic responses? What are the control processes 
involved and how is this flexibility in behavior achieved? The current thesis aims to 
understand the control processes involved in coordinating the time course of visual 
processing in support of flexible, goal-directed behavior. 
Continuing with the example in Figure 1.1, it is proposed that the binding of word 
and form occurs because each is trying to communicate a single, coherent message (to 
STOP or to EXIT)—that is, they group by common function (i.e., communication of 
symbolic value). In this view, then, the reason STOP and EXIT signs cue rapid and 
effortless, but opposing, responses in spite of reasonably equivalent perceptual features is 
because their messages differ, meaning that the function on which their respective 
constituents group differs, which in turn leads to a different percept and a different 
response. That is, as different functions or tasks are likely to tap different stages of 
processing or to evoke different optional strategies available to the processing system, 
this leads to different percepts and thus different responses. 
 
STOP 
Level 1 (lines): most local 
Level 2 (letters): either more 
global (relative to level 1) or 
more local (relative to level 3) 
Level 3 (word): most global 
Level 3 (shape): most global 
T 
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Figure 1.1. Visual symbols with hierarchical structure (STOP and EXIT signs), in which 
lines are nested within letters, which in turn are nested within a word and a form and 
where word and form are crossed at the highest level of globality (i.e., relative position in 
hierarchical space) given that each line-letter combination appeared with both word and 
form in a given sign. 
1.1.2 Selection Problem in Perception and Action 
A control process is any process that helps to overcome rigid responding. 
Cognitive control processes are particularly required in situations of task uncertainty, in 
which no cue is given for the selection of the relevant action, or in situations that produce 
problems in selecting which action or task to perform at any given moment. Many 
common behaviors and visual scenes constitute such situations (Monsell, 2003). This is 
because everyday visual environments contain more information than can be processed 
within a glance, which can be appreciated by considering that humans make 3-4 eye 
movements each second (Henderson, 2003; Henderson & Hollingworth, 1998) or several 
billion (109) over the lifespan. Despite this seemingly impressive rate of orienting, real-
world visual environments are often too complex to allow for visually guided behavior. 
Even under the obtuse assumption that eye movements are random, at this sampling rate, 
localizing a target in scene with only 24 distractor locations would take 3-4 seconds. 
Humans and other animals, therefore, have to cope with an enormous amount of 
perceptual data. 
Similarly, everyday visual environments also continuously bombard humans and 
other animals with various opportunities for action. Some stimuli automatically elicit the 
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same behavioral response from an observer each time that particular stimulus is 
encountered (e.g., visual transients cause reflexive oculomotor orienting), whereas other 
stimuli afford a variety of alternative responses depending on situational constraints, 
learned associations, and the goals of the observer (e.g., when standing in front of a sink 
there are numerous behaviors that could be activated such as washing one’s hands, 
brushing one’s teeth, washing dishes, getting a drink of water, or fixing one’s hair 
amongst a multitude of other options). Because one cannot perform all possible actions at 
the same time, there must be mechanisms to reduce the number of potential actions. To 
overcome the computational limitations imposed by the environment and enable efficient, 
flexible behavior amenable to the current goals of the observer, goal-driven perception 
and action depend on selective attention for allocating limited resources towards a subset 
of relevant items—that is, effective and efficient goal-directed behavior depends on a 
combination of processes that suppress irrelevant responses from interfering with one’s 
goals and that select and initiate responses relevant to the completion of that goal 
(collectively regarded as executive control processes). But what gets selected, a whole 
scene or just certain parts? And how is efficient selection achieved? The current thesis 
aims to understand the factors that control orienting and enable efficient selectivity in 
sampling behavior. 
Approaches to selectivity. One way to deal with this selection problem is 
through extensive filtering, which should minimize the use of resources and processing 
effort, as both of these are limited. Another approach to the selection problem is to make 
the scene virtually larger—by zooming out the focus of attention—so that the information 
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can be held in low-cost storage. Yet another approach is to offload work with automated 
visual routines (e.g., obligatory grouping and parsing processes involved in perceptual 
organization), which aid object constancy and thereby effectively shift cognitive 
processing load to the perceptual system. Each of these approaches to the selection 
problem is intended to decrease the costs for performing information-intensive tasks 
(resource accounts), or, alternatively, to increase the scope of the information that can be 
utilized for the same cost (adaptation accounts). The current thesis describes these 
approaches in greater detail below and then reports a series of empirical studies 
addressing these possibilities. 
1.1.3 Hierarchical Structure 
An important property of real-world objects is that they tend to be structured 
hierarchically. The human body, for example, is composed of a number of parts that 
cannot exist independently. A hand, for instance, cannot exist without an arm, which 
cannot exist without a torso, and so on. Accordingly, visual scenes (scenes, objects, 
faces) are generally conceptualized as containing global and local information, where 
global information corresponds to overall form and local information to finer-grain detail 
(Neisser, 1967). Hierarchical levels of structure (fingers within hands within arms within 
person), therefore, may be ordered from global (body) to local (fingers), where more 
global levels contain or encompass local constituents. Such structure poses a challenge to 
the visual system because the identity of an item with hierarchical structure is potentially 
ambiguous in that its interpretation depends on which level of globality (i.e., the relative 
position of an item in hierarchical space) is dominant. For example, a herd of sheep 
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arranged in a circular pattern is a potentially ambiguous stimulus: given strict 
interpretation of the global level, it would be interpreted as a plain circle; given strict 
interpretation of a more local level, it would be interpreted as a herd of sheep. Visual 
perception, therefore, requires the coordinated processing of objects on both global and 
local levels. During global processing local elements are grouped into perceptual wholes 
(Koffka, 1935; Kohler, 1947; Wertheimer, 1955), whereas during local processing scene 
elements are analyzed as individual objects (Titchener, 1909; see also Han, Weaver, 
Murray, Kang, Yund, & Woods, 2002). 
The visual world is cluttered and complex, typically containing a multitude of 
objects that can appear in an infinitude of orientations, sizes, shapes, colors, and so on 
and which are often degraded by atmospheric conditions and occluded by other objects. 
Despite such vagaries of sensory experience, the phenomenological experience of 
perception is one of instantaneous completeness and coherence imbued with meaning. 
How is this meaning apprehended? A challenge to understanding the temporal dynamics 
of visual perception is that even when the physical properties of a stimulus are constant 
over time, one’s perception of that stimulus may still change as a function of processing 
duration. For instance, a brief glimpse of an unfamiliar object or scene may be sufficient 
to categorize it at a basic level (e.g., table or indoor room), but to perceive the table as a 
‘coffee table’ or the indoor room as a ‘kitchen’ tends to require additional processing 
time (Potter, 1975, 1976). Captured in this example is the notion that there is a temporal 
order to visual processing, wherein the skeletal-structure of a stimulus tends to be 
processed more rapidly than finer grain details. That is, visual processing is held to 
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progress in global-to-local fashion (Navon, 1977). In terms of metaphor, the one most 
commonly applied in describing the typical course of visual processing is “perception of 
the forest before the trees”. Whether or not the speeded processing of global properties 
has meaningful consequences for cognitive and behavioral activity is still under 
investigation (see Hegdé, 2008; Kimchi, 1992, 2003a,b, 2012, 2014; Navon, 2003; 
Morrison & Schyns, 2001; for reviews). Can people actually use global information to 
classify and act on objects and scenes? Or is this information processed simply to 
constrain local processing? 
1.2 Global and Local Processing 
1.2.1 Compound Stimulus Paradigm 
To investigate how the availability and use of information at different levels of 
hierarchical structure contributes to scene understanding, researchers have made 
extensive use of compound stimuli (i.e., stimuli containing hierarchical structure such as 
larger figures constructed of smaller figures), introduced first by Asch (1962) and later by 
Kinchla (1974, 1977), and popularized by Navon (1977). In Navon’s compound stimulus 
paradigm (Figure 1.2), observers are presented with a compound letter (e.g., a large, 
global F constructed from smaller, local Fs) and instructed to respond to either the larger 
(global) or the smaller (local) letter in separate blocks of trials.1 Importantly, the relation 
                                                 
1 There are actually two versions of Navon’s (1977) compound letter paradigm, which 
differ in terms of whether attention is directed to a particular level via task instructions or 
stimulus manipulations that directly call for the selection of one level while ignoring the 
other or is divided between levels. As the directed attention version is the more widely 
used one, it is this version to which the current proposal refers where discussed, unless 
otherwise noted. 
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between levels is either consistent (global F, local Fs) or inconsistent (global F, local Hs). 
The preponderant finding is that the global letter is responded to faster (global advantage) 
and is more difficult to ignore (global interference). The allure of the paradigm, apart 
from its elegant simplicity, is that it serves to equate the complexity, identifiability, 
familiarity, codability, and relative diagnosticity of the levels, such that they differ only 
in level of globality (i.e., relative position in hierarchical space). Additionally, the two 
structures can be independent such that one cannot necessarily be predicted from the 
other. Compound letters, therefore, satisfy two conditions considered by Navon (1977, 
1981, 2003) to be critical for testing the global precedence hypothesis. 
 
Figure 1.2. Example hierarchical stimuli in Navon’s (1977) compound stimulus 
paradigm, in which a compound letter is presented (e.g., large, global F constructed from 
small, local Hs) and observers are instructed to identify the letter at either the global or 
local level in separate blocks of trials. Importantly, the relation between levels is either 
consistent (global F, local Fs) or inconsistent (global F, local Hs). 
1.2.2 Global Precedence 
Inconsistent 
Consistent Inconsistent 
S H 
S 
H 
Local Level 
Global Level 
Consistent 
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Navon’s global precedence hypothesis (1977) is concerned with the temporal 
organization of perceptual processes in the course of identifying an attended object. 
Global precedence refers to a priority in perceptual processing for the more global 
features of a form or object, suggesting that perceptual processing is temporally 
organized and proceeds from analysis of global structure towards analysis of more local 
details. More specifically, it states that the perceptual system is predisposed to process 
“clusters”, with this disposition setting the stage for dominance of global compared with 
local information in the evolution of the percept. Thus, Navon’s hypothesis is one about a 
processing disposition, with the essence of global perceptual precedence being the 
inevitability of global processing. According to Navon (1977), global precedence occurs 
because identification of global information occurs first and constitutes an obligatory 
stage of perceptual processing. In other words, global processing is viewed as an 
obligatory process that is complete upon identification of global information, at which 
point processing of more local information that has become available is optional. 
Functional Advantages. A disposition to process clusters of information (i.e., 
global precedence) may have some functional advantages. First, an initial, crude, global 
analysis may be useful for locating local stimuli or stimulus features and for perceptual 
organization (Marr, 1982; Neisser, 1967). Second, the processing of global structure may 
be more informative regarding the processing of individual elements than vice versa. The 
global structure of stimuli tends to be more unique than local features. For any given pair 
of a global feature and a local one (e.g., global octagon shape and local white letters of 
the STOP sign in Figure 1.1), the number of stimuli that have that global feature (N = 1) 
17 
 
is probably smaller, on average, than the number of stimuli that have that local feature (N 
= 4). An idea about general structure, therefore, may be more suggestive of the identity of 
the stimulus than a few isolated details. Having such an idea may be valuable when only 
partial analysis is possible because of rapid changes in input (e.g., pedestrians occluding 
one or more letters of the whole word on the STOP sign), or when task demands call for 
rapid scanning of stimuli (e.g., approaching a busy intersection). Considering that 
perception may be an interplay of input-driven and concept-driven processes (Broadbent, 
1977; McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1981; Norman & Bobrow, 1976; Palmer, 1975), global 
precedence can help in setting off concept-driven processes by quickly narrowing down 
the range of possible identities of the whole stimulus. Finally, for the same reason, global 
features may be more efficient in priming local features than local features are in priming 
global features (Navon, 1991). Thus, global precedence seems desirable. 
Empirical Support. Within the compound stimulus paradigm, support for 
Navon’s (1977) perceptual global precedence account is based on the joint occurrence of 
two effects: speeded responses to global versus local targets (global advantage) and a 
greater difficulty ignoring irrelevant global versus local distractors (global interference). 
That global information interferes with local responses but not vice versa can be seen as 
evidence that information at the global level is present at the time of the local response 
but not the reverse. Moreover, the global response time advantage together with global 
interference can be seen as evidence reflecting a global-to-local order of processing. On 
the basis of these findings, Navon (1977) proposed that global precedence occurs because 
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identification of global aspects is a fast, obligatory process completed before 
identification of local aspects, which is a slower and optional process. 
Summary. To summarize, global precedence (Navon, 1977) is a hypothesis 
concerned with the temporal organization of perceptual processes in the course of 
identifying an attended object, stating that the perceptual system is predisposed to process 
global compared with local information. It provides a theoretical explanation of global 
advantage and global interference findings whereby the availability of global information 
occurs early in the course of visual processing and does not attenuate over time. In turn, 
earlier registration of global features yields a processing priority for global information 
and, therefore, accounts for global advantage, whereas stationary availability of global 
information over time results in global information being available even when local 
information is the focus of processing and, therefore, accounts for global interference. 
1.2.3 Theory 
An unresolved issue in understanding the temporal dynamics of visual perception 
is the question of how perceptual processing is temporally organized. Are global 
configurations such as the roundness of a human face processed prior to local elements 
such as the eyes and mouth (global-to-local), or are local elements processed prior to the 
global configuration (local-to-global)? Or, are elements at each level processed 
independently? A related question is the nature of this order (fixed or flexible)? A 
common view throughout much of the temporal visual processing literature is that, 
although global and local levels may both contribute to scene understanding, processing 
of global structure tends to precede processing of local structure (see Hegdé, 2008, for a 
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review). The relevant points on which subsequent explanations of this phenomenon differ 
concern a) whether or not the order in which global and local information is acquired 
relates to scene understanding, b) whether or not dependencies exist between levels, such 
that processing at one level depends on the outcome of processing at another level, and c) 
whether the source of the phenomenon resides in perception or attention. 
 Perceptual Accounts. Perceptual accounts (Andres & Fernandes, 2006; Han, 
Fan, Chen, & Zhuo, 1997; Han & Humphreys, 1999; Kimchi, 1998; Koivisto & 
Revonsuo, 2004; Miller & Navon, 2002; Navon, 1977, 1991, 2003; Paquet, 1999; Paquet 
& Merikle, 1988; Sanocki, 2001) suggest that processes involved in property extraction 
and detection operate global-to-local. Perceptual accounts of global/local phenomena 
attribute findings of advantage and interference to availability of percept (i.e., the global 
level is registered earlier or processed faster than the local level). According to perceptual 
accounts, global precedence is due to earlier identification of global features than local 
features, which is possible because global information is available earlier than local 
information. 
 Attentional Accounts. Attentional accounts suggest that decision and response 
selection processes operate global-to-local (Boer & Keuss, 1982; Hübner, 2014; Hübner 
& Volberg, 2005, 2007; Miller, 1981a,b; Ward, 1982). According to attentional accounts, 
information about both levels is available at the same time, but it is simply easier to 
attend to and base decisions on information from the global level. Attentional accounts of 
global/local phenomena attribute advantage and interference not to availability in the 
percept but to executive functions. A number of accounts have been proposed for how 
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information at the global- or local-level of a hierarchically structured stimulus is 
prioritized for selection. An early account was based on the zoom-lens analogy of 
attention. This regional selection account proposes that the size of the attentional window 
determines selection of global or local information. Such an account might assume that 
the spotlight is initially set to encompass the global shape of the stimulus and then to 
gradually shrink until it encloses only a single local item. Accordingly, this account 
would predict that selectivity improves continuously as the size of the attentional window 
narrows. This account is somewhat paradoxical, though. In particular, if the most 
important information processing operations require a fine-grained attentional “spotlight” 
in order to unfold efficiently, then why should the spotlight narrow or zoom at all? The 
current thesis argues that the answer is because important operations do in fact take place 
at more coarse resolutions. A finer resolution simply allows operations to continue and 
for higher level processing (i.e., operations to be performed on operations). 
 At least three mechanisms could affect the efficiency of level selection (and/or 
processing) in a global/local identification task (Hübner, 2000). First, attentional 
resources could be voluntarily allocated to a given level. That such control is possible is 
demonstrated by negative effects of invalid cues, whereby cues directing attention to a 
non-target level produce costs (Robertson, Lamb, & Zaidel, 1993). Second, sensory 
factors (e.g., physical salience) could push attention involuntarily to a given level, as 
demonstrated by the finding of a global advantage even when the local level is validly 
cued (Stoffer, 1993, 1994). Third, proactive exogenous factors, which affect subsequent 
selection efficiency and which resist voluntary control, could prime a given level and 
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thereby enhance its likelihood of being selected. This sort of control is supported by 
findings demonstrating that the availability of valid cues does not prevent level repetition 
effects. Finally, the work of Lamb et al. (e.g., Lamb, Pond, & Zahir, 2000; Lamb, 
London, Pond, & Whitt, 1998) suggests that the efficiency of identifying targets at 
different levels of structure is determined by the combined effects of voluntary and 
involuntary control processes. 
1.2.4 Research 
Much of the research following Navon’s (1977) seminal work has been focused 
on the localization of visual awareness (namely, whether global configurations can be 
used in the classification of a stimulus), delineating boundary conditions of the global 
advantage, examining its source and its localization in the brain. The following sections 
review these issues. 
1.2.4.1 Temporal Availability in the Percept. A crucial assumption of Navon’s 
(1977) global precedence hypothesis is that the availability of the global level is constant 
and does not attenuate over time (stationary assumption). A stationary account of global 
precedence suggests that global advantage is observed and is constant across time 
because not only is global information registered earlier or faster (which accounts for the 
global advantage) but because its availability does not change, not even when local 
information is being processed (which accounts for the obligatory nature of global 
advantage and the global-to-local interference pattern in compound stimulus paradigms). 
Testing this assumption, however, requires a paradigm that can measure the relative 
availability of global and local features at some point in the course of processing 
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following the onset of the stimulus, which necessarily relegates compound stimulus 
paradigms that measure precedence in terms of Stroop-like interference (e.g., Figure 1.2) 
unusable. 
To test the stationary assumption, Navon (1991) manipulated processing duration, 
operationalized as stimulus-onset-asynchrony (SOA), within an auditory-visual 
interaction paradigm (cf. Navon, 1977, Experiment 2). Participants responded to an 
auditory letter stimulus while freely viewing a compound letter in preparation for a 
memory test to be delivered at the end of the experiment—it was suggested that this 
constituted “minimal, or close to minimal, instructions that just call for looking without 
any specific assignment or focus and without even describing the nature of the stimulus” 
(Navon, 1991, pp. 175). The auditory stimulus was either globally consistent with the 
visual letter (the auditory stimulus and the global level of the visual stimulus contained 
the same letter), globally inconsistent with the visual letter (the auditory stimulus and the 
global level of the visual stimulus contained different letters), or globally neutral (the 
global level of the visual stimulus contained a rectangle, not a letter). Local consistency 
was defined in the same way but with reference to the local rather than global level. The 
test of precedence was whether the global or local level of the visual stimulus would 
interfere with the response to the auditory stimulus. It was found that only the global 
level interfered. The test of the stationary assumption was whether this global consistency 
by local consistency interaction varied as a function of SOA (i.e., the time interval 
between the onsets of the visual and auditory stimuli). The SOAs used were 0, 50, 100, 
150, 200, and 250 ms. In five out of six experiments, Navon reported non-significant 
23 
 
interactions of global advantage and SOA, which was taken to support the stationary 
assumption and suggests that the availability of global features does not vary with 
processing duration. 
Three points should be noted, however. First, exposure duration was also 
manipulated, and it is not entirely clear how this should interact with the SOA by global- 
and local-consistency effect. Second, the lack of an SOA effect does not necessarily 
imply that global properties are available throughout processing because performance can 
be based on later rather than earlier representations, particularly in discrimination and 
classification tasks (Kimchi, 2014). Finally, although the instruction to ‘freely view a 
stimulus in preparation for a later test’ might seem innocuous, it is has since been 
demonstrated that this is not the case. For example, eye movements in a free-view task 
exhibit different spatial and temporal characteristics with different time course profiles 
than eye movements in scene search, memorization, and evaluation tasks (Mills, 
Hollingworth, Van der Stigchel, Hoffman, & Dodd, 2011). It is not at all clear, therefore, 
whether the lack of interaction between global advantage and SOA is even meaningful, 
let alone indicative of a stable global advantage. 
Subsequent work suggests that the stationary assumption may be too strong. In 
particular, there is evidence that the availability of different levels of structure indeed 
change over time. Kimchi (1998) examined the microgenesis of the perceptual 
organization of hierarchical stimuli (i.e., the time course of the development of the 
percept) using a variant of Beller’s (1971) primed matching paradigm. Observers were 
presented with a prime (either a few- or many-element hierarchical pattern) followed by a 
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pair of test figures to be matched for identity. In the element-similarity test pair condition, 
the test figures were similar to the prime in their elements but different in their global 
configuration. In the configuration similarity test pair condition, the test figures were 
similar to the prime in their global configuration but different in their elements. By 
varying the duration of the prime and constructing test figures that were similar to 
different aspects of the prime, this paradigm allowed changes in observers’ implicit 
perceptual representations over time to be measured. With few-element patterns, 
elements were primed at brief exposures whereas the configuration was primed at longer 
exposures. In contrast, with many-element patterns, the configuration was primed at brief 
exposures whereas elements were primed at longer exposures. Thus, the results of the 
microgenetic analysis show that the relative dominance of the global configuration and 
the local elements varies during the evolution of the percept, presumably as a result of 
grouping and individuation processes that operate in early perceptual processing (Kimchi, 
1998). 
Compatible findings have been observed using hybrid images (i.e., stimuli in 
which low-spatial frequency components of one picture are superimposed on the high-
spatial frequency components of a different picture). Using such stimuli, Schyns and 
Oliva (1994) showed that with short viewing durations the low-spatial frequency picture 
is perceived whereas with longer viewing durations the high-spatial frequency picture is 
perceived. It is interesting that changes in the availability of global features have been 
detected when the compound stimulus contained response-related elements (Kimchi, 
1998; Schyns & Oliva, 1994) but not when it did not (Navon, 1991). This suggests that 
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global and local processing may differ as a function of the locus of response-related 
elements. 
1.2.4.2 Source of Global Precedence. Whether the source of global precedence 
resides in perception or attention is a matter of intense debate (Kimchi, 1992, 2014; 
Miller, 1981a,b; Navon, 1981, 2003). Two broad classes of mechanisms of level selection 
can be discriminated on the basis of how the issue of source is handled. Perceptual 
accounts (Andres & Fernandes, 2006; Broadbent, 1977; Han et al., 1997; Han & 
Humphreys, 1999; Kimchi, 1998; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2004; Miller & Navon, 2002; 
Navon, 1977, 1991, 2003; Paquet, 1999; Paquet & Merikle, 1988; Sanocki, 2001) are 
based on the concept of availability in the percept and suggest that global precedence 
arises as a result of early perceptual organizational processes (Han & Humphreys, 2002; 
Kimchi, 1998, 2000, 2003a,b). It has also been suggested that global dominance arises 
from a sensory mechanism—faster processing of low spatial frequencies than high spatial 
frequencies (Badcock, Whitworth, Badcock, & Lovegrove, 1990; Han et al., 2002; 
Hughes, Fendrich, & Reuter-Lorenz, 1990; Shulman, Sullivan, Gish, & Sakoda, 1986; 
Shulman & Wilson, 1987). Although the differential processing rate of low and high 
spatial frequencies may play a role in global and local perception, it cannot account for 
several findings, such as the effects of meaningfulness and goodness of form on global 
precedence (Poirel, Pineau, & Mellet, 2006; Sebrechts & Fragala, 1985) among others 
(Behrmann & Kimchi, 2003; Kimchi, 2000). In contrast, attentional accounts (Boer & 
Keuss, 1982; Miller, 1981a,b; Ward, 1982) are based on the concepts of physical salience 
of features and attentional resources (i.e., effort). This view is supported by findings 
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demonstrating that attention can modulate global precedence (Kinchla et al., 1983; Lamb 
et al., 2000; Robertson, 1996). Of course, as noted by Navon (2003), attention can 
magnify biases that originate prior to the focusing of attention. Similarly, an effect that 
arises at the perceptual level can be magnified by post-perceptual processes, such as those 
related to response (Miller & Navon, 2002). Perceptual accounts were the first to be 
proposed, but quickly gave way to attentional accounts. The evidence precipitating this 
shift is discussed next. 
Evidence for an attentional source of global advantage has been observed in 
studies examining whether global advantage is sensitive to manipulations of attention. In 
light of such findings, it has been suggested that relative discriminabilities of the global 
and local levels determine global or local precedence effects (Pomerantz, 1983). Several 
findings are in accordance with this notion. Kinchla and Wolfe (1979) found that when 
the large (global) letter was small, the target was located faster on the global level than 
the local level. In contrast, the effect was reversed for larger displays. Kinchla and Wolfe 
suggested that there is an optimal size for stimuli, with forms larger/smaller than this 
optimum disadvantaged in speed of processing. These findings suggest that Navon’s 
(1977) finding of global precedence may have been due to the fact that the global level 
was simply easier to perceive than the local. Martin (1979) varied the number of local 
letters used to construct a global letter. With dense global letters (i.e., many-element 
patterns), global precedence was observed, whereas with sparse global letters (i.e., few-
element patterns), local precedence was observed. Hoffman (1980) manipulated the 
relative discriminability of the global and local levels directly by selectively distorting the 
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form of the stimuli at the two levels. When the local level was distorted (via elimination 
of fragments of the local letters), global precedence was observed. In contrast, when the 
global level was distorted (via elimination of fragments of the global letter), local 
precedence was observed. Miller (1981a) found that participants searching for a target 
letter in a letter composed of letters respond faster when targets are present at both levels, 
global and local, relative to when a target was present only at the global level. This 
suggests that both levels became available at roughly the same time. It was further 
demonstrated that a race model, which assumes that detection of targets at the global 
level occurs often, but not necessarily faster than local ones (Hoffman, 1980), was 
incompatible with the observed distribution of response times. In light of this finding, 
Miller concluded that global precedence is not perceptual, instead residing in a post-
perceptual stage of attention or decision. In other words, decision and response selection 
processes, rather than those of property extraction and detection, operate global-to-local.2 
Similarly, Ward (1982) suggested that the source of global advantage may be at the stage 
of feature integration, a stage which has been assumed to require focal attention 
                                                 
2 Three points are worth noting (Navon, 1981). First, asymmetric interference effects 
(Miller, 1981a, Experiment 2) do not necessarily entail perceptual precedence. Though 
perceptual precedence is not the only explanation for asymmetric interference (i.e., 
perceptual dominance), it is in some cases the most reasonable one. Second, finding that 
a stimulus-specific response is faster to the presence of the stimulus in two levels than to 
its presence in just one level does not rule out perceptual precedence of one of those 
channels. As global precedence does not entail that global and local information cannot 
interact in their effects on responses, the finding that they do is not incompatible with 
global precedence. Third, the notion that effects considered to be attentional must be 
post-perceptual is debatable. In particular, it is questionable that attention or decision are 
applied only to the resultant of perception rather than determining it or constituting part 
of it. 
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(Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Moreover, Boer and Keuss (1982) found initial similar time 
courses for global and local detection, concluding that the absence of an initial global 
advantage argues for a post-perceptual locus of the effect, somewhere between perception 
and response selection. Likewise, Hughes et al. (1984) suggested that global precedence 
is the result of greater inhibitory influences from global than from local channels of 
information (but see Paquet & Merikle, 1988). Taken together, these studies make a 
compelling case that a host of factors determine baseline discriminabilities at the local 
and global levels. Yet, none was informative as to whether global or local precedence 
will occur once discriminabilities have been matched. Pomerantz (1983) provided key 
data in this regard, showing that while some cases of global precedence are due to greater 
discriminability of the global level and thus demonstrate only that more discriminable 
stimuli are harder to ignore (i.e., factors involved in discriminability dictate the 
precedence of the global or local level), other cases of global precedence can be observed 
even once the levels had been equated on discriminability. 
 Caveat. Following these studies, the preponderant conclusion in the literature was 
a rejection of a perceptual source of global advantage in favor of a post-perceptual one. 
Even Navon (2003) was tempted to attribute the effect to allocation of visual attention, 
for two reasons. First, the effect clearly reflects some sort of bias, and bias tends to be 
associated with attentional selection. Second, direct and indirect manipulations of 
attention often modulate the effect. Importantly, however, as attention may enhance 
biases generated before the focusing of attention, it is plausible that the bias in favor of 
the global level may originate in preattentive processing. In support, global effects are 
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exerted by unattended objects (Paquet, 1992; Paquet & Merikle, 1988) and resist attempts 
to eliminate them via manipulations of attention (Paquet, 1992, 1994; Paquet & Wu, 
1994). 
At this point, it is important to distinguish between a global-to-local bias for 
perceptual processing on the one hand, and a global-to-local bias for categorization on the 
other. It is one thing to say that the global level is perceptually available prior to the local 
level, whereas it is quite another to say that the global level is categorized prior to the 
local level. The critical question is whether a global-to-local perceptual bias would be so 
constraining as to impose a global-to-local categorization scheme. There is some 
evidence suggesting this may be the case. Paquet and Merikle (1988) examined whether 
global advantage originates during preattentive processing by evaluating the effects of 
global and local aspects of nonattended figures on the processing of attended figures. 
They found that the global aspect of a nonattended figure was categorized regardless of 
whether attention was directed toward the global or the local aspect of the attended 
figure, though, it was not invariably identified. In agreement with previous findings in 
directed attention global/local tasks (e.g., Navon, 1977), global advantage was observed 
with attended figures. On the basis of these findings, they suggested that a mandatory 
global processing, at least to the level of stimulus categorization, takes place during 
preattentive perceptual processing and that it might be the reason for the dominance of 
the global level of attended objects. Recent evidence from studies of natural scene 
perception also support this conclusion (e.g., Greene & Oliva, 2009). In contrast, Schyns 
and Oliva’s (1997, 1999) work with spatial scale suggests that this is probably not the 
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case as scale selection can vary flexibly depending on the nature of the categorization 
task. This work suggests that biases in early vision do not necessarily translate into the 
same biases in categorization. 
To determine the extent of processing of unattended information, it is common to 
manipulate semantic or identity information of the unattended items. If there is no effect 
of their identity on target processing, it is assumed that unattended items are not 
identified. Duncan (1981) questioned this logic by pointing out that even though selection 
may be efficient (i.e., ignored items have little effect on responses to targets), this does 
not imply that the unselected items have not been analyzed semantically. However, it is 
equally clear that the influence of unattended items is clear evidence that those items 
have been analyzed to at least the semantic level. A major problem is that most studies of 
selective attention have involved only one measure of semantic processing—that is, 
Stroop-type interference with the processing of the attended items as a function of the 
identity of the unattended items, or, in other words, whether the response indicated by 
this unattended item is compatible or incompatible with the response indicated by the 
attended item (e.g., Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Kahneman & Henik, 1981; Paquet & 
Merikle, 1988). An obvious weakness of any study of selective attention that relies on 
one measure of the processing of unattended items is that the failure to find an effect of 
their identity does not mean that they have not been identified. It is entirely conceivable 
that some other measure might have revealed extensive semantic analysis (Allport, 
Tipper, & Chmiel, 1985; Driver & Tipper, 1989). 
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Taken together, these studies highlight the difficulty in localizing the source of 
global advantage. In turn, the issue of source remains controversial, with differing views 
emphasizing different points in the course of processing the global advantage manifests. 
There are at least two reasons for this difficulty in localizing global advantage. One is 
that the manifestation of an effect in a post-perceptual process (e.g., response 
competition) does not, by itself, rule out the possibility that the effect originated in earlier 
perceptual processing. The second is that different tasks may tap different stages of 
processing or elicit different optional strategies available to the processing system. With 
hierarchical stimuli and separable dimensions, selective attention may be possible in one 
task but not in another, depending on the likelihood of dimensional output conflict. This 
suggests that dimensional analysis is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
successful selective attention to a stimulus dimension. Similarly, local properties may be 
extracted before the stage of complete identification of the global configuration, 
depending on task demands; however, this does not rule out the possibility that in early 
stages of perceptual processing, global properties are available before the local ones. 
Further complicating matters is that speed of processing and interference, the two 
experimental effects on which the global precedence hypothesis was based, do not always 
covary (Amirkhiabani & Lovegrove, 1999; LaGasse, 1993; Lamb & Robertson, 1988, 
1989; Navon & Norman, 1983) and, therefore, may reflect different modes of processing 
(Navon & Norman, 1983) or even separate mechanisms (Robertson & Lamb, 1991). A 
better method of testing for advantage, therefore, seems prudent, a point elaborated on 
next. 
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1.3 Limitations of Previous Research 
Inappropriate conditions for assessing the obligatory nature of precedence 
effects: Need to equate likelihood of level-specific processing between levels. Navon’s 
global precedence hypothesis (1977) relates to the processing of stimulus structure and is 
concerned with the temporal organization of perceptual processes in the course of 
identifying an attended object. It states that the perceptual system is predisposed to 
process global compared with local information. Thus, Navon’s hypothesis is one about a 
processing disposition. Testing for the existence of a disposition is not quite 
straightforward since it constitutes just one vector in a complex space in which vectors 
are not necessarily orthogonal and so might be counteracted by modulating factors in 
certain real-world situations. Hence, the test of any disposition (e.g., in favor of the left 
side of the visual field) requires proper control and possibly special conditions. 
To test the global precedence hypothesis, therefore, global and local structure 
must carefully be controlled for. In particular, if the question is whether global 
precedence may be conceptualized as a processing disposition (Navon, 1977), then it is 
prudent to test for such a disposition under conditions unlikely to modulate it. Such 
conditions, in which attempts are made to equate processing load between, have been 
discussed at length (Navon, 1977, 1981, 2003). Testing whether a disposition exists, 
however, requires a further equivalency consideration: the likelihood of processing, not 
only the load of processing. In other words, testing whether a disposition exists requires 
that each level be equated in terms of likelihood of processing—not only the option to 
process either level but also the option to process neither level (Navon, 2003). For 
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instance, even if one finds evidence in a divided attention paradigm for obligatory global 
processing, it may be that this evidence depended on the global level being task-relevant 
(not just task-relevant on a given trial, as any conclusion drawn is based on the whole 
task; Iglesias-Fuster, Santos-Rodríguez, Trujillo-Barreto, & Valdés-Sosa, 2014). 
To examine this, one would ideally need to incorporate a compound stimulus that 
can be ignored while simultaneously generating a measureable response. In all previous 
studies of global and local processing dynamics, however, participants have been 
required to process the critical compound stimulus in a goal-directed manner via task and 
stimulus parameters that emphasize global or local characteristics. Importantly, this 
assumes that the task itself has no bearing on processing, which may not be the case. For 
instance, if a task representation for letter identification biased attention toward more 
local levels, it could be that the local level was salient and therefore attention bypassed 
the global level. Or, it could be that global processing still occurred but progressed to a 
more local level without significant cost (an especially likely possibility given that the 
task was always repeated). Moreover, processing of global cues—as a disposition—may 
not automatically lead to subsequent processing of local levels. A disposition account 
makes no claims as to how task-relevant global features are processed, it only makes 
claims about how global features of an attended object tend to be processed ceteris 
paribus or before accounting for moderating factors such as task—as is the essence of a 
disposition (i.e., that which existed before experience). As such, the intent to process one 
level and ignore another precludes any possibility of establishing whether processing of 
one level was obligatory. This is because signal amplification and suppression 
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mechanisms of attention are dissociable (Remington & Folk, 2001). This means that a 
critical piece of the global/local puzzle has been ignored: does early global precedence 
and late local precedence also occur obligatorily in the absence of task demands and, 
furthermore, is the temporal ordering of processing fixed or flexible? The challenge is 
how to do it. 
1.4 Incidental Processing 
Proposed method: Incidental processing and the compound arrow cueing 
paradigm. One method for simply sidestepping the non-trivial issue of task-relevancy is 
to use a less invasive measure of processing. The method suggested in the current thesis 
is to measure global and local processing in a situation that does not require participants 
to process or respond to the critical hierarchical stimulus. The current thesis refers to the 
sort of processing in such a situation as incidental (cf. Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Hyde & 
Jenkins, 1973; Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). Operationally, incidental processing 
is defined in the compound arrow cueing paradigm as processing of a hierarchical 
stimulus when information at different levels of structure is uninformative (does not aid 
task performance) and task-irrelevant (does not need be processed to perform the task). In 
the compound arrow cueing paradigm, the basic methodology of traditional global/local 
tasks is retained but instead of measuring performance on a classification task, 
performance will be measured on a Posner-style spatial cueing task. The importance of 
visual attention and the spatial cueing paradigm with respect to the current thesis is 
described next. 
1.5 Visual Attention 
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 This section reviews concepts, paradigms, and theories in the visual attention 
literature with respect to their importance in pursuing the objectives of the current thesis 
outlined in Table P.1. Namely, this section describes bottom-up and top-down control of 
attention; their measurement within the spatial cueing paradigm; and, most critically to 
the current thesis, symbolic control of attention. 
1.5.1 Bottom-Up and Top-Down Control of Attentional 
Everyday visual environments generally contain more information than can be 
processed within a glance. As such, goal-directed perception and action depend on 
mechanisms of selective visual attention for prioritizing an endless stream of sensory 
input, giving more weight or resources to a subset of relevant objects, locations, or events 
that require immediate or sustained processing. To understand how attention is prioritized 
and allocated to visual stimuli, a useful distinction is that between bottom-up and top-
down attentional control, with the former driven by the physical characteristics of a 
stimulus and the latter by the current goals of the observer (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Itti & Koch, 2000; Jonides, 1981; 
Posner, 1980; see Yantis, 2000, for a review). For example, an abrupt visual onset may 
on the one hand capture attention in a purely stimulus-driven manner (Enns, Austen, Di 
Lollo, Rauschenberger, & Yantis, 2001; Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1986; 
Theeuwes, 1990, 1994; Yantis & Jonides, 1984). On the other hand, capture may be 
contingent on the top-down attentional set of an observer such that the onset captures 
attention only if it shares a feature with an item in the set (Folk & Remington, 1998; 
Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992). Thus, with bottom-up attention, selection is driven 
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by the physical properties of a stimulus, such as its luminance and contrast, and this is 
considered to be automatic (i.e., involuntary, unconscious, and capacity free; Schneider & 
Shiffrin, 1977). With top-down attention, selection is driven by current selection goals, 
task instructions, and associative learning, and is considered to be effortful (i.e., 
voluntary, conscious, and capacity limited). It is not the case, however, that one operates 
independent of the other at all times. Rather, both frequently operate in parallel, with 
either bottom-up or top-down attentional selection having greater influence at different 
points in time (van Zoest, Donk, & Theeuwes, 2004; van Zoest & Donk, 2005). These 
two forms of attention have been studied widely within the spatial cueing paradigm, as 
described next. 
1.5.2 Spatial Cueing Paradigm 
One of the most widely used methods for studying both the bottom-up and top-
down control of attention is the spatial cueing paradigm. Introduced by Posner (1980; 
Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980), the spatial cueing paradigm (Figure 1.3) requires 
observers to respond to a target appearing at a peripheral location previously indicated by 
a spatial cue (valid condition) or at a different location (invalid condition). Attentional 
influence on performance is measured in terms of spatial cueing effects, or the difference 
in response time (RT) between valid and invalid cues. Two broad categories of cues have 
been used to tap into bottom-up and top-down attentional orienting: peripheral cues (e.g., 
the brightening of a peripheral location), which are thought to reveal characteristics of 
bottom-up control (Posner, 1980), and central cues (e.g., a spatially informative 
directional arrow presented at a centrally fixated location), which are thought to reveal 
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characteristics of top-down control (Jonides, 1981). Importantly, peripheral cues are 
spatially non-predictive of the target’s location, allowing cueing effects to be attributed to 
bottom-up capture. When a cue is presented and it does not predict target location, then 
there is no reason to voluntarily allocate attentional resources to the cued location and so 
any effect of the cue can therefore be regarded as involving bottom-up capture (e.g., 
Prinzmetal, McCool, & Park, 2005; Wright & Richard, 2000). The temporal 
characteristics of attentional influence are commonly investigated by manipulating the 
interval between the cue stimulus and the onset target (i.e., stimulus-onset-asynchrony; 
SOA). With peripheral cues, the standard finding is that responses to the valid location 
are facilitated at short SOAs (within as little as 100 ms after the cue; Posner, Cohen, & 
Rafal, 1982; Warner, Joula, & Koshino, 1990). After some critical SOA (~300 ms after 
the cue), participants are typically slower on valid trials than on invalid trials, a 
phenomenon known as inhibition of return (IOR; Posner & Cohen, 1984). 
In contrast, central cues are spatially predictive of the target’s location, allowing 
cueing effects to be attributed to top-down control. When a cue is presented and it does 
predict target location (e.g., the direction of the arrow predicts the target’s location on 
75% of trials), then there is reason to voluntarily allocate attentional resources to the cued 
location and so any effect of the cue can therefore be regarded as involving top-down 
attention. The standard finding with central cues is that responses to the valid location are 
facilitated for all SOAs longer than some critical SOA (~500 ms after the cue), with no 
evidence of IOR at these longer intervals (Posner & Cohen, 1984; Wright & Richard, 
2000). If the SOA is very short, cueing effects tend to be small or absent, presumably 
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because it takes time for the cue to be encoded (Müller & Rabbitt, 1989) and for its 
impact on control processes to unfold (Pratt & Hommel, 2003). Thus, the effects of top-
down attention (measured with predictive, central cues) can be statistically independent 
of bottom-up attention (measured with non-predictive, peripheral cues; Berger, Henik, & 
Rafal, 2005; see also Lupiáñez, Decaix, Siéroff, Chokron, Milliken, & Bartolomeo, 
2004). 
 
Figure 1.3. Posner’s spatial cueing paradigm. Two broad categories of cues have been 
used within the spatial cueing paradigm to measure bottom-up and top-down attentional 
control: peripheral cues such as the brightening of a peripheral location (right panel), 
which are thought to reveal characteristics of bottom-up control (Posner, 1980), and 
central cues such as a spatially predictive directional arrow (left panel), which are thought 
to reveal characteristics of top-down control (Jonides, 1981). 
1.5.3 Symbolic Control of Attention 
As noted above, in the spatial cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980; Posner, Snyder, & 
Davidson, 1980) observers respond to a target appearing either at a peripheral location 
previously indicated by a spatial cue (valid condition) or at a different location (invalid 
condition). Two measurable effects of cue-target validity on responses can be observed: 
facilitation and inhibition. The signature of peripheral cueing is a biphasic pattern of 
response times such that early facilitation is followed by later inhibition of processing at 
+ 
Fixation cue 
Central cue 
Target + 
Fixation cue 
Peripheral cue 
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the cued location, whereas the signature of central cueing is a slowly arising, stationary 
pattern of facilitation (Funes, Lupiáñez, & Milliken, 2005). Though pervasive, the pattern 
is not universal. In particular, over the last decade numerous reports indicate that 
behaviorally relevant symbolic stimuli such as directional arrows can influence 
attentional control in ways that are distinct from the traditional top-down/bottom-up 
taxonomy (Gibson & Kingstone, 2006; Hommel, Pratt, Colzato, & Godijn, 2001; 
Hommel & Akyürek, 2009; Pratt & Hommel, 2003; Ristic & Kingstone, 2006, 2012). For 
example, Hommel et al. (2001) presented a centrally located directional arrow (e.g., <, >) 
or word (e.g., left, right) which was followed by a peripheral target requiring a detection 
response. Targets were detected more quickly when they appeared at the location 
indicated by the arrow or word (valid condition) than at another location (invalid 
condition). Importantly, this occurred even though these symbols were entirely irrelevant 
to the detection task, and observers were explicitly told that the symbols did not predict 
the location of the upcoming target (see also, Friesen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; Ristic & 
Kingstone, 2006, 2012; Ristic, Landry, & Kingstone, 2012). 
Similar findings have been observed for temporal words (e.g., tomorrow, 
yesterday; Weger & Pratt, 2008; see also Ouellet, Santiago, Funes, & Lupiáñez, 2010), 
words relating to concrete concepts (e.g., head, foot; Estes, Verges, & Barsalou, 2008), 
words relating to abstract concepts (e.g., god, devil; Chasteen, Burdzy, & Pratt, 2010), 
pictures relating to abstract concepts (e.g., liberal, conservative; Mills, Smith, Hibbing, & 
Dodd, 2015), numbers (Fischer, Castel, Dodd, & Pratt, 2003), and letters (Dodd, Van der 
Stigchel, Leghari, Fung, & Kingstone, 2008). Taken together, these findings indicate that 
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a broad range of visual symbols can produce unintentional shifts of attention (but see 
Fattorini, Pinto, Rotondaro, & Doricchi, 2015, for alternative conclusions). Outside of the 
traditional top-down/bottom-up dichotomy, therefore, considerable evidence exists 
indicating that various kinds of symbolic information presented at fixation produce 
unintentional shifts of attention to peripheral locations compatible with the meaning of 
the symbol. In particular, symbolic cues elicit early facilitation (similar to exogenous 
cues), but this facilitation is prolonged and unaccompanied by inhibition (similar to 
endogenous cues). Critical to the current thesis, symbolic cueing effects occur even when 
the cue is spatially uninformative and completely irrelevant to the primary target 
detection task, thereby displaying key properties of involuntary processes (Hasher & 
Zacks, 1979). This is critical because it is this involuntary aspect of symbolic attentional 
orienting on which the compound cueing paradigm used in the experiments reported in 
the current thesis capitalizes. As described in the next chapter, this paradigm is a novel 
method that combines spatial cueing and compound stimulus paradigms, and which 
draws on involuntary attentional orienting elicited by a spatially uninformative central 
arrow cues, in order to investigate global/local processing under incidental processing 
conditions, wherein global/local levels were uninformative (do not aid performance) and 
task-irrelevant (need not be processed to perform the task). 
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CHAPTER 2: THESIS OBJECTIVES, METHODS, AND HYPOTHESES 
2.0 Chapter Overview 
The goal of the current thesis is to investigate visual processing of hierarchical 
structure under incidental processing conditions. To do so, the current thesis pursues two 
broad objectives, each of which is met with multiple experiments. Chapter 2 describes 
these objectives (Section 2.1), as well as the general compound arrow cueing paradigm 
(Section 2.2) and the specific experiments (Section 2.3) designed to meet them. General 
analytic methods are also described (Section 2.4). 
2.1 Primary Objectives 
 There were two primary objectives, each met with a different set of experiments 
and a number of specific aims. Experiments 1-2 pursued the first objective and 
Experiments 3-5 pursued the second, which will be described in turn. 
Objective #1: To examine global and local processing in incidental perception 
of hierarchical structure. Two experiments investigate global and local processing in a 
situation that does not require an observer to process a critical hierarchical stimulus (i.e., 
incidental processing conditions; see Section 1.4). Experiment 1 tests Navon’s (1977) 
global precedence hypothesis under such conditions, namely, the temporal organization 
(Issue #1), availability (Issue #2), and nature (Issue #3) issues. Experiment 2 investigates 
these issues along a broader time course using a more sensitive manipulation of 
processing duration. 
Objective #2: To examine control of level-specific selection in perception of 
hierarchical structure. According to Desimone and Duncan (1995), objects in the visual 
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field compete for limited processing capacity and control of behavior. This competition is 
biased by bottom-up and top-down mechanisms, where bottom-up processing tends to 
parse figures from background and top-down processing tends to select objects relevant 
to current behavioral goals. Navon’s (1977) global precedence hypothesis relates global 
advantage and interference to the evolution of the percept, claiming that global properties 
have temporal precedence during the microgenesis of percept, possibly due to their 
earlier registration or speeded processing. Global precedence, therefore, can be seen as 
relative to bottom-up aspects of attentional processing, suggesting that attention may first 
be captured by properties of the global level. If so, biasing attention via top-down task-set 
representations or via bottom-up salience might affect global and local processing. Three 
experiments investigate top-down and bottom-up aspects of attentional control in 
selection of level-specific information (Issue #4). In particular, these experiments 
examine the roles of current task goals (Experiment 3), physical salience (Experiment 4), 
and attentional focusing (Experiment 5) in controlling level-specific selection. 
To meet these objectives, global and local processing was measured within a 
novel, compound arrow cueing paradigm. This paradigm is described next (Section 2.2), 
followed by a description of the specific aims, measures, and hypotheses for each 
experiment (Section 2.3).  
2.2 Compound Arrow Cueing Paradigm 
The current thesis introduces a method that combines spatial cueing and 
compound stimulus paradigms (Figure 2.1), and which capitalizes on the involuntary 
aspect of attentional orienting elicited by central arrow cues, in order to investigate global 
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and local processing under incidental processing conditions—that is, where global and 
local levels are spatially uninformative (do not predict target location and thus cannot aid 
detection performance) and task-irrelevant (do not need to be processed in order to 
perform the detection task). The task is peripheral target detection—a target is presented 
to the left or right of a centrally presented, spatially uninformative, task-irrelevant 
compound arrow cue, and observers are instructed to press a button as quickly as possible 
once a target is detected. Compound arrow cues are either consistent (global and local 
arrows pointed at the same location), inconsistent (global and local arrows pointed at 
opposite locations), local-neutral (global arrow composed of local rectangles), or global-
neutral (global rectangle composed of local arrows). Consistent cues are valid when 
arrows at both global and local levels point to the location where the target is presented 
and are invalid otherwise. Local-neutral cues are valid when the arrow at the global level 
points to the location where the target is presented and are invalid otherwise. Global-
neutral cues are valid when arrows at the local level point to the location where the target 
is presented and invalid otherwise. As inconsistent cues are technically always valid 
given that either the global or local arrow is always pointed to the location where the 
target is presented, the validity states for this cue type are referred to as global-valid and 
local-valid. Accordingly, inconsistent cues are global-valid when the arrow at the global 
level points to the location where the target is presented and local-valid when arrows at 
the local level point to the location where the target is presented. The response time 
difference between global-valid and local-valid conditions is used to measure level-
specific spatial cueing effects (i.e., global or local advantage, where global advantage 
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refers to a speed advantage in responding to targets presented at the global-valid location 
relative to the local-valid location and local advantage refers to a speed advantage in 
responding to targets presented at the local-valid location relative to the global-valid 
location). SOA is manipulated to test whether global or local advantage varies with 
relative stimulus availability. The rationale is that the priming potency of a level varies 
with SOA in correspondence with how early that level is processed (cf. Navon, 1991; 
Kimchi, 1998). Critically, as the compound arrow cue is incidental to the target detection 
task, and can therefore safely be ignored, this provides an opportunity to determine 
whether the global-to-local processing sequence is obligatory. 
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Figure 2.1. Compound arrow cues, validity conditions, and example trial sequence in the 
compound arrow cueing paradigm used to measure global and local processing in the 
experiments reported in the current thesis. 
2.3 Experiments in Order of Presentation 
2.3.1 Experiment 1: Global and Local Processing in Incidental Perception 
Experiment 1 investigates the effect of globality (i.e., cue-level: global or local) 
and processing duration (i.e., SOA) on symbolic control of attentional orienting under 
incidental processing conditions. To do so, the compound arrow cueing paradigm 
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described in Section 2.2 is used (see Figure 2.1 for example cue stimuli and trial 
sequence). There are two specific aims. The first aim is to determine whether early global 
dominance and a shift from global to local processing are obligatory by presenting task-
irrelevant symbolic cues that have both global and local interpretations. By capitalizing 
on the well-known effects of non-predictive, task-irrelevant central arrow cues on 
fixation (i.e., obligatory orienting in the direction consistent with the meaning of the cue, 
even when the cue is task-irrelevant), the compound arrow cueing paradigm is able to 
determine the manner in which global/local processing modulates symbolic cuing 
effects—importantly, this provides an opportunity to determine whether early global 
precedence and late local precedence occurs even in the absence of task demands. A 
second aim is to test the prediction that the availability (i.e., priority or dominance) of 
global information is stationary throughout the course of processing (Navon, 1977). The 
SOA factor represents a manipulation of the availability of processed visual information, 
with the test for stationarity given by the interaction of globality and SOA (Kimchi, 1998; 
Navon, 1991). 
Measures. Global/local phenomena have been measured almost exclusively with 
Stroop-like interference, though, this is not the only available measure and, even by 
Navon’s (2003) own account, probably not the best and sometimes not even appropriate 
(e.g., Navon, 1991). Thus, although Stroop-like interference is almost always used to 
measure global/local phenomena, this is not a requirement (contrary to some claims, e.g., 
Pomerantz, 1983) and was not adopted for measuring precedence in the current 
experiments. Rather, in the compound arrow cueing paradigm used here, global/local 
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advantage was measured by comparing response times to global-valid targets with 
response times to local-valid targets (global-valid minus local-valid). Thus, positive 
values would reflect a cueing effect due to the local level (local advantage), whereas 
negative values would reflect a cueing effect due to the global level (global advantage). 
Moreover, along the lines of Hoffman (1980), interference was measured by comparing 
RTs in trials with cues whose levels agreed (consistent cues) with those in which they 
conflicted (inconsistent cues). Finally, change in availability of the percept was measured 
by the function relating level-specific cueing effects with SOA. 
Hypotheses. Navon’s (1977) global precedence hypothesis suggests that 
information at the global level is prioritized in the development of the percept. In the 
compound arrow cueing paradigm, a significant spatial cueing effect with inconsistent 
cues would indicate a processing advantage at one level, with the direction of the cueing 
effect (whether the global or local level is directed at the target) indicating which of the 
levels held the advantage. As symbolic cueing effects are obligatory (Gibson & 
Kingstone, 2006; Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel & Akyürek, 2009; Pratt & Hommel, 
2003; Ristic & Kingstone, 2006, 2012), and given that there is no a priori reason to 
process or select one level over the other, the finding of global advantage would provide 
strong evidence for the inevitability of global processing. Furthermore, according to 
Navon’s (1977) global precedence hypothesis, global advantage is attributable to global 
information being more available or active in all stages of processing (i.e., there is 
stationary availability in the global percept). In the compound arrow cueing paradigm, the 
SOA manipulation represents a manipulation of availability in the percept. Accordingly, 
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global precedence predicts that global advantage should not vary with SOA. In contrast, 
if the availability of a particular level is modulated, then the effect of globality should 
vary with SOA. Thus, an effect of SOA on global advantage would not support Navon’s 
(1977) perceptual global precedence hypothesis. It would be consistent with a weaker 
version, however, in which the availability of global level can be modulated over time 
(Navon, 1991). 
2.3.2 Experiment 2: Capturing Time Sensitive Effects  
Experiment 2 examines the time course of global and local processing with the 
goal of mapping the time course of change as it relates to the global and local processing 
advantage. Critically, in Experiment 2, a more sensitive method and analytic approach for 
making fine-grain measurements of the effect of processing duration on global and local 
processing biases is used. To do so, SOA was manipulated by sampling values across a 
broad range SOAs within three discrete, theoretically motivated intervals U(a, b), where a 
is the minimum SOA value within interval U and b is its maximum: the first interval, 
U(100, 300), reflects SOA values for which global processing is expected to dominate; 
the second interval, U(400, 600), reflects values for which global processing is expected 
to transition to local processing; and the third interval, U(700, 900), reflects values for 
which local processing is expected to dominate. 
Measures. Advantage, interference, and availability are measured the same as in 
Experiment 1. Two additional measures are 1) micro-level change in the magnitude of 
spatial cueing effects (i.e., change within an SOA interval), which tests whether change 
in advantage proceeds more continuously or discretely, and 2) macro-level change in the 
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magnitude of spatial cueing effects (i.e., change between SOA intervals in how much 
change occurred within an SOA interval). As local processing is generally conceived as 
volitional, at least more so than global processing, examination of macro-level change 
affords a test of whether volitional biases are constant over time, or at least change over 
time less so than automatic biases associated with global processing. 
Hypotheses. A stationary account of global precedence predicts that a global 
cueing effect should be observed and should remain stationary across SOAs given that, 
not only is global information available earlier (which accounts for the global advantage), 
but that its availability does not decline over time, not even when local information is 
being processed (which accounts for the obligatory nature of global advantage and the 
preponderance of asymmetric, global-to-local interference patterns in global/local tasks). 
Accordingly, as in Experiment 1, support for this account is the finding that, with 
inconsistent cues, global advantage does not vary with SOA. In contrast, if the 
availability of a particular level is modulated, then the effect of globality should vary 
with SOA. The test of micro-level change (reflecting incremental change within an SOA 
interval) is the jump by validity interaction. If the interaction is not significant, this would 
indicate that there was no change in the availability of the percept between SOA 
intervals, which would suggest that change progressed more gradually. If the interaction 
is significant, this would indicate that there was significant change in the availability of 
the percept between SOA intervals, which would suggest that change progressed more 
discretely. The test of macro-level change (reflecting change between SOA intervals in 
how much change occurred within an SOA interval) is the within-SOA slope by validity 
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interaction for conditions conspiring to produce local precedence (e.g., longer SOAs). If 
the interaction is not significant when examined around the point in time that local 
processing is expected to occur or dominate, U(700, 900), this would indicate that there 
was no change in the percept during this interval, which would suggest that local 
processing was volitional and constant over time. In contrast, if the interaction is 
significant for U(700, 900), this would indicate that there was change in the percept 
during this interval, which would in turn suggest that local processing was less volitional 
than previously considered. This would especially be the case given that, under incidental 
processing conditions, its ebb and flow in dominance was likely obligatory as there was 
no top-down or bottom-up basis for biasing level-specific information toward a particular 
level, let alone in a temporally prescribed order. 
2.3.3 Experiment 3: Role of Top-Down Task Set  
Task-relevant items may be located at different levels of stimulus structure 
(global or local level). Previous research suggests that processing of items at one level 
tends to dominate processing of items at the other, with level-dominance determined by 
the task-relevancy of items at a given level (Grice, Canham, & Boroughs, 1983; Morrison 
& Schyns, 2001; Schyns & Oliva, 1997). Experiment 3, therefore, examines whether the 
influence of competing symbolic stimuli at different levels of structure on attentional 
control depends on top-down selection processes (manipulated via level-specific 
orienting tasks). Each trial consists of two major events (Figure 2.2). First, a spatially 
uninformative compound arrow cue is presented at fixation. Second, after a variable 
SOA, a peripheral target is presented requiring a simple detection response. Participants 
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are instructed that their primary task is target detection, but that they should also perform 
one of two secondary tasks. In the global-orienting task, arrow cues are oriented either 
perfectly in-line with or slightly above or below the horizontal line and participants are 
instructed to try and remember the orientation of the big arrow. In the local-orienting 
task, one of the local arrows is a color singleton and participants are instructed to try and 
remember its location. Following the detection response, a test display is shown 
presenting two compound arrows, and participants are instructed to select the one that 
matches what they had just seen. 
 
Figure 2.2. Compound arrow cues and validity conditions, as well as example trial 
sequences, in Experiment 3. The left panel shows example cue stimuli used for the global 
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orienting task, in which the orientation of the global arrow was task-relevant. The right 
panel shows example cue stimuli used for the local orienting task, in which the location 
of a color-singleton local arrow was task-relevant. 
Measures. Advantage, interference, and availability are measured the same as in 
Experiment 1. 
Hypotheses. One possibility is that the level that is relevant to the current task 
goal will be selected, and the arrow at this task-relevant level will then produce an 
unintentional shift of attention. Evidence for this hypothesis comes from research on the 
role of control settings in attentional capture. The framework of attentional control 
settings (Folk et al., 1992) proposes that the processing of a stimulus feature is contingent 
on the task goal at hand such that only stimuli possessing a task-relevant feature can pass 
through a perceptual filter and enter working memory. Thus, the control setting account 
predicts that only the arrow that shares a critical feature specified by top-down control 
settings will be selected to control the allocation of attention. Another possibility is that 
the global level will be selected first regardless of task, and this global arrow will then 
produce an unintentional shift of attention. Evidence for this hypothesis comes from 
research on the role of global precedence in perception of hierarchical structure (Navon, 
1977). Such studies indicate that global properties can be extracted rapidly, suggesting 
that the potency of an arrow to evoke an unintentional shift of attention may depend on 
its globality (i.e., its relative position in hierarchical space). Thus, the global precedence 
account predicts that the global arrow will be selected to control the allocation of 
attention, independent of task. 
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2.3.4 Experiment 4: Role of Bottom-Up Salience  
Recent work has provided direct behavioral and neurophysiological evidence that 
salient but irrelevant singletons can be actively suppressed when top-down guidance is 
deployed (Gaspelin, Leonard, & Luck, 2015). It is unlikely, therefore, that differential 
local salience between tasks could be responsible for any differences between tasks or for 
the pattern of cueing effects in the local orienting task. Nonetheless, to be sure, an 
experiment testing this possibility is conducted. In this experiment, arrow cues are the 
same as those used in the local orienting task (i.e., cues contain a local color singleton) of 
Experiment 3. Participants perform the same target detection task as before but without 
any secondary orienting task. If the local color singleton captures attention, then 
participants should be faster to respond to targets appearing at the location indicated by a 
local singleton arrow relative to targets appearing at the mirror location (i.e., a local 
cueing effect). In the same vein, there should not be a cueing effect with cues in which 
the local color singleton is a rectangle (i.e., local-neutral cues). Alternatively, if the local 
color singleton is suppressed, then participants should be slower to respond to targets 
appearing at the location indicated by a local singleton arrow relative to targets appearing 
at the mirror location (i.e., an inhibition of return-like effect, or local anticueing effect). 
Furthermore, if the IOR-like effect is indeed due to suppression of the salience signal—as 
opposed to influence from the global level—then inconsistent cues (for which influence 
from the global level is possible) and global-neutral cues (for which influence from the 
global level is not possible) should show the same pattern of slower responses to targets 
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appearing at the local-valid (inconsistent cues) or the valid (global-neutral cues) location 
relative to the mirror location. 
Measures. Advantage, interference, and availability are measured the same as in 
Experiment 1. 
Hypotheses. The finding of a larger and more rapidly arising local advantage 
with cues containing a local color singleton compared with those that are homogenously 
colored would reflect a bottom-up attentional source of level-specific advantage. 
Alternatively, a finding of global advantage regardless of local salience would indicate 
that local salience does not invariably capture attention and produce cueing effects, at 
least not before the global level does, and would speak to a perceptual source. Similarly, 
the finding that local salience eliminates, but does not reverse, global advantage might 
suggest that global processing passively interfered with local processing (Navon, 1977, 
2008; Sanocki, 2001) or that local salience biased competition for selection between 
levels (Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel & Akyürek, 2009; Pratt & Hommel, 2003), for 
instance, by attenuating the availability of the global level and/or by enhancing the 
availability of the local level. In any case, either of these latter two possibilities would 
indicate that a local-level entry point for visual processing is not obligatory, even under 
conditions in which it might be expected. 
2.3.5 Experiment 5: Role of Attentional Focusing and Adjustments 
The zoom-lens metaphor of spatial attention captures the idea that visual attention 
can be allocated to differently sized regions of the visual field. Changing the level 
attended, therefore, can be seen as a redistribution of resources over a region that is 
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proportionally larger than the height of the level in the hierarchy (Castiello & Umiltà, 
1990; Eriksen & St. James, 1986). Accordingly, it is possible that global-local response 
time differences reflect the time needed to refocus attention from the global to the local 
level. There is ample evidence that a tradeoff exists between the size of the visual field 
over which attention is distributed and its resolution (Eriksen & St. James, 1986; Eriksen 
& Yeh, 1985) and that the size of such attentional focusing plays an important role in 
attentional control (Theeuwes, 2004). To this point, each of the current experiments 
require only simple detection responses to a 1° target. It is possible that such a simple 
(coarse) judgement might permit what Theeuwes (2004) has referred to as a wide 
attentional window. These studies suggest that the size of the attentional window is an 
important factor in determining whether an irrelevant color singleton will capture 
attention. For example, Belopolsky, Zwann, Theeuwes, and Kramer (2007) manipulated 
the size of the attentional window by requiring observers to detect either a global or a 
local shape prior to performing a search task. They found that attention was captured 
more often when the attentional window was induced to be wide (global shape detection) 
than when it was induced to be narrow (local shape detection). If detection responses to a 
1° target permit a wide attentional window, then the spatial cueing task may introduce a 
top-down bias towards global processing across all conditions. 
To examine this possibility, in Experiment 5, attentional focus is manipulated 
(Figure 2.3) along the lines of previous work (e.g., Belopolsky et al., 2007). If it is 
assumed that global and local levels are equated on salience, then the focused attention 
condition should prime a local advantage (because the effective visual field is smaller, 
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potentially omitting grouping cues). This would be evident by larger local cueing effects 
(with inconsistent and global-neutral cues) in the focused versus diffuse attention 
condition. In contrast, the diffuse attention condition should prime a global advantage 
(because the effective visual field is larger, encompassing all the items). Thus, in the 
diffuse attention condition there should be a bias toward global processing, which would 
be evident by a larger global cueing effect (with inconsistent and local-neutral cues) in 
the diffuse versus focused attention condition. However, if the local level contains a 
salient color singleton, then the focused attention condition should prime a local 
advantage (because the effective visual field is smaller, as well as because attention is 
allocated automatically to the singleton), and the diffuse attention condition should prime 
a local advantage commensurate with the focused attention condition (because, though 
the effective visual field may encompass the whole cluster of items, attention is allocated 
automatically to the singleton). 
 
Figure 2.3. Examples of the displays used to manipulate the size of the attentional 
window (focused or diffuse) in Experiment 5. In the focused attention condition, 
participants were to respond only when the local shape of the color singleton was a 
left/right arrow or rectangle (go trials) and to withhold responding when the local shape 
Focused Diffuse 
Go 
No-
Go 
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of the color singleton was an up/down arrow or rectangle (no-go trials). In the diffuse 
attention condition, participants were to respond only when the global shape was a 
left/right arrow or rectangle (go trials) and to withhold responding when the global shape 
was an up/down arrow or rectangle (no-go trials). 
Measures. Advantage, interference, and availability were measured the same as 
in Experiment 1. 
Hypotheses. The finding of a window-compatible, level-specific advantage 
regardless of processing duration would imply an alternative account of global/local 
processing phenomena, one predicated on the focusing an attentional window rather than 
availability in the percept (Cave & Chen, 2016). 
2.4 Analytic Method 
Response times less than 100 ms or greater than 1.5*interquartile range above 
condition means were removed (unless noted otherwise). Multilevel models with 
participants and display items as crossed (Experiment 1 and Experiments 3-5) or nested 
(Experiment 2) random effects (Hoffman & Rovine, 2007; Hoffman, 2015) were used to 
account for the imbalance in the number of observations across participants and arrow 
conditions. Although repeated measures designs have historically been analyzed via least 
squares analysis of variance (ANOVA) of subject or item means, this approach has 
significant limitations (e.g., listwise deletion, random intercepts only, use on aggregated 
data, limitations on kind of predictors, untestable and untenable assumptions). With 
respect to the current experiments, the main limitation relates to missing data and the 
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impact this might have on the (in)ability to estimate crucial random effect parameters, 
namely, by-subject random slopes.  
Previous simulation work has shown that random slope models that control for 
between-unit variability in the effects of predictors by estimating random slope 
parameters are critical in analysis of repeated measures designs (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, 
& Tily, 2013; Barr, 2013; Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015; Hoffman, 2015; 
Schielzeth & Forstmeier, 2009). For instance, Schielzeth and Forstmeier (2009) 
demonstrated that for data sets with between-subject grouping variables and within-
subject predictors, random slope models are superior to random intercept models both in 
reducing Type II errors for the between-subject predictor as well as reducing Type I 
errors for the within-subject predictors. Furthermore, if random intercept models were 
used inappropriately in such situations, they found a considerable risk of inflated Type I 
errors, depending on how pronounced the random slope variation was. These studies 
indicate that random slope models should be used in situations where effects of 
experimental manipulations are known or suspected to differ between subjects. 
The idea that the magnitude of the effect of an experimental manipulation can 
vary across subjects is not one typically entertained in repeated measures designs, though 
this is likely only because it is not possible to model such effects with least squares 
ANOVA. Least squares ANOVA does not tolerate missing data. As such, apart from 
fully-crossed designs with complete and balanced data—none of which apply to the 
current experiments—least squares ANOVA would not permit estimation of random 
slopes. This is especially problematic for the current experiments because global and 
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local processing biases are known to vary between individuals, meaning the ideal 
analysis would need to consider the effects of experimental manipulations only once 
random variation between individuals in the effect of that manipulation had been 
controlled for. Multilevel modeling, in contrast, offers substantial flexibility in this 
regard, including the capacity to a) explicitly represent and quantify how individuals 
differ in their effects of experimental manipulations, b) predict how individual 
differences can account for differential sensitivities to manipulations, and c) allow for the 
inclusion of incomplete data under the assumption that data are missing at random after 
controlling for the effects of predictors and for the outcomes from the same sampling unit 
(subjects or display items), which is more reasonable than that assumed by least squares 
ANOVA (missing completely at random). 
Data were analyzed via general (response times) and generalized (errors) linear 
mixed models with subjects and display items specified as crossed random effects 
(Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Hoffman, 2015) and by-subject random slopes for 
within-subject manipulations (Barr, 2013; Barr et al., 2013), data permitting. The 
significance of fixed effects was evaluated via Wald test p-values. The significance of 
random effects was evaluated via -2ΔLL tests (i.e., deviance difference test—likelihood 
ratio test using degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of estimated 
parameters). Where relevant, effect sizes were computed using Pseudo-R2 statistics 
(Singer & Willett, 2003), which reflect the change in each of the relevant variance 
components before and after including the effects of predictors. Response time models 
were estimated within SAS PROC MIXED using restricted maximum likelihood 
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estimation and Satterthwaite denominator degrees of freedom. Given that accuracy was a 
dichotomous outcome (correct or incorrect), for analysis of errors, a generalized linear 
function modeling the logit of the probability of an errant response was selected. 
Parameter estimates, therefore, are on a logit scale, which is unbounded and symmetric 
around zero. A logit of zero means that a response was equally likely to be incorrect as 
correct—i.e., a logit of zero is equivalent to a probability p of .50, where p = exp(logit) / 
(1 + exp(logit)). To facilitate interpretation, the mean logit of an error in each condition 
was transformed back onto the probability scale for plotting purposes using the equation 
above. Error models were estimated within SAS PROC GLIMMIX using maximum 
likelihood (ADQ) estimation (Laplace estimation was used if maximum likelihood 
estimates failed to converge) and either Satterthwaite or Kenward-Rogers denominator 
degrees of freedom (depending on which estimator was used). 
Ultimately, the present analytical approach is not a rejection of ANOVA in favor 
of multilevel modeling—ANOVA is a multilevel model (trials nested within subjects), it 
is simply one instantiation of a multilevel model that implies a very specific (co)-variance 
structure. The goal in using multilevel modeling was simply to assess this structure 
empirically, to account for extra sources of dependency if necessary (if there are no extra 
sources of dependency then the multilevel model and ANOVA yield identical inferential 
statistics for fixed effects), and to benefit from the advantages that multilevel modeling 
offers (more powerful and accurate assessment of fixed effects afforded via use of all 
observed responses instead of by-subject or by-item condition means). 
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CHAPTER 3: WHICH WAY IS WHICH? GLOBAL AND LOCAL PROCESSING 
IN INCIDENTAL PERCEPTION OF HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE 
3.0 Chapter Overview 
A novel method combining spatial cueing and compound stimulus paradigms 
draws on involuntary attentional orienting elicited by a spatially uninformative central 
arrow cue to investigate global/local processing under incidental processing conditions, 
wherein global/local levels were uninformative (do not aid performance) and task-
irrelevant (need not be processed to perform the task). The task was peripheral target 
detection. Cues were compound arrows, which were either consistent (global/local arrows 
oriented in same direction) or inconsistent (global/local arrows oriented in opposite 
directions). Global/local processing was measured by spatial cueing effects (response 
time difference between target locations validly cued by an arrow and targets at different 
locations), with the test of global/local advantage represented by the effect of cue-level 
for inconsistent cues (response time difference between global-valid and local-valid 
cues). The temporal asynchrony between presentation of the cue stimulus and the target 
onset (stimulus-onset-asynchrony; SOA) was manipulated to test whether global/local 
advantage varied with relative stimulus availability. Experiment 1.1 observed a cue-level 
by SOA interaction such that an early, large global cueing effect was followed by a later, 
smaller local cueing effect, indicative of a global-to-local shift in advantage. This 
occurred despite knowledge that global/local arrows were uninformative and task-
irrelevant and could therefore be ignored, thus displaying key properties of an 
involuntary process. Experiment 1.2 added neutral cues (arrow at one level, rectangle at 
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the other) and determined that the reversal was not due to inhibition of the globally-cued 
location or to attenuation of global information but rather to the presence of conflicting 
spatial information. Experiments 1.3 and 1.4 ruled out alternative accounts for these 
results. These data indicate global precedence in attended but incidentally processed 
objects. 
3.1 Introduction 
Visual scenes (scenes, objects, faces) can be conceptualized as containing global 
and local information, where global information corresponds to overall form and local 
information corresponds to finer-grain detail (Neisser, 1967). To examine how 
information across levels contributes to scene understanding, Navon (1977) presented a 
compound stimulus—a large global letter composed of smaller local letters—and 
instructed participants to respond to one level while ignoring the other. Navon found that 
the global level was responded to faster (global advantage) and was more difficult to 
ignore (global interference). To explain this finding, a global precedence hypothesis was 
proposed, whereby a disposition to register form grants processing priority to global 
information, resulting in early and temporally stable availability of this information. 
Thus, early availability explained the global advantage and temporal stability explained 
global interference. 
Global precedence is therefore a hypothesis about processing disposition. It 
provides a theoretical account of global advantage/interference but is not entailed by it, as 
highlighted by evidence that advantage and interference do not co-vary systematically 
(Amirkhiabani & Lovegrove, 1999; LaGasse, 1993; Lamb & Robertson, 1989; Navon & 
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Norman, 1983). That is, global precedence describes the course of visual processing, 
whereas global advantage and interference are simply phenomena that may or may not be 
observed as visual processing unfolds. Though advantage and interference may be 
related, they are independent and thus may arise for a variety of reasons. As such, global 
precedence can accommodate the observation of advantage or interference, but neither is 
required for its existence. To determine whether a disposition exists, each level must be 
equated in terms of likelihood of processing (Navon, 2003), which requires not only the 
option to process either level but also the option to process neither level. To examine this, 
one would ideally need to incorporate a compound stimulus that is task-irrelevant. In all 
previous studies of global/local processing, however, participants have been required to 
process a compound stimulus in a goal-directed or stimulus-driven manner via task 
instructions and stimulus parameters that emphasize global or local characteristics. As 
such, a crucial test of global precedence is missing: does global precedence characterize 
global/local processing in the absence of a direct demand for global or local processing? 
To examine this issue, the present study combines Navon’s (1977) compound stimulus 
paradigm with Posner’s (1980) spatial cueing paradigm to capitalize on recent evidence 
that central presentation of overlearned spatial symbols influences the distribution of 
spatial attention, even when these symbols are task-irrelevant. To our knowledge, this is 
the first time these paradigms have been combined. 
 In the traditional spatial cueing paradigm, participants respond to a target 
appearing at a peripheral location previously indicated by a spatial cue (valid condition) 
or at a different location (invalid condition). Cueing effects are measured as the 
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difference in response time (RT) between valid and invalid cues, with facilitation 
evidenced by faster RTs to cued locations. Traditionally, cueing effects have been 
dichotomized as either exogenous or endogenous on the basis of their magnitude and 
time course. Exogenous (involuntary) cueing effects are characterized by large, early, and 
transient facilitation followed by a period of inhibition (slower responses at cued versus 
uncued locations) whereas endogenous (voluntary) cueing effects are smaller, later, 
temporally stable, and unaccompanied by inhibition (see Funes et al., 2005, for a review). 
Over the last decade, however, numerous reports indicate that behaviorally relevant 
symbolic stimuli such as directional arrows can influence attentional control in ways that 
are distinct from the traditional exogenous-endogenous taxonomy (Gibson & Kingstone, 
2006; Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel & Akyürek, 2009; Pratt & Hommel, 2003; Ristic & 
Kingstone, 2006, 2012). In particular, symbolic cues elicit early facilitation, similar to 
exogenous cues, and prolonged facilitation unaccompanied by inhibition, similar to 
endogenous cues. Critically, symbolic cueing effects occur even when the cue is spatially 
uninformative and completely irrelevant to the primary target detection task (Friesen, 
Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007), thereby displaying key properties of involuntary processes 
(Hasher & Zacks, 1979). 
 Given that attention is involuntarily oriented in the direction consistent with the 
meaning of an arrow, the present study sought to measure global/local processing in 
terms of spatial cueing effects elicited by presentation of a compound arrow cue. 
Accordingly, when levels of a cue are inconsistent (directed at opposite locations), a 
global advantage would be revealed by a global cueing effect (faster RTs to targets at 
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global-valid versus local-valid locations). To examine whether availability of global 
information changes over time, stimulus-onset-asynchrony (SOA—time interval between 
compound-stimulus onset and target presentation onset) was varied (Navon, 1991). 
3.2 Experiment 1.1: Effect of Cue Globality on Peripheral Target Detection 
 The purpose of Experiment 1.1 was to test global precedence under incidental 
processing conditions. If a global advantage is attributable to earlier availability of global 
information, then inconsistent cues should elicit a global cueing effect. Furthermore, if 
the availability of global information is stable over time, then the magnitude of the global 
cueing effect should be stable across SOA. 
3.2.1 Methods 
Participants 
Fifty-two undergraduates from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln participated in 
exchange for course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
were naïve to the purpose of the experiment, and were informed of their rights of 
participation according to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln institutional review board. 
Three participants completed fewer than half of all trials and were excluded from 
analysis. 
Stimuli 
Cues were structured such that 26 local arrows (each subtending .625° x .50° 
visual angle) yielded a single global arrow (7.5° x 5.0°). Local arrows were outlined in 
black and presented on a white background. Testing took place on a Pentium IV 
computer with 17” monitor in a room equipped with soft lighting and sound attenuation. 
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Design and procedure 
There were 240 trials. A central fixation point began each trial and was replaced 
by the cue after 500 ms, which remained onscreen until a response. A variable SOA (250, 
500, 750 ms) preceded the onset of the target (a black circle subtending 1° visual angle). 
The intertrial interval was 1,500 ms. Cue direction and target location were presented 
with equal probability leftward or rightward and to the left or right of fixation, 
respectively. Participants were seated ~48 cm from the monitor and instructed to press 
the spacebar as quickly as possible when the target appeared while maintaining central 
fixation throughout. Participants were informed that central arrows were irrelevant to 
their task and did not predict target location. 
Compound arrow cues are shown in Figure 3.1a, the combinations of which may 
be classified by three factors: consistency (consistent, inconsistent), validity (valid, 
invalid), and cue-level (global, local). Consistent cues (global and local arrows oriented 
in the same direction) were either valid (both levels oriented toward the target) or invalid 
(both levels oriented away from the target). Inconsistent cues, in contrast, were always 
valid given that either the global or local level was always oriented toward the target. As 
such, this was a nested design with validity nested within consistent cues and cue-level 
(whether the global or local level was valid) nested within inconsistent cues. 
Furthermore, as the ratio of valid to invalid trials was consequently 3:1, the design was 
also unbalanced. To account for this fact, individual RTs were analyzed with the 
consistency factor specified as a multivariate outcome. 
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Figure 3.1. Compound arrow cues. A) Consistent and inconsistent cue conditions. B) 
Local-neutral and global-neutral cue conditions. 
3.2.2 Results 
 RTs less than 100 ms or greater than 2.5 SDs above condition means were 
removed (4.2%). Condition mean RTs are shown in Figure 3.2a. Overall, there was a 
significant main effect of SOA, F(2, 94) = 330.51, p < .001, reflecting faster RTs with 
increasing SOA. The main effect of consistency was not significant (F < 1); nor was its 
interaction with SOA, F(2, 94) = 2.49, p = .12. Importantly, cueing effects were observed 
with both consistent and inconsistent cues, which are shown in Figure 3.2b.    
 For consistent cues, the effect of validity was significant, F(1, 47) = 50.13, p < 
.001, such that RTs were faster for valid (M = 312) versus invalid cues (M = 326). The 
interaction of validity and SOA was not significant (F < 1) indicating that the cueing 
effect was stable across SOA. For inconsistent cues, the effect of cue-level was not 
significant (F < 1) but the interaction with SOA was, F(2, 94) = 14.36, p < .001. At SOA 
= 250 ms, there was a significant global cueing effect such that RTs were faster for 
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global-valid (M = 342) versus local-valid (M = 358) cues, t(48) = 4.50, p < .001. At SOA 
= 500 ms, the effect of cue-level was not significant, t(48) = -.80, p = .42. At SOA = 750 
ms, there was a significant local cueing effect, such that RTs were faster for local-valid 
(M = 291) versus global-valid (M = 301) cues, t(48) = -2.79, p = .005. 
 
Figure 3.2. Mean RTs and spatial cueing effects in Experiment 1.1 data. A) Mean RT for 
each cue by validity state as a function of SOA. B) Mean cueing effects for consistent 
(valid minus invalid) and inconsistent (global-valid minus local-valid) cues as a function 
of SOA. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
The presence of a global advantage despite the fact that the cue was 
uninformative and task-irrelevant suggests that the global advantage was a) obligatory, 
and b) generalizes to conditions in which objects are incidentally processed, which is 
consistent with global precedence. Interestingly, a local advantage was observed at the 
latest SOA. As there was little reason to favor one level over the other, let alone to favor 
both levels in a temporally prescribed order, this suggests that the global-to-local shift in 
advantage was obligatory. On the one hand, the effect of SOA may suggest that the 
availability of global information attenuated over time, thereby producing a null effect at 
intermediate SOAs and permitting the local level to dominate at later SOAs. This 
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contrasts with global precedence in that the availability of global information should not 
attenuate and thus should always elicit a global cueing effect. On the other hand, Hommel 
and Akyurek (2009) found that spatial symbols with incompatible meaning produced 
conflict between symbolic and voluntary attentional control modes, resulting in 
competition. Assuming focus shifts induced by irrelevant arrows are more likely to be 
undone in the presence of competition and that this process takes time, this would explain 
the null effect at intermediate SOAs. This would be consistent with global precedence as 
selection of local information would have occurred only after global information had 
been processed. It is worth noting, however, that the pattern of results for inconsistent 
cues mirrors that which is typically observed with exogenous cues (early facilitation 
followed by later inhibition) making it unclear whether the later local advantage was 
attributable to inhibition of the globally-cued location or to a shift in processing 
advantage. Neutral cues should delineate among these possibilities. 
3.3 Experiment 1.2: Testing an Inhibitory Account of Global-To-Local Shifts in 
Dominance 
 Experiment 1.2 replicates and extends Experiment 1.1 by including two neutral 
conditions in which directional meaning was represented at only one level. In the global-
neutral condition, the global level was a rectangle and the local level consisted of arrows. 
In the local-neutral condition, the global level was an arrow and the local level consisted 
of rectangles. If attenuation of global information over time gave rise to the local 
advantage in Experiment 1.1, then the magnitude of the local-neutral cueing effect should 
decrease with SOA. If the global-to-local shift in advantage was due to inhibition of the 
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globally-cued location, then the local-neutral cueing effect should show an early global 
cueing effect and late local cueing effect. If conflicting spatial information between levels 
gave rise to the local advantage, then the magnitude of the local-neutral cueing effect 
should be stable across SOA given that the conflicting level does not contain spatial 
information. 
3.3.1 Methods 
Participants 
 Forty-four undergraduates from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln participated 
in exchange for course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
were naïve to the purpose of the experiment, and were informed of their rights of 
participation according to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln institutional review board. 
None of the participants took part in Experiment 1.1. 
Stimuli  
 Global-neutral cues were 30 local arrows arranged to form a global rectangle 
whereas local-neutral cues were 26 local rectangles arranged to form a global arrow. 
Consistent and inconsistent cues were the same as in Experiment 1.1, as was the size of 
global and local elements. 
Design and procedure 
These were identical to Experiment 1.1 with two exceptions. First, there were 480 
trials. Second, there were two blocks of trials, with consistent and inconsistent cues in 
one block and neutral cues in the other. Blocking was used to ensure that perception of 
neutral cues was not biased by the consistent/inconsistent cues between trials. Each block 
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was performed twice (120 trials/block), with block order counterbalanced across 
participants. Neutral cues could be any of the four patterns presented in Figure 3.1b, the 
combinations of which may be classified by the factors validity (valid, invalid) and 
neutral-level (global-neutral, local-neutral).  
3.3.2 Results 
 RTs less than 100 ms or greater than 2.5 SDs above condition means were 
removed (2.4%). Condition mean RTs are shown in Figure 3.3. Overall, there was a 
significant main effect of SOA, F(2, 84) = 313.29, p < .001, reflecting faster RTs with 
increasing SOA. Neither the main effect of consistency nor its interaction with SOA was 
significant (Fs < 1). Importantly, there were significant cueing effects for each cue type, 
which are shown in Figure 3.4.  
 For consistent cues, the effect of validity was significant, F(1, 42) = 48.31, p < 
.001, such that RTs were faster for valid (M = 336) versus invalid cues (M = 354). The 
interaction of validity and SOA was not significant (F < 1) indicating that the cueing 
effect was stable across SOA. For neutral cues, the effect of validity was significant, F(1, 
42) = 35.52, p < .001, such that RTs were faster for valid (M = 337) versus invalid cues 
(M = 350), on average. There was also a significant validity x neutral-level interaction, 
F(1, 42) = 5.06, p = .02, indicating that the cueing effect was larger for local-neutral (17 
ms) versus global-neutral cues (9 ms). The SOA x validity x neutral-level interaction was 
not significant (F < 1) indicating that these effects were stable across SOA. 
For inconsistent cues, the effect of cue-level was not significant (F < 1) but the 
interaction with SOA was, F(2, 84) = 13.40, p < .001. At SOA = 250 ms, there was a 
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significant global cueing effect (18 ms) such that RTs were faster for global-valid (M = 
361) versus local-valid (M = 379) cues, t(43) = 4.27, p < .001. At SOA = 500 ms, the 
effect of cue-level was not significant, t(43) = -.23, p = .82. At SOA = 750 ms, there was 
a significant local cueing effect (10 ms) such that RTs were faster for local-valid (M = 
319) versus global-valid (M = 329) cues, t(43) = -2.37, p = .02. 
Experiment 1.2 replicated the global-to-local shift in dominance as a function of 
SOA observed in Experiment 1.1 and determined that this shift was not attributable to 
attenuation of global information over time or to inhibition of globally-cued locations, as 
evidenced by a temporally stable cueing effect for local-neutral cues. 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean RT for each cue by validity state as a function of SOA in Experiment 
1.2. Error bars represent +/-1 standard error. 
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Figure 3.4. Mean spatial cueing effects for consistent (valid minus invalid), inconsistent 
(global-valid minus local-valid), local-neutral (valid minus invalid), and global-neutral 
(valid minus invalid) cues as a function of SOA in Experiment 1.2. Note that the global-
neutral cueing effect has been remapped (i.e., multiplied by -1) in order to reflect the fact 
that this cueing effect was due to the local level (given that the global level was a 
rectangle). Error bars represent +/-1 standard error. 
3.4 Interim Summary and Overview of Experiments 1.3 and 1.4 
Experiment 1.2 suggests that the early global advantage was due to global 
precedence and that the global-to-local shift in dominance was attributable to conflicting 
spatial information between levels. There are at least two alternative interpretations, 
however, that need to be ruled out. In Experiments 1.1 and 1.2, the global arrow was 
closer to the location it indicated than were many of the local arrows. One possibility, 
therefore, is that the global advantage observed at short SOAs was due not to global 
precedence but to spatial proximity (i.e., the proximity of the global arrow boundaries to 
the target may have led to a sensory bias in favor of global information). Relatedly, given 
that the detection task required attention to extend beyond the global arrow boundaries, it 
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is possible that task demands and spatial proximity together encourage or prime global 
processing in an indirect manner. Experiment 1.3 examined this possibility by 
manipulating target eccentricity such that targets appeared either inside or outside the 
boundaries of the global arrow. If the global advantage was due to spatial proximity, then 
a local advantage would be expected for targets appearing inside the boundaries of the 
global arrow and a global advantage would be expected for targets appearing outside. 
A second possibility is that global and local levels differed in their validity power. 
Given that the baseline power of global-neutral cues was half that of local-neutral cues, it 
is possible that this difference reflects the cue’s basic potential rather than its globality. 
For example, the arrow cues used Experiments 1.1 and 1.2 were relatively small and 
contained many local elements. Patterns composed of many relatively small elements 
(many-element patterns) may be perceived as overall form associated with texture, such 
that local elements lose their function as individual parts of the form, whereas patterns 
composed of few relatively large elements (few-element patterns) may be perceived as 
overall form and figural parts (Kimchi, 1992; Pomerantz, 1983). It is possible, therefore, 
that the use of many-element cues rendered the global level more salient, resulting in a 
priority for global information (Kimchi, 1990; Kimchi & Palmer, 1982). Although the 
low cueing power of local arrows cannot explain the global-to-local shift in dominance, it 
could account for the early global advantage. To examine this possibility, Experiment 1.4 
made the local level more salient with the use of few-element cues. Accordingly, if the 
early global advantage can be attributed to differential salience between global and local 
levels, then making the local level more salient should lead to an early local advantage. 
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It is worth noting that the magnitude difference between global-neutral and local-
neutral cueing effects is not necessarily incompatible with global precedence. For one, 
previous work has demonstrated that global rectangles interfere more with local forms 
than local rectangles interfere with global form (Navon, 1991, Experiment 5), meaning 
that the difference in baseline could be due to stronger global versus local interference 
which would be consistent global precedence. For another, the neutral forms of the global 
and local levels were not perceptually equivalent (though both forms were rectangles 
with an area equivalent the arrow at the corresponding level, the neutral form of the 
global level was clearly more square), so a difference in baseline should not be too 
surprising. For this reason, Experiments 1.3 and 1.4 modified the global-neutral cue to be 
more rectangular at the global level (see Figure 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.5. Global-neutral cue used in Experiment 1.3. Also shown are the possible target 
locations for the inside and outside proximity conditions. 
3.5 Experiment 1.3: Effect of Target Eccentricity 
3.5.1 Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-five undergraduates from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln participated 
in exchange for course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
were naïve to the purpose of the experiment, and were informed of their rights of 
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participation according to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln institutional review board. 
None of the participants took part in Experiments 1.1 or 1.2. 
Stimuli, design, and procedure 
 These were identical to Experiment 1.2 except that, a) on 50% of trials the target 
appeared inside the boundaries of the global arrow (see Figure 3.5), and b) a different 
global-neutral cue was used. Global-neutral cues were 17 local arrows (each subtending 
1.25° x 1.0° visual angle) arranged to form a single global rectangle (7.5° x 3.0°). 
3.5.2 Results 
RTs less than 100 ms or greater than 2.5 SDs above condition means were 
removed (2.5%). Cueing effects for each cue type as a function of SOA are shown in 
Figure 3.6. Overall, there was a main effect of SOA, F(2, 68) = 597.31, p < .001, 
reflecting faster RTs with increasing SOA. The main effect of proximity (i.e., whether the 
target appeared inside or outside of the cue) was not significant (F < 1), though, there was 
an SOA x proximity interaction, F(2, 68) = 6.81, p = .009, such that the effect of SOA 
was larger for outside versus inside targets. Neither the main effect of consistency nor its 
interaction with SOA was significant (Fs < 1). Likewise, neither the proximity x 
consistency nor proximity x consistency x SOA interaction was significant (Fs < 1). 
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Figure 3.6. Mean spatial cueing effects, averaging over the proximity factor, for 
consistent (valid minus invalid), inconsistent (global-valid minus local-valid), local-
neutral (valid minus invalid), and global-neutral (valid minus invalid) cues as a function 
of SOA in Experiment 1.3. Note that the global-neutral cueing effect has been remapped 
(i.e., multiplied by -1) in order to reflect the fact that this cueing effect was due to the 
local level. Error bars represent +/-1 standard error. 
Importantly, if spatial proximity can account for the results of Experiments 1.1 
and 1.2, then a local advantage should be observed for targets appearing inside the 
boundaries of the global arrow and a global advantage should be observed for targets 
appearing outside. In contrast, and consistent with Experiments 1.1 and 1.2, the SOA x 
cue-level interaction was significant for inconsistent cues, F(2, 68) = 6.92, p = .009, the 
pattern of which replicated the global cueing effect at SOA = 250 ms, t(34) = 2.24, p = 
.025, and the local cueing effect at SOA = 750 ms, t(34) = -2.45, p = .014; the effect of 
cue-level was not significant at SOA = 500 ms, t(34) = -.75, p = .45. There were also 
effects of validity for consistent, F(1, 34) = 8.94, p = .005, and for neutral cues, F(1, 34) 
= 14.36, p < .001, reflecting significant cueing effects for these cues. Critically, proximity 
78 
 
did not interact with cue-level for inconsistent cues or with validity for consistent cues 
(Fs < 1). Thus, spatial proximity did not significantly alter the global-to-local sequence. 
Only responses to neutral cues were influenced by proximity. First, there was a 
significant proximity x level x SOA interaction, F(2, 68) = 5.23, p = .02, such that the 
level x SOA interaction (i.e., effect of level—faster RTs for global-neutral versus local-
neutral cues—decreased with increasing SOA) was significant only for outside targets. 
As the three-way interaction was driven by the null effect of level x SOA for inside cues, 
it reflects an inconsequential effect of proximity that does not alter the interpretation of 
the critical finding. Second, there was a significant proximity x validity x SOA 
interaction, F(2, 68) = 4.23, p = .04, indicating that the validity x SOA interaction (i.e., 
smaller cueing effect with increasing SOA) was larger for inside versus outside targets. 
Looking at Figure 3.7, which shows the pattern of cueing effects for inside and outside 
targets, it is clear that this interaction was driven by the much larger cueing effect for 
inside targets at SOA = 250 ms relative to the cueing effect for outside targets. Although 
this might reflect a spatial proximity effect for global-neutral cues given that its local 
cueing effect was larger for inside versus outside targets, the fact that local-neutral cues 
still led to a global cueing effect for inside targets and that this global cueing effect was 
similarly much larger for inside versus outside targets (as well as the fact that these 
global and local cueing effects were the same magnitude) provides strong evidence that 
the global advantage in the present experiments was not due to spatial proximity. 
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Figure 3.7. Mean spatial cueing effects for consistent (valid minus invalid), inconsistent 
(global-valid minus local-valid), local-neutral (valid minus invalid), and global-neutral 
(valid minus invalid) cues as a function of SOA in Experiment 1.3, plotted separately for 
targets appearing outside (left panel) and inside (right panel) the boundaries of the global 
arrow cue. Note that the global-neutral cueing effect has been remapped (i.e., multiplied 
by -1) in order to reflect the fact that this cueing effect was due to the local level. Error 
bars represent +/-1 standard error. 
Interestingly, for consistent cues, there was a marginally significant validity x 
SOA interaction, F(2, 68) = 2.98, p = .08, such that the effect of validity was smaller at 
SOA = 750 ms relative to the 250 ms, t(34) = 1.48, p = .13, and 500 ms SOAs, t(34) = 
2.14, p = .03. For neutral cues, the validity x SOA interaction was significant, F(2, 68) = 
7.67, p = .006, such that the effect of validity was smaller at the 750 ms, t(34) = 2.87, p = 
.004, and 500 ms SOAs, t(34) = -1.93, p = .05, relative to the 250 ms SOA. Thus, for 
consistent and neutral cues, cueing effects appear to dissipate at large SOAs. It is unclear 
what might have caused this. Intertrial effects of proximity, cue type, SOA, and target 
location were investigated as a possible explanation, but in each case consistent and 
neutral cueing effects at SOA = 750 ms were either absent or severely diminished. As 
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such, the introduction of spatial uncertainty from the proximity manipulation is likely at 
play. For example, Kimchi and Merhav (1991) found mutual interference between global 
and local levels (i.e., no advantage) under spatial uncertainty. Assuming this was the case 
here, the present results suggest that such mutual interference takes time to develop 
(given that an advantage was always observed at SOA = 250 ms) and may interact with 
eccentricity (given that an advantage was observed with neutral cues at SOA = 500 ms 
for outside but not inside targets). 
3.6 Experiment 1.4: Effect of Few- Versus Many-Element Cues 
3.6.1 Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-four undergraduates from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
participated in exchange for course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, were naïve to the purpose of the experiment, and were informed of their 
rights of participation according to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln institutional 
review board. None of the participants took part in any of the previous experiments. 
Stimuli, design, and procedure 
 These were identical to Experiment 1.2 except for the cue stimuli (Figure 3.8). 
Consistent, inconsistent, and local-neutral cues were 8 local arrows/rectangles (each 
subtending 1.25° x 1.0° visual angle) arranged to form a single global arrow (7.5° x 5.0°). 
Global-neutral cues were 4 local arrows (each subtending 1.25° x 1.0° visual angle) 
arranged to form a single global rectangle (7.5° x 1.0°).  
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Figure 3.8. Few-element compound arrow cue stimuli in Experiment 1.4. 
3.6.2 Results 
RTs less than 100 ms or greater than 2.5 SDs above condition means were 
removed (2.1%). Cueing effects for each cue type as a function of SOA are shown in 
Figure 3.9. Overall, there was a main effect of SOA, F(2, 46) = 111.09, p < .001, 
reflecting faster RTs with increasing SOA. Neither the main effect of consistency nor its 
interaction with SOA was significant (Fs < 1). 
 
Figure 3.9. Mean spatial cueing effects for consistent (valid minus invalid), inconsistent 
(global-valid minus local-valid), local-neutral (valid minus invalid), and global-neutral 
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(valid minus invalid) cues as a function of SOA in Experiment 1.4. Note that the global-
neutral cueing effect has been remapped (i.e., multiplied by -1) to reflect the fact that this 
cueing effect was due to the local level. Error bars represent +/-1 standard error. 
For inconsistent cues, the effect of cue-level was not significant (F < 1) but its 
interaction with SOA was, F(2, 46) = 4.75, p = .03. Consistent with Experiments 1.1-1.3, 
there was a global cueing effect at SOA = 250 ms, t(23) = 1.85, p = .07, and a local 
cueing effect at SOA = 750 ms, t(23) = -1.97, p = .05; the effect of cue-level was not 
significant at SOA = 500 ms, t(23) = -1.21, p = .23. Thus, few-element cues did not lead 
to an early local cueing effect. For consistent cues, the effect of validity was significant, 
F(1, 23) = 9.0, p = .01, such that RTs were faster for valid (M = 317) versus invalid cues 
(M = 328). The interaction of validity and SOA was not significant (F < 1), indicating 
that the cueing effect was stable across SOA. For neutral cues, the effect of validity was 
significant, F(1, 23) = 21.99, p < .001, such that RTs were faster for valid (M = 317) 
versus invalid cues (M = 327). The validity x neutral-level interaction was not significant, 
F(1, 23) = 1.96, p = .16, nor was its interaction with SOA (F < 1), indicating that the 
cueing effect was the same size for local-neutral and global-neutral cues and was stable 
across SOA. Thus, consistent with Experiment 1.3, global and local arrows did not differ 
in their baseline validity power, suggesting the difference observed in Experiment 1.2 
was attributable either to global-to-local interference or to the shape of the global level 
rather than differential baseline validity power. It is also worth noting that consistent and 
neutral cueing effects were stable across SOA, which replicates Experiments 1.1 and 1.2 
and points to spatial uncertainty as the source of their dissipation in Experiment 1.3.  
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3.7 Discussion   
 The present study tested global precedence under conditions where processing of 
global/local levels was incidental and, therefore, optimally suited for the testing of a 
hypothesized processing disposition. Participants performed a peripheral target detection 
task in the presence of a central non-predictive task-irrelevant compound arrow cue. 
Given evidence that these cues elicit involuntary spatial cueing effects, global/local 
processing was measured by spatial cueing effects. Supporting the notion that global 
information is available early and receives priority, a global cueing effect was observed at 
the earliest SOA despite cue processing being unnecessary. This suggests either that 
attention to the global level was obligatory or that the locus of the global advantage lies 
within processes preceding selective attention (e.g., perceptual organization; Neisser, 
1967). In either case, the source of the global advantage seems perceptual, consistent with 
Navon’s (1977) proposal. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the global 
advantage was observed within the spatial cueing paradigm, wherein responses (simple 
target detection) do not depend on post-perceptual processing stages to nearly the same 
extent as typical global/local tasks (e.g., identification, discrimination, categorization). 
Interestingly, and somewhat unexpectedly, a local cueing effect was observed at the latest 
SOA. The observation of a global advantage temporally preceding a local advantage 
under stimulus and task conditions that provided little if any basis for favoring one level 
over the other, let alone for favoring both levels in a temporally prescribed order, 
suggests that the global-to-local processing sequence may be obligatory. Importantly, this 
shift was not due to attenuation of global information as the magnitude of the cueing 
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effect for the neutral condition in which only the global level was an arrow remained 
constant across SOA. It would seem then that the early prioritization of global 
information leads to large, rapid cueing effects that eventually give way to later 
processing at other levels—though the conflict between cue levels influences response at 
these later times (Hommel & Akyurek, 2009). In support of this interpretation, and as 
predicted by global precedence, the global advantage was twice the size of the local 
advantage. Taken together, the present data find support for global precedence in 
attended but incidentally processed objects.  
Though the present study was designed to examine global/local processing under 
incidental processing conditions, the interaction of SOA with cue-level also has the 
potential to advance understanding of spatial cueing effects more generally. Exogenous 
and endogenous cues, which differ in magnitude and time course, are traditionally 
thought to reflect distinct subtypes of attention, with symbolic cues representing a hybrid 
of these subtypes. The present results demonstrate the importance of cue-level in the 
magnitude and time course of a cue’s effect on attention. Specifically, cues at a global 
level had larger and earlier effects on attention, meaning differences among cues may 
reflect differences in representational level rather than, or in addition to, different types of 
attention. 
Finally, it is important to note that the present use of an incidental processing 
paradigm is important in that it closely reflects the manner in which a great deal of 
information is processed in the real world. Though attention, perception, and action can 
be strongly influenced by goals and intentions, processing of stimuli routinely occurs in a 
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passive manner given the overwhelming number of inputs available at any given time. 
The present results suggest that under such conditions the perceptual system is more 
prepared to process global versus local information. This reasoning dovetails with 
Navon’s (1977, 2003) conceptualization of global precedence as a processing disposition. 
Accordingly, a disposition constitutes just one vector in a complex space in which vectors 
are not necessarily orthogonal, meaning a disposition could easily be counteracted by any 
number of modulating factors in real-world situations. It should not be surprising, 
therefore, that task and stimulus parameters are capable of modulating and reversing 
asymmetries in processing dominance (e.g., Schyns & Oliva, 1994; Oliva & Schyns, 
1997). In this light, the test of any disposition would necessarily require proper control 
and possibly special conditions. The present study suggests that incidental processing is 
one such condition. 
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CHAPTER 4: MOVING THOUGHTS MAKE FOR MOVING TARGETS: 
CAPTURING TIME SENSITIVE EFFECTS IN GLOBAL AND LOCAL 
PROCESSING 
4.0 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 4 reports an experiment in which the goal is to map the time course of 
global and local processing using a more sensitive method and analytic approach for 
making fine-grain measurements of the effect of SOA on global and local processing 
biases. Given that perceptual processing changes over time, experimental methods have 
been developed to manipulate various timing aspects in order to analyze factors that 
control this change. Categorical models of change such as analysis of variance are 
appropriate when there is no meaningful segregation of time. But what about time course 
studies where the goal is to manipulate rate of change, such as tasks in which SOA is 
varied to assess change in facilitation and inhibition over time, or as in the compound 
arrow cueing paradigm in which SOA is varied to assess change in availability over time? 
Where discrete phases of time are theoretically meaningful, researchers may feel resigned 
to choose a priori ‘where’ in time those discrete phases are best probed. One of the 
problems with having to make a priori choices about ‘where’ in time to probe attention is 
the inherent risk of choosing the wrong point in time, which, at best may cause one to 
miss effects that manifest perhaps only milliseconds before or after the chosen time point 
and, at worst, provide only a glimpse into the time course function such that the 
conclusions researchers draw are essentially determined by methodological decisions, 
creating a sort of moving target. Experiment 2 has three aims: 1) to examine the time 
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course of global/local processing, 2) to present an approach for manipulating SOA across 
a broad window, and 3) to propose a model of discontinuous change well-suited for 
capturing change across meaningful, discrete phases of time. 
4.1 Methods 
Participants 
 Forty-one undergraduates from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln participated in 
exchange for course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
were naïve to the purpose of the experiment, and were informed of their rights of 
participation according to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln institutional review board. 
None of the participants took part in any of the previous experiments. 
Stimuli, procedure, and design  
The stimuli and experimental procedure were the same as in Experiment 1.2 but 
the design differed in that SOA was now a trial-level predictor (rather than a display 
item-level predictor). In terms of design factors and dimensionality, this means that every 
trial was potentially a unique display item (i.e., there were few, if any, repetitions of 
display items within a condition within a subject). 
Generative model for SOA manipulation 
SOA values were generated for trial t in subject s by sampling from the 
continuous uniform distribution, SOAts ~ U(a, b), where SOAts = a + (b-
a)*RAND(“UNIFORM”). Values generated from U(a, b) were rounded to the nearest 
integer. The seed value for the random function was PC time. This generation process 
was used to sample SOAs from three specific intervals, each corresponding to 
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theoretically meaningful points in time at which processing of global or local information 
has been shown to dominate or is expected to change. The first interval, U(100, 300), 
sampled from points in time during which global processing was expected to dominate. 
The second interval, U(400, 600), sampled from points in time during which global 
processing was expected to transition to local processing. Thus, sampling multiple points 
around this point in time afforded a test of whether this transition proceeded more 
continuously or discretely. Finally, the third interval, U(700, 900), sampled from points 
in time during which local processing was expected to dominate. Moreover, as local 
processing is generally conceived as volitional, at least more so than global processing, 
multiple samples during this time interval afforded a test of whether volitional biases 
were constant over time, or at least changed over time less so than global processing. 
Table 4.1 shows the distributional characteristics of the generated SOA values. 
Table 4.1. Sample characteristics for the generated SOA values in Experiment 2. 
SOA Interval Frequency Percent Mean SD 
U(100, 300) 6,771 34.41 200.28 58.50 
U(400, 600) 6,439 32.72 500.84 57.47 
U(700, 900) 6,470 32.88 800.22 57.13 
     
Total 19,680 100.00 495.85 252.70 
 
Piecewise jump and slope model for estimating macro- and micro- effects of SOA  
To analyze effects of SOA on change in global and local processing over 
discontinuous time, a piecewise jump and slope model (Hoffman, 2015) was estimated. 
The model contained three piecewise slope terms (one for indexing change within each 
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time interval) and two jump terms (which capture the mean difference between intervals). 
The model is presented in Equation 1 below. 
RTts = γ00 + γ10(Slope1ts) + γ20(Jump2ts) + γ30(Slope2ts) + γ40(Jump3ts) + γ50(Slope3ts)   
+ Ut + Us + ets.               (1) 
 
The intercept γ00 is the predicted response time (RT) in milliseconds on trial t from 
subject s. The predictor variable for Slope1 captures the slope specifically during the first 
SOA interval, U(100, 300): it starts at 100 and indexes the change in RT during the first 
interval, but then shuts off afterwards at its last value of 300. If no other jump or slope 
terms for the other intervals were included, then the model would predict that the RT 
value expected at an SOA of 300 should remain constant for the rest of the SOAs. The 
next two intervals are each characterized by a jump and a slope that work together to 
describe the trajectory during each interval. The predictor variable for Jump2 represents 
the acute shift in the intercept at the beginning of the second interval: it has a value of 0 
before the second interval and a value of 100 afterwards given that SOAs between 300 
and 400 were not sampled. Thus, it represents the mean difference in RT between an 
SOA of 300 and an SOA of 400. The predictor variable for Slope2, then, captures the 
slope specifically during the second interval: it is 0 until the end of the first interval, 
indexes the change in RT during the second interval, and then turns off afterwards at its 
last value of 600. Continuing further along the trajectory, the predictor variable for 
Jump3 represents the acute shift in the intercept at the beginning of the third interval: it 
has a value of 0 before the third interval and a value of 100 afterwards given that SOAs 
between 600 and 700 were not sampled. Thus, it represents the mean difference in RT 
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between an SOA of 600 and an SOA of 700. The predictor variable for Slope3, then, 
captures the slope specifically during the third interval: it is 0 until the end of the second 
interval and indexes the change in RT during the third interval. Table 4.2 provides an 
illustration of the data structure necessary for fitting this model. 
Table 4.2. Illustration of data structure for fitting a piecewise jump and slope model with 
three linear slope terms and two jump terms. 
SOA SOAc Slope1 Jump2 Slope2 Jump3 Slope3 
100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
101 1 1 0 0 0 0 
… … … … … … … 
299 199 199 0 0 0 0 
300 200 200 0 0 0 0 
       
400 300 200 1 100 0 0 
401 301 200 1 101 0 0 
… … … … … … … 
599 499 200 1 299 0 0 
600 500 200 1 300 0 0 
       
700 600 200 1 300 1 100 
701 601 200 1 300 1 101 
… … … … … … … 
899 799 200 1 300 1 299 
900 800 200 1 300 1 300 
 
4.2 Results 
Response times less than 100 ms or greater than 2,000 ms were removed (< 1%). 
First, to determine whether the pattern of spatial cueing effects in Experiment 1 was 
replicated in the present experiment, the effects of validity for each cue type were 
examined specifically at SOAs of 250, 500, and 750 ms. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, 
which plots mean RT by cue type and validity state specifically at 250, 500, and 750 ms 
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SOAs, the pattern of spatial cueing effects appears to replicate the pattern observed in 
Experiment 1: with consistent, local-neutral, and global-neutral cues, a ~10-20 ms cueing 
effect was observed and which appeared to be temporally stable; with inconsistent cues, a 
global cueing effect was observed at the shortest SOA whereas a local cueing effect was 
observed at longer SOAs. 
 
Figure 4.1. Mean RTs by cue type and validity state in Experiment 2, plotted at 250, 500, 
and 750 ms SOAs. Note that the global-neutral cueing effect has been remapped (i.e., 
multiplied by -1) to reflect the fact that this cueing effect was due to the local level. Error 
bars represent +/-1 standard error. 
Next, micro- and macro- effects of SOA were evaluated, as estimated by the 
piecewise jump and slope model described in Section 4.2.4 (in which SOA was centered 
at 100 ms). Parameters estimates for each cue type are shown on Table 4.3. The intercept 
γ00 is the predicted mean RT in ms on trial t for subject s, specifically at SOA = 100 ms. 
The effect of Slope1 γ10 is the linear rate of change in RT specifically during U(100, 
300). The effect of Jump2 γ20 is the acute shift in the intercept at the start of U(400, 600) 
and represents the mean difference in RT between an SOA of 300 and an SOA of 400. 
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The effect of Slope2 γ30 is the linear rate of change in RT specifically during U(400, 
600). The effect of Jump3 γ40 is the acute shift in the intercept at the start of U(700, 900) 
and represents the mean difference in RT between an SOA of 600 and an SOA of 700. 
The effect of Slope3 γ50 is the linear rate of change in RT specifically during U(700, 
900). The effect of validity γ60 is the mean difference in RT between valid and invalid 
cues (or, for inconsistent cues, between global-valid and local-valid cues), specifically at 
SOA = 100 ms. Thus, slope by validity and jump by validity interactions reflect the mean 
difference in the slope or jump term between validity states. 
Table 4.3. Parameter estimates for each cue type (consistent, inconsistent, local-neutral, 
and global-neutral), as estimated by a piecewise slope and jump model for the effect of 
SOA in Experiment 2. Significant estimates (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. 
Model Parameter 
Consistent Inconsistent Local-Neutral Global-Neutral 
Est SE Est SE Est SE Est SE 
Fixed Effects         
γ00 Intercept 418.47 8.27 419.18 8.45 430.48 10.94 421.31 10.74 
γ10 Slope1 -.28 .04 -.29 .04 -.25 .05 -.22 .05 
γ20 Jump2 -7.12 11.00 -9.39 10.51 -23.66 13.26 1.25 12.31 
γ30 Slope2 -.06 .04 -.02 .04 -.02 .05 -.15 .05 
γ40 Jump3 -13.60 10.66 -7.99 10.23 -10.03 12.84 .70 13.08 
γ50 Slope3 .05 .04 -.05 .04 -.02 .05 .00 .05 
γ60 Validity 19.02 9.40 26.14 9.91 -.72 12.13 .10 11.37 
γ70 Validity*Slope1 -.08 .09 -.04 .08 .09 .10 .11 .10 
γ80 Validity*Jump2 26.95 21.34 -41.52 20.44 53.73 25.73 -27.07 24.66 
γ90 Validity*Slope2 -.05 .09 .04 .09 -.29 .11 .09 .10 
γ10 Validity*Jump3 -20.30 21.31 -8.23 20.14 27.08 25.72 -21.97 25.90 
γ11 Validity*Slope3 .10 .09 .07 .08 .00 .11 .03 .11 
Random Effects         
Us0 Intercept 1708 424 1988 484 3393 820 3461 815 
Us2 Jump2 327 159 269 145 424 215 .00 .00 
Us4 Jump3   144 125   181 371 
Us6 Validity 24 87 255 150   .00 .01 
Us8 Validity*Jump2   166 203   208 152 
ets Residual 10707 220 9594 200 15144 309 14056 288 
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 Mean spatial cueing effects as a function of SOA are shown for consistent and 
inconsistent cues in Figure 4.2 and for local-neutral and global-neutral cues in Figure 4.3. 
For consistent cues, there was a significant γ60 = 19.0 ms cueing effect at SOA = 100 ms. 
Furthermore, the non-significant validity by slope interactions indicate that the magnitude 
of the cueing effect was not predicted to vary within a given SOA interval, and the non-
significant validity by jump interactions indicate that the change in magnitude of the 
cueing effect within an interval was not predicted to differ between intervals. Thus, with 
consistent cues, a significant, temporally stable cueing effect was observed. 
 For inconsistent cues, there was a significant γ60 = 26.1 ms cueing effect at SOA = 
100 ms. The positive sign of this effect indicates it was due to the global level. The non-
significant validity by Slope1 interaction indicates that the magnitude of the global 
cueing effect was not predicted to vary within the U(100, 300) SOA interval. Importantly, 
the significant validity by Jump2 interaction indicates that the magnitude of the cueing 
effect at the end of the U(100, 300) SOA interval was predicted to be reduced by γ80 = -
45.5 ms at the start of the U(400, 600) SOA interval. As result, the sign of the cueing 
effect during the U(400, 600) SOA interval was predicted to be negative (i.e., γ60 + γ80 = -
19.4 ms), indicating it was due to the local level. The non-significant validity by Slope2 
and validity by Slope3 interactions indicate that this local cueing effect was not predicted 
to vary within the U(400, 600) or U(700, 900) SOA intervals, respectively. Moreover, the 
non-significant validity by Jump3 interaction indicates that the magnitude of the cueing 
effect was not predicted to differ between the end of the U(400, 600) SOA interval and 
the start of the U(700, 900) SOA interval. Thus, with inconsistent cues, a significant and 
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temporally stable global cueing effect was observed within the U(100, 300) SOA interval, 
whereas a significant and temporally stable local cueing effect was observed with the 
U(400, 600) and U(700, 900) intervals. 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean RTs by validity state and SOA for consistent and inconsistent cues in 
Experiment 2. Error bars represent +/-1 standard error. 
For local-neutral cues, there was a non-significant γ60 = -0.72 ms cueing effect at 
SOA = 100 ms, and the non-significant validity by Slope1 interaction indicates that the 
magnitude of the cueing was not predicted to vary within the U(100, 300) SOA interval. 
There was, however, a significant validity by Jump2 interaction such that the magnitude 
of the cueing effect at the start of the U(400, 600) SOA interval was predicted to be larger 
by γ80 = 53.7 ms than its magnitude at the end of the U(100, 300) SOA interval. 
Moreover, the significant validity by Slope2 interaction indicates that the magnitude of 
the cueing effect was predicted to be reduced by γ90 = -0.29 ms per 1 ms increase in SOA 
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within the U(400, 600) SOA interval. Finally, the non-significant validity by Jump3 
interaction indicates that the magnitude of the cueing effect was not predicted to differ 
between the end of the U(400, 600) SOA interval and the start of the U(700, 900) SOA 
interval, and the non-significant validity by Slope3 interaction indicates that the 
magnitude of the cueing effect was not predicted to vary within the U(700, 900) SOA 
interval. Thus, with local-neutral cues, a slowly rising and transient cueing effect was 
observed such that the effect did not emerge until ~300-400 ms into the processing 
episode, at which point it began to gradually diminish in magnitude.  
 For global-neutral cues, there was a non-significant γ60 = 0.10 ms cueing effect at 
SOA = 100 ms. Furthermore, the non-significant validity by slope interactions indicate 
that the magnitude of the cueing effect was not predicted to vary within a given SOA 
interval, and the non-significant validity by jump interactions indicate that the change in 
magnitude of the cueing effect within an interval was not predicted to differ between 
intervals. Thus, with global-neutral cues, a non-significant, temporally stable cueing 
effect was observed. 
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Figure 4.3. Mean RTs by validity state and SOA for local-neutral and global-neutral cues 
in Experiment 2. Note that the global-neutral cueing effect has been remapped (i.e., 
multiplied by -1) to reflect the fact that this cueing effect was due to the local level. Error 
bars represent +/-1 standard error. 
4.3 Discussion 
The results indicated that, on average, processing transitioned from global to local 
dominance over time, consistent with the results presented in Experiment 1. Examination 
of time course variation around this average, however, pointed to an ebb-and-flow in 
dominance rather than strict linear change. The results showed that within the earliest 
time interval (SOAs between 100 and 300 ms) there was a global advantage. Also, there 
was more subject variation in the time course trajectories of local cueing effects than in 
the time course trajectories of global cueing effects. These observations suggest global 
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processing dominates during automatic perceptual analysis whereas local processing 
dominates during strategic perceptual analysis. 
It is possible to perform the SOA manipulation procedure for any experimental 
parameter that could in theory be drawn from a population. The main advantage of this 
procedure is the ability to estimate effects for a very large time window so that 
experimental effects known or suspected to change over time are not missed due to 
sampling too narrow of a window and, furthermore, so that effects of time on 
experimental effects can be predicted within other windows. Also, this approach affords 
the ability to assess both macro (e.g., three theoretically relevant time intervals) and 
micro time scales (fixed and random change in and around those time intervals), which 
can provide additional information for generating and testing hypotheses. 
The piecewise jump and slope model is especially well-suited for addressing the 
present research question in which manipulation of SOA stands at the fore, but likely is 
equally well-suited for many other common timing-interval manipulations, for instance, 
preparatory intervals, response-cue intervals, preview and exposure durations, and the 
like, each of which are central manipulations in several paradigms (e.g., cueing and task 
switching). Moreover, the model can easily be extended to accommodate non-linear 
slopes within each interval (e.g., exponential or quadratic). 
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CHAPTER 5: ROLE OF TOP-DOWN TASK SET 
5.0 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 5 reports an experiment examining how different orienting tasks 
influence the global-to-local sequence. Spatial symbols can generate attentional biases 
toward peripheral locations compatible with the symbol’s meaning. An important 
question concerns how one symbol is selected when competing symbols are present. 
Studies examining this issue for spatially distinct symbols suggest that selection depends 
on task goals. The present study examines whether the influence of competing symbolic 
stimuli (arrows) at different levels of structure on attentional control also depends on task 
goals. Participants made simple detection responses to a peripheral target preceded by a 
spatially uninformative compound arrow (global arrow composed of local arrows). In 
addition, participants were required to perform a secondary task where they matched the 
orientation of the global arrow (global task) or the location of a uniquely colored local 
arrow (local task) to a test display presented immediately following a detection response. 
When global and local arrows pointed at opposite locations, there was a local cueing 
effect in the local task and a global cueing effect in the global task, indicating that task 
goals influenced the selection of the level of structure. However, when the local level was 
spatially neutral (global arrow, local rectangles), a cueing effect was observed 
independent of task, and when the global level was spatially neutral (global rectangle, 
local arrows), a cueing effect was observed in the local task only, suggesting that global 
processing was obligatory and local processing optional. These findings suggest that 
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attentional effects triggered by the global level are more strongly reflexive than those 
triggered by the local level. 
5.1 Introduction 
Everyday visual environments generally contain more information than can be 
processed within a glance. As such, goal-directed perception and action depend on 
mechanisms of selective visual attention for prioritizing an endless stream of sensory 
input, and so giving more weight to those objects, locations, or events that require 
immediate or sustained processing. To understand how attention is prioritized and 
allocated to visual stimuli, a useful distinction is that between bottom-up (reflexive) and 
top-down (volitional) attentional control, with the former driven by the physical 
characteristics of a stimulus and the latter by the current goals of the observer (Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Itti & Koch, 2000; 
Jonides, 1981; Posner, 1980; see Yantis, 2000, for a review). For example, an abrupt 
visual onset may on the one hand capture attention in a purely stimulus-driven manner 
(Enns, Austen, Di Lollo, Rauschenberger, & Yantis, 2001; Remington, Johnston, & 
Yantis, 1986; Theeuwes, 1990, 1994; Yantis & Jonides, 1984). On the other hand, 
capture may be contingent on the top-down attentional set of an observer such that the 
onset captures attention only if it shares a feature with an item in that set (Folk & 
Remington, 1998; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992). 
Outside of the traditional top-down/bottom-up dichotomy, considerable evidence 
exists indicating that various kinds of symbolic information presented at fixation produce 
unintentional shifts of attention to peripheral locations compatible with the meaning of 
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the symbol. For example, Hommel et al. (2001) presented a centrally located directional 
arrow (e.g., <, >) or word (e.g., left, right) which was followed by a peripheral target 
requiring a detection response. Targets were detected more quickly when they appeared 
at the location indicated by the arrow or word (valid condition) than at another location 
(invalid condition). Importantly, this occurred even though these symbols were entirely 
irrelevant to the detection task, and observers were explicitly told that the symbols did 
not predict the location of the upcoming target (see also, Ristic & Kingstone, 2006, 2012; 
Ristic et al., 2012). Similar findings have been observed for temporal words (e.g., 
tomorrow, yesterday; Weger & Pratt, 2008), words relating to concrete concepts (e.g., 
head, foot; Estes, Verges, & Barsalou, 2008), words relating to abstract concepts (e.g., 
god, devil; Chasteen, Burdzy, & Pratt, 2010), pictures relating to abstract concepts (e.g., 
liberal, conservative; Mills, Smith, Hibbing, & Dodd, 2015), numbers (Fischer, Castel, 
Dodd, & Pratt, 2003), and letters (Dodd, Van der Stigchel, Leghari, Fung, & Kingstone, 
2008). Taken together, these findings indicate that a broad range of visual symbols can 
produce unintentional shifts of attention (but see Fattorini, Pinto, Rotondaro, & Doricchi, 
2015). 
Not all visual symbols capable of producing unintentional shifts of attention are 
likely to do so in all situations, however. For example, observers are sometimes faced 
with scenes in which one symbol is nested within another, potentially conflicting symbol 
(e.g., eyes looking one way nested within a head looking another way). Assuming that 
shifts of attention cannot be made in two or more directions simultaneously, an important 
question is which level might be selected (global head or local eyes) to control the 
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allocation of attention? The present study examines this issue using compound stimuli for 
which observers should have no a priori basis for selecting one level over the other 
(global arrow composed of local arrows). One possibility is that the level that is relevant 
to the current task goal will be selected, and the arrow at this task-relevant level will then 
produce an unintentional shift of attention. Evidence for this hypothesis comes from 
research on the role of control settings in attentional capture. The framework of 
attentional control settings (Folk et al., 1992) proposes that the processing of a stimulus 
feature is contingent on the task goal at hand such that only stimuli possessing a task-
relevant feature can pass through a perceptual filter and enter working memory. For 
instance, Pratt and Hommel (2003) examined how one symbol is selected to control the 
allocation of attention when several symbols appear in the visual field. They found that in 
a field of spatially distinct arrows, the arrow most likely to affect attentional control was 
that which possessed a task-relevant feature of an expected target. This suggests that the 
unintentional effects of arrows depend on the cognitively represented task goal. Thus, the 
control setting account predicts that only the arrow that shares a critical feature specified 
by top-down control settings will be selected to control the allocation of attention. 
Another possibility is that the global level will be selected first regardless of task, 
and this global arrow will then produce an unintentional shift of attention. Evidence for 
this hypothesis comes from research on the role of global perceptual precedence in 
perception of hierarchical structure, as well as the previous experiments reported in the 
current thesis. Global precedence (Navon, 1977, 2003) proposes that perceptual 
processing is predisposed to favor the processing of “clusters” such that the global form 
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of a hierarchical structure is registered earlier than its local constituents, resulting in 
greater availability of the global versus local percept. As such, processing of global 
information is assumed to be obligatory whereas processing of local information is 
optional. Navon (1977) tested this notion in experiments involving compound stimuli—
stimuli with hierarchical levels of structure (e.g., large, global F constructed from small, 
local Hs). Observers were presented with these stimuli and instructed to identify the letter 
at either the global or local level. Importantly, the relation between levels was either 
consistent (global F, local Fs) or inconsistent (global F, local Hs). The critical finding 
was that global versus local letters were identified faster (global advantage) and that 
processing of the local level was slowed to a greater extent than processing of the global 
level when global and local object-identities were inconsistent (global interference). Such 
findings indicate that global properties can be extracted rapidly, suggesting that the 
potency of an arrow to evoke an unintentional shift of attention may depend on its 
globality (i.e., its relative position in hierarchical space). 
Navon’s (1977, 2003) global precedence hypothesis assumes that the availability 
of the global level is constant and, therefore, findings of global advantage should not vary 
over time. Subsequent work, however, suggests that this assumption may be too strong. 
In particular, there is evidence that the availability of different levels of structure of 
hierarchical patterns change over time. Kimchi (1998) examined the microgenesis of the 
perceptual organization of hierarchical stimuli using a primed matching task. Observers 
were presented with a prime (either a few- or many-element hierarchical pattern) 
followed by a pair of test figures to be matched for identity. In the element-similarity test 
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pair condition, the test figures were similar to the prime in their elements but different in 
their global configuration. In the configuration similarity test pair condition, the test 
figures were similar to the prime in their global configuration but different in their 
elements. By varying the duration of the prime and constructing test figures that were 
similar to different aspects of the prime, this paradigm allowed changes in observers’ 
implicit perceptual representations over time to be measured. With few-element patterns, 
elements were primed at brief exposures whereas the configuration was primed at longer 
exposures. In contrast, with many-element patterns, the configuration was primed at brief 
exposures whereas elements were primed at longer exposures. Similar findings have been 
obtained with compound arrows. Mills and Dodd (2014; the present thesis) presented a 
spatially uninformative and task-irrelevant compound arrow (a large, global arrow 
constructed from smaller, local arrows) at fixation which was followed by a peripheral 
target requiring a simple detection response. The direction of the global and local arrows 
were either consistent (same direction) or inconsistent (different directions). The critical 
manipulation was stimulus-onset-asynchrony (SOA). The rationale of the paradigm is 
that the priming potency of a level varies with SOA in correspondence with how early 
that level is processed (Navon, 1991). Results indicated that inconsistent arrows produced 
a global cueing effect (target detection was faster when the global versus local level 
pointed toward the target) at short SOAs, consistent with global advantage. At long 
SOAs, however, a local cueing effect was observed (target detection was faster when the 
local versus global level pointed toward the target), indicative of a local advantage. 
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Taken together, these findings suggest that that the unintentional effects of arrows may 
depend not only on the globality of an arrow, but also on its availability over time. 
In sum, previous work suggests that the potency of symbols to evoke 
unintentional shifts of attention may vary with their globality and the availability of that 
percept over time or with their relevance to the current task. Accordingly, the present 
study investigates whether the relative impact of competing symbolic stimuli on 
attentional control depends on top-down selection processes. In particular, we use the 
compound arrow cueing task introduced in Experiment 1 to examine effects of top-down 
orienting task on selection of information at global and local levels of a compound arrow 
cue. Each trial consists of two major events (Figure 2.2). First, a spatially uninformative 
compound arrow cue is presented at fixation. Cues are either consistent (global and local 
arrows point in the same direction), inconsistent (global and local arrows point in 
opposite directions), local-neutral (global arrow composed of local rectangles), or global-
neutral (global rectangle composed of local arrows). Second, after a variable delay, a 
target is presented to the left or right of fixation requiring a simple detection response. 
Participants are instructed that their primary task is target detection, but that they should 
also perform one of two secondary tasks. In the global orienting task, arrow cues are 
oriented either perfectly in-line with or slightly above or below the horizontal line and 
participants are to remember the orientation of the big arrow. In the local orienting task, 
one of the local arrows is a color singleton and participants are to remember its location. 
Following the detection response, a test display is shown presenting two compound 
arrows and participants are to select the one that matches what they had just seen. 
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For consistent cues, the perceptual precedence and control setting accounts both 
predict the presence of a spatial cueing effect. For inconsistent cues, however, the two 
accounts make different predictions. According to the perceptual precedence account, 
information at the global level is available earlier than information at the local level and 
therefore receives prioritized processing. For inconsistent cues, then, this account predicts 
that the global level will be selected first regardless of orienting task, and the arrow at 
this level will then produce an unintentional shift of attention. If a target does not appear 
at the location indicated by the global arrow, attention may be re-oriented back to center 
and a local arrow may be selected, provided that the local level is task-relevant. Thus, the 
perceptual precedence account predicts an early, task-independent global cueing effect, 
which may later give way to a local cueing effect when the local level is task-relevant and 
there is conflict between levels. According to the control setting account, in contrast, only 
arrows possessing a task-relevant feature will enter working memory and compete for 
attentional control. Therefore, for inconsistent cues, this account predicts a task-
compatible level-specific cueing effect such that a global cueing effect should be 
observed in the global orienting task whereas a local cueing effect should be observed in 
the local orienting task.  
The two accounts also differ in their predictions for local-neutral cues. The 
perceptual precedence account predicts that because the global level is always prioritized 
it will be selected regardless of orienting task, and the arrow at this level will produce an 
unintentional shift of attention. Furthermore, because there is no conflict between levels, 
the cueing effect should not vary with SOA. In contrast, the control setting account 
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predicts that the global level will be selected only when it is task-relevant. Thus, global 
cueing effects triggered by local-neutral cues should be observed in the global but not 
local orienting task. The two accounts make a similar prediction for global-neutral cues, 
albeit for different reasons. The perceptual precedence account predicts that because 
processing of the global level is obligatory whereas the processing of the local level is 
optional, the local level should be processed only when it is task-relevant. Therefore, this 
account predicts a local cueing effect in the local orienting task (given that the local level 
is task-relevant and contains arrows) but not in the global orienting task (given that the 
global level does not contain an arrow). Furthermore, because there is no conflict 
between levels, local cueing effects triggered by global-neutral cues should not vary with 
SOA. The control setting account predicts that the local level will be selected only when 
it is task-relevant. Local cueing effects triggered by global-neutral cues, therefore, should 
be observed in the local but not the global orienting task. 
5.2 Methods 
Participants 
 Thirty-eight undergraduates from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln participated 
in exchange for course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
were naïve to the purpose of the experiment, and were informed of their rights of 
participation according to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln institutional review board. 
None of the participants took part in any of the previous experiments. 
Stimuli  
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Compound arrow cues, validity conditions, and example trial sequences in each 
orienting task are shown in Figure 2.2. As in Experiment 1.2, consistent and inconsistent 
cues were structured such that 26 local arrows (each subtending .625° x .50° visual angle) 
yielded a single global arrow (7.5° x 5.0°). Local-neutral cues were 26 local rectangles 
(each subtending .625° x .50°) arranged to form a global arrow (7.5° x 5.0°). Global-
neutral cues were 17 local arrows (each subtending .625° x .50°) arranged to form a 
single global rectangle (7.0° x 3.0°). In the local orienting task, local arrows/rectangles 
were filled with red except for a single arrow/rectangle that was filled with green. In the 
global orienting task, local arrows/rectangles were filled with red, and the global 
arrow/rectangle was oriented about the horizontal line -10°, 0°, or 10°. Cues in both tasks 
were presented on a white background. 
Procedure 
An example trial sequence for each orienting task is shown in Figure 2.2. As in 
Experiment 1, each trial began with a central fixation point (black ‘+’ subtending 1° 
visual angle) and was replaced by a compound arrow cue after 500 ms, which remained 
onscreen until a response was made on the primary detection task. After a variable SOA 
(250, 500, or 750 ms), a target (black circle subtending 1° visual angle) was presented 
requiring simple target detection. Cue direction and target location were presented with 
equal probability leftward (‘<’) or rightward (‘>’) and to the left or right of fixation, 
respectively. The combination of these factors indexed each cue’s validity state. Thus, 
cues were either consistent (global and local arrows pointed in the same direction), 
inconsistent (global and local arrows pointed in opposite directions), local-neutral (global 
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arrow only), or global-neutral (local arrows only) and either valid (pointed toward target 
location) or invalid (pointed away from target location). Again, because inconsistent cues 
were technically always valid given that either the global or local level was always 
pointed at the target location, the conditions of its validity state are referred to as global-
valid (global level pointed at target location) and local-valid (local level pointed at target 
location). Participants were instructed to press the spacebar as quickly as possible once 
the target appeared and to maintain central fixation throughout. Moreover, participants 
were informed that arrow direction did not predict target location and, therefore, was 
irrelevant to the detection task. 
To induce voluntary selection of global or local arrows, a secondary task was used 
to orient attention toward either the global or the local level. Participants were told that 
their primary task was target detection but that they should also try to perform a 
secondary task in preparation for a test given at the end of each trial. The secondary task 
was a matching task in which participants matched either the orientation of the global 
arrow (global orienting task) or the location of a uniquely colored local arrow (local 
orienting task) to one of two alternatives in a test display. Test displays were presented 
immediately following a detection response and remained present until a discrimination 
response. The intertrial interval was 1,500 ms. Participants were seated 48 cm from the 
monitor and used the keyboard to make detection responses (spacebar) and 
discrimination responses (‘a’ or ‘s’ key for left or right response, with the mapping 
counterbalanced across participants). Testing took place on a Pentium IV computer with 
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17” monitor in a room equipped with soft lighting and sound attenuation. Experimental 
sessions took place individually and lasted ~30 minutes. 
Design 
Participants saw each cue (consistent, inconsistent, local-neutral, global-neutral) 
at each SOA (250, 500, 750) and validity state (i.e., for consistent and neutral cues: valid 
or invalid; for inconsistent cues: global-valid or local-valid) for each orienting task 
(global orienting task, local orienting task). These 48 display items were repeated 10 
times for a total of 480 trials per participant. Cue type was blocked such that consistent 
and inconsistent cues were presented in one block and local-neutral and global-neutral 
cues were presented in another block. Block order was fixed across participants, with the 
latter always performed last. Within each cue block, orienting task was also blocked, with 
task order counterbalanced across participants. 
5.3 Results 
Accuracy on secondary matching task 
Accuracy on the secondary matching task is reported first. Because accuracy was 
binary (correct or incorrect), the log-odds of the probability of an errant matching 
response was selected for analysis (Hoffman, 2015). The model included a random 
intercept for subjects and by-subject random slopes for within-subject manipulations 
(Barr et al., 2013). Table 5.1 shows the mean probability of an error in each condition. 
The overall probability of an error was .18. Though this is somewhat high for relatively 
easy tasks, it was expected because participants were instructed to prioritize speed on the 
primary target detection task. There was a main effect of cue type, F(3, 91.5) = 8.94, p < 
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.001, in which the mean probabilities of error were greater with consistent (M = .203, SE 
= .040) and inconsistent (M = .201, SE = .039) cues than with local-neutral (M = .177, SE 
= .036) and global-neutral (M = .157, SE = .033) cues (ps < .017). There was also a 
marginally significant orienting task x cue type x SOA interaction, F(6, 85.8) = 2.03, p = 
.069. Figure 5.1 shows the mean difference in probability of error between orienting tasks 
for each cue type and SOA. The effect of orienting task was not significant and did not 
significantly vary with SOA for consistent, local-neutral, or global-neutral cues (ps > 
.301). For inconsistent cues, the orienting task x SOA interaction was significant (p = 
.050). Whereas there was a greater probability of error in the local (M = .259, SE = .049) 
versus global (M = .183, SE = .038) orienting task at the 250 ms SOA (p = .028), no 
difference between tasks was apparent at the 500 ms (p = .94) or 750 ms (p = .46) SOAs. 
This finding may reflect interference from the global level at the 250 ms SOA, which 
attenuated at longer SOAs. No other effects were significant (ps > .11). 
Table 5.1. Mean response time (RT) in milliseconds and mean probability of error, 
p(error), in each cue by SOA condition in Experiment 3. Note, GV = global-valid; LV = 
local-valid. 
Condition 
Local orienting task   Global orienting task 
ValidGV   InvalidLV  ValidGV   InvalidLV 
M SE   M SE   M SE   M SE 
RT (ms)            
Consistent            
250 454 14  469 14  436 14  452 14 
500 386 14  405 14  374 14  391 14 
750 376 14  375 14  367 14  393 14 
Inconsistent            
250 489 15  475 15  448 15  454 15 
500 408 15  395 15  378 15  395 15 
750 381 15  378 15  366 15  393 15 
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Local-neutral            
250 403 12  426 12  394 12  406 12 
500 338 12  352 12  333 12  345 12 
750 322 12  332 12  326 13  327 12 
Global-neutral            
250 409 12  412 12  407 12  411 12 
500 330 12  350 12  334 12  337 12 
750 319 12  334 12  331 12  332 12 
            
p(error)            
Consistent            
250 .184 .040  .245 .049  .217 .046  .220 .046 
500 .217 .046  .186 .041  .178 .040  .208 .045 
750 .252 .051  .185 .041  .158 .037  .202 .044 
Inconsistent            
250 .268 .053  .249 .050  .167 .038  .202 .043 
500 .203 .044  .162 .037  .191 .042  .168 .038 
750 .223 .047  .175 .039  .217 .046  .212 .045 
Local-neutral            
250 .163 .041  .182 .045  .173 .043  .187 .045 
500 .178 .045  .184 .045  .181 .045  .208 .049 
750 .166 .043  .152 .040  .171 .044  .179 .045 
Global-neutral            
250 .143 .037  .185 .045  .139 .037  .163 .041 
500 .135 .036  .166 .042  .125 .034  .186 .046 
750 .165 .043   .134 .036   .176 .045   .174 .044 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Mean orienting task effect (local task minus global task) on probability of 
error, p(error), in the secondary matching task for each cue type and SOA in Experiment 
3. Positive values reflect a greater probability of error in the local orienting task, whereas 
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negative values reflect a greater probability of error in the global orienting task. Error 
bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
RT on primary target detection task 
RTs less than 100 ms or greater than 2.5 SDs above condition means were 
removed (4.8%). Data were analyzed via linear mixed modeling with subjects and items 
specified as crossed random effects (Baayen et al., 2008; Hoffman, 2015) and by-subject 
random slopes for within-subject manipulations (Barr et al., 2013). Table 5.1 shows the 
mean response time in each condition. There were significant main effects of SOA, F(2, 
66.5) = 130.32, p < .001 (targets detected faster at longer SOAs) and cue type, F(3, 89.8) 
= 20.43, p < .001 (targets following local-neutral and global-neutral cues were detected 
faster than targets following consistent and inconsistent cues). The latter likely reflects a 
simple practice effect given that the block of neutral cue trials always followed the block 
of consistent/inconsistent cue trials. The main effect of orienting task was marginally 
significant, F(1, 39.1) = 3.28, p = .078 (targets detected faster in the global versus local 
orienting task), though, there was a significant orienting task x SOA interaction, F(2, 
64.9) = 5.65, p = .006 (smaller effect of orienting task at longer SOAs). Regarding spatial 
cueing effects (Figure 5.2), there was a significant validity x orienting task x cue type 
interaction, F(4, 54.9) = 4.51, p = .001, indicating that the effect of orienting task on the 
size of cueing effects differed between cue types. 
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Figure 5.2. Mean spatial cueing effects (valid minus invalid or, for the inconsistent cue, 
global-valid minus local-valid) for each cue type and SOA in the global orienting task 
(left) and the local orienting task (right) in Experiment 3. For the inconsistent cue, 
negative values reflect a cueing effect due to the global level whereas positive values 
reflect a cueing effect due to the local level. Note that the global-neutral cueing effect 
was remapped (i.e., multiplied by -1) to reflect that this cueing effect was attributable to 
the local level. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
With consistent cues, there was a significant cueing effect in both the local (M = -
10.83, SE = 4.64, t = -2.33, p = .020) and global (M = -18.99, SE = 4.66, t = -4.07, p < 
.001) orienting tasks (targets were detected faster when appearing at the location global 
and local arrows pointed), the size of which did not significantly differ between tasks (M 
= 8.16, SE = 6.57, t = 1.24, p = .215). Although we did not manipulate any incentive to 
ignore the arrow cues, the presence of a cueing effect despite the fact that the cue was 
spatially uninformative is consistent with the notion that directional symbols presented at 
fixation induce unintentional shifts of attention to locations compatible with the meaning 
of the cue (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; Pratt & Hommel, 2003; Ristic & Kingstone, 2006, 
2012; Ristic et al., 2012). 
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With inconsistent cues, there was a significant cueing effect in both the local (M = 
9.50, SE = 4.62, t = 2.06, p = .040) and global (M = -15.98, SE = 4.69, t = -3.41, p < .001) 
orienting tasks, the sign of which was in opposite directions resulting in a significant 
difference between tasks (M = 25.48, SE = 6.58, t = 3.87, p < .001). In the local orienting 
task, the positive sign indicates that the cueing effect was due to the local level (targets 
were detected faster when appearing at the location the local arrows pointed). In the 
global orienting task, the negative sign indicates that the cueing effect was due to the 
global level (targets were detected faster when appearing at the location the global arrow 
pointed). Thus, orienting task determined which level of an inconsistent compound arrow 
cue was selected, and the arrow(s) at this level then produced an unintentional shift of 
attention. This pattern is consistent with a control setting account. 
With global-neutral cues, there was a significant cueing effect in the local 
orienting task (M = -12.22, SE = 6.19, t = -1.97, p = .050), with targets detected faster 
when appearing at the location the local arrows pointed. The cueing effect in the global 
orienting task, however, was not significant (M = -3.02, SE = 6.47, t = -.47, p = .641). 
Thus, when arrows were present at only the local level of a compound cue, cueing effects 
were observed only when the current task goal specified the local level as task-relevant. 
Otherwise, these local arrows appeared to have been ignored. As the only difference 
between the present global-neutral cue and the one in Experiment 1.3, which did produce 
a significant cueing effect, is the task-relevant nature of the global level, it is reasonable 
to interpret the present finding with global-neutral cues in terms of global precedence. 
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With local-neutral cues, there was a significant cueing effect in both the local (M 
= -15.67, SE = 6.12, t = -2.56, p = .011) and global (M = -12.40, SE = 6.31, t = -1.97, p = 
.050) orienting tasks (targets were detected faster when appearing at the location the 
global arrow pointed), the size of which did not significantly differ between tasks (M = -
3.33, SE = 9.07, t = -.37, p = .713). Thus, when an arrow was present at only the global 
level of a compound cue, cueing effects were observed regardless of the current task goal. 
This pattern speaks to the inevitability of processing global information and the optional 
processing of local information, in line with a global precedence account. 
The four-way interaction was not significant (p = .21), indicating that the pattern 
of cueing effects did not vary with SOA. Considering that Experiments 1 and 2 showed 
that the cueing effect with inconsistent cues changed with SOA—such that a global 
cueing effect was observed at a 250 ms SOA, whereas a local cueing effect was observed 
at a 750 ms SOA—the absence of an influence of SOA in the present experiment may 
suggest that rather than causing the local or global advantage per se, the effect of 
orienting task was to enhance, attenuate, or otherwise maintain the availability of level-
specific information. This would explain both the presence of a local cueing effect with 
inconsistent cues at the 250 ms SOA, as well as the lack of an SOA effect with 
inconsistent cues. 
To summarize, a task-compatible, level-specific cueing effect was observed when 
there was conflict between the two levels of structure (i.e., inconsistent cue), which is in 
line with a control setting account. Yet, when there was no such conflict, the results were 
consistent with a global precedence account: when the cue was a global arrow composed 
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of local rectangles (i.e., local-neutral cue), a cueing effect was observed regardless of 
orienting task, and when the cue was a global rectangle composed of local arrows (i.e., 
global-neutral cue), a cueing effect was observed in the local orienting task but not in the 
global orienting task, findings compatible with some form of global precedence. More 
generally, the emerging suggestion is that shifts in precedence depend on conflict 
between levels. This is consistent with Experiment 1, with the exception that in that 
experiment there was no orienting task. In light of the present findings, this suggests that 
level-specific advantage may not have been due to task per se but rather to conflict 
between levels, with the effect of task serving to modulate the availability of level-
specific information, effectively prolonging (in the case of task-relevant global 
information) or expediting (in the case of task-relevant local information) the advantage 
at a given level. 
5.4 Discussion 
The present study examined whether the influence of competing symbolic stimuli 
at different levels of structure on attentional control depends on top-down selection 
processes. Certain aspects of the results suggest this was the case. In particular, there was 
positive evidence that attention can be allocated voluntarily to a specific level of a 
compound symbol. This was shown by a task-compatible, level-specific cueing effect: 
with inconsistent cues in which global and local arrows pointed in opposite directions, a 
local cueing effect was observed in the local orienting task (target detection was faster for 
targets appearing at the location indicated by the local arrows) whereas a global cueing 
effect was observed in the global orienting task (target detection was faster for targets 
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appearing at the location indicated by the global arrow). Thus, current task goals 
determined the level of structure to be selected, and the directional meaning of the 
arrow(s) at this level subsequently induced an unintentional shift of attention. These 
findings are comparable with previous work examining the influence of competing 
symbols at the same level of structure (Pratt & Hommel, 2003). 
Though top-down control of attention via orienting task made it possible to select 
information at either level of structure depending on which level was task-relevant, other 
aspects of the present results suggest that this type of selection was insufficient for 
restricting selection to only arrows at the local level. In particular, we observed a local-
neutral cueing effect (cueing effect due to the global level) not only in the global 
orienting task but also in the local orienting task, indicating that access to symbolic 
information at the global level was not prevented when attending to the location of a local 
rectangle. This finding is inconsistent with the predictions of a top-down control setting 
account, which suggests that because the global arrow’s directional information was 
irrelevant to the local orienting task it should not be processed and, therefore, no cueing 
effect should have been observed (Folk et al., 1992). Instead, this finding is more in-line 
with a perceptual precedence account (Navon, 1977), which suggests that processing of 
information at the global level is obligatory whereas processing of information at the 
local level is optional. According to this account, the local-neutral cueing effect was 
observed regardless of orienting task because there was an arrow at the highest level of 
globality (i.e., the relative position of an item in hierarchical space). As processing of the 
118 
 
global level is obligatory, this level was therefore selected and the arrow at this level then 
induced an unintentional shift of attention. 
Interestingly, a global-neutral cueing effect (cueing effect due to the local level) 
was observed in the local but not the global orienting task. On the one hand, this might 
indicate that access to symbolic information at the local level was prevented when 
attending to the orientation of a global rectangle, consistent with the predictions of a top-
down control setting account. On the other hand, considering that this task-level 
compatibility effect was not observed with local-neutral cues (indicating that access to 
symbolic information at the global level could not be prevented when attending to the 
location of a local rectangle), the perceptual precedence account seems to provide a more 
complete account of the data for the two neutral cue types. Accordingly, the global-
neutral cueing effect may reflect the assumption that processing of information at the 
local level is optional (Navon, 1977). That is, because the local level was not task-
relevant in the global orienting task it was not processed and, as a result, no cueing effect 
was observed. Taken together, the pattern of spatial cueing effects for the two types of 
neutral cues suggest that cueing effects triggered by the global level may be more 
strongly reflexive than those triggered by the local level, insofar as the spatial orienting 
effect for local-neutral cues (cueing effect due to global level) could withstand violations 
to a nonspatial task-level attentional set whereas the spatial orienting effect for the 
global-neutral cue (cueing effect due to the local level) could not. 
According to Navon’s (1977, 2003) global precedence hypothesis, the availability 
of the global level is constant and does not attenuate even when focused on the local 
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level. Subsequent findings, however, suggest that this assumption may be too strong as 
there is evidence that the availability of different levels of structure of hierarchical 
patterns vary with time (Kimchi, 1998). An effect of processing duration (i.e., SOA) on 
global advantage (Experiment 1), therefore, does not support Navon’s global precedence 
hypothesis; though, it is consistent with a weaker version in which the availability of the 
global level can be modulated over time (Navon, 1991). Therefore, it is speculated that an 
effect of SOA was not observed in Experiment 3 because the task-relevancy of a 
particular level modulated the availability of that level, effectively prolonging (in the case 
of task-relevant global information) or expediting (in the case of task-relevant local 
information) the availability and thus dominance of level-specific information. Only in 
the absence of direct task demands is there an obligatory global-to-local change in 
advantage (Experiment 1.2), and even then, only in the presence of conflict. The 
emerging picture here is that shifts in precedence depend on conflict between levels. 
Accordingly, it is concluded that the results support a version of global precedence in 
which task-set can either maintain the availability of the global level (evident by the 
absence of SOA effects on global cueing effects when the global level was task-relevant; 
Experiment 3) or attenuate the availability of the global level (evident by the absence of 
SOA effects on local cueing effects when the local level was task-relevant; Experiment 
3). 
In summary, the present experiment found that interactions between task demands 
and the structure of the input information selectively modulate the relative needs of visual 
information at different levels of stimulus structure. To select symbols at different levels 
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of structure, therefore, the present work suggests that at least two factors need to be 
considered: the observer’s current task, which specifies the demands of visual 
information from the input, and the globality of this visual information across the percept, 
which specifies the availability of the percept for selection. Studies investigating 
determinants of selection efficiency typically draw on tasks requiring selective attention 
to centrally presented local information while ignoring irrelevant peripheral information, 
as in flanker tasks. Moreover, the stimuli used in these studies are generally perceptually 
simple, containing semantic information at only one level of stimulus structure, as in a 
single central arrow. Many structural differences exist between the stimuli presented in 
traditional studies of selectivity and the sort of stimuli found in the real-world (e.g., 
hierarchical levels of structure, depth planes). Considering that differences in stimulus 
structure are known to influence processing strategies (Garner, 1970, 1974), 
understanding the role of stimulus structure in information processing is crucial for 
understanding how various factors influence selective attention. Ignoring the nature of the 
stimulus, at worst, would lead to incorrect assessment of the nature of information 
processing, and, at best, an inadequate picture. A goal for future research, therefore, 
should be to understand how other dimensions of stimulus structure, such as a target’s 
location in depth on a three-dimension plane, contribute to selectivity. 
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CHAPTER 6: ROLE OF BOTTOM-UP SALIENCE 
6.0 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 6 reports an experiment that examines the role of level salience on the 
selection priorities of global and local information. In particular, to assess whether the 
task-compatible, level-specific cueing effects in Experiment 3 can be attributed to 
differential salience between levels, the present experiment used the same cues as in the 
local orienting task in Experiment 3 (in which one of the local arrows was a color-
singleton), however, there was no secondary matching task. Accordingly, if the results of 
Experiment 3 were attributable to the salience (as opposed to task-relevance) of the local 
level biasing a local processing mode, then making the local level salient should produce 
a local advantage even when the arrows at this level are task-irrelevant, as has been 
demonstrated in previous work (Han, He, Yund, & Woods, 2001; Hübner  & Malinowski, 
2002; Stoffer, 1993, 1994). 
6.1 Introduction 
Although the two orienting tasks in Experiment 3 clearly required responses to 
either the global or the local level, the arrow cues differed between tasks, which raises the 
possibility that this difference may have had some influence on the results. This 
difference may be particularly problematic for the cues containing local arrows, because 
the local arrows, at the stimulus level and independent of the task, were more salient in 
the local orienting task (a single green arrow among red arrows) than in the global 
orienting task (all red arrows). By itself, this stimulus level difference—local arrows 
being more salient in the local versus global orienting task—could potentially explain the 
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finding with global-neutral cues, in which there was a significant cueing effect in the 
local orienting task (targets detected faster when appearing at the location the local 
arrows pointed) but not in the global orienting task. It is unclear, therefore, to what extent 
this finding with global-neutral cues can be attributed to the orienting task. Likewise, 
differential local salience between tasks could also explain the finding with inconsistent 
cues, in which there was a significant local cueing effect in the local orienting task 
(targets detected faster when appearing at the location the local arrows pointed) and a 
significant global cueing effect in the global orienting task (targets detected faster when 
appearing at the location the global arrow pointed). If local salience, independent of the 
orienting task, was responsible for the different pattern of cueing effects with inconsistent 
cues between tasks, then local salience should produce significant local cueing effects 
regardless of the relevancy of a particular level to a given task. Experiment 4 tests this 
possibility. In particular, Experiment 4 tests whether a local color singleton can draw 
attention to the local level and reverse the precedence effect. 
6.2 Methods 
Participants 
Forty undergraduates from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln participated in 
exchange for course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
were naïve to the purpose of the experiment, and were informed of their rights of 
participation according to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln institutional review board. 
None of the participants took part in any of the previous experiments. 
Stimuli, procedure, and design 
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The compound arrow cue stimuli were the same as in the local orienting task in 
Experiment 3 (see Figure 2.2). The procedure was also the same except that there was no 
secondary matching task, meaning that cue processing was now entirely incidental to the 
detection task. Thus, participants were informed that central arrows did not predict the 
location of a target and, therefore, were irrelevant to the detection task and should be 
ignored. The design was also the same as Experiment 3 except that there were more trials 
and that rather than there being just one block of consistent/inconsistent cues followed by 
one block of neutral cues, there were now four blocks of each, which were interleaved. 
This modification was made to determine whether it would eliminate the suspected 
practice effect (i.e., main effect of cue type) from Experiment 3. Thus, participants saw 
each cue (consistent, inconsistent, local-neutral, global-neutral) at each SOA (250, 500, 
750) and validity state (for consistent and neutral cues, valid or invalid; for inconsistent 
cues, global-valid or local-valid). These 24 conditions were repeated 27 times for a total 
of 648 trials. Experimental sessions took place individually and lasted ~45 minutes. 
6.3 Results 
Prior to all analyses, RTs less than 100 ms or greater than 2.5 SDs above 
conditional means were removed (5.7%). Data were analyzed via linear mixed modeling 
with subjects and display items specified as crossed random effects (Baayen et al., 2008; 
Hoffman, 2015) and by-subject random slopes for within-subject manipulations (Barr et 
al., 2013). There was a significant main effect of SOA, F(2, 92.3) = 67.19, p < .001 
(targets detected faster at longer SOAs). The main effect of cue type, which was 
significant in Experiment 3, was no longer significant, F(3, 63.9) = 1.62, p = .19, likely 
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due to the increased number of blocks and their interleaving. Regarding spatial cueing 
effects (Figure 6.1), a significant validity x SOA interaction emerged, F(2, 66.8) = 4.12, p 
= .02. Cueing effects were significant at the 250 ms SOA (M = -15.55, SE = 4.69, t = -
3.32, p = .002) and were significantly smaller at the 500 ms SOA by (M = -12.37, SE 
=6.11, t = -2.02, p = .05), as well as at the 750 ms SOA by (M = -17.09, SE = 6.17, t = -
2.77, p = .007). The -3.18 ms cueing effect at the 500 ms SOA (i.e., -15.55 minus -12.37) 
and the 1.54 ms cueing effect at the 750 ms SOA (i.e., -15.55 minus -17.09) were not 
significantly different from zero (ps > .51) or from each other (t = -.76, SE = 6.18, p = 
.45). Importantly, there was a significant cue type x validity interaction, F(3, 45.5) = 
4.01, p = .013, indicating that the sizes of the cueing effects differed between cue types. 
Significant cueing effects occurred with consistent (M = -13.45, SE = 6.85, t = -1.96, p = 
.05), local-neutral (M = -12.76, SE = 6.30, t = -2.03, p = .05), and global-neutral (M = -
12.49, SE = 6.19, t = -2.02, p = .05) cues, none of which differed (ps > .92). Each, 
however, was significantly different from the cueing effect with inconsistent cues (ts > 
2.78, SEs ~9, ps < .01). With inconsistent cues, the cueing effect at the 250 ms SOA was 
due to the global level (M = -10.82, SE = 6.31, t = -1.75, p = .078), whereas the cueing 
effects at the 500 (M = 18.67, SE = 7.41, t = 2.52, p = .027) and 750 (M = 14.95, SE = 
7.63, t = 1.96, p = .050) ms SOAs were due to the local level. 
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Figure 6.1. Mean spatial cueing effects (valid minus invalid or, for the inconsistent cue, 
global-valid minus local-valid) for each cue type and SOA in Experiment 4. For the 
inconsistent cue, negative values reflect a cueing effect due to the global level whereas 
positive values reflect a cueing effect due to the local level. Note that the global-neutral 
cueing effect was remapped (i.e., multiplied by -1) to reflect that this cueing effect was 
attributable to the local level. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
6.4 Discussion 
If local salience accounted for the local cueing effects in the local orienting task in 
Experiment 3, then local salience should produce a local cueing effect independent of the 
status of the local level with respect to one’s task. Moreover, just as in Experiment 3, the 
local cueing effect should not vary with SOA. The results of Experiment 4 did not 
support this possibility. With inconsistent cues—despite a local cueing effect at the 500 
and 750 ms SOAs—neither a global nor local cueing effect was found at the 250 ms SOA 
(in fact, the trend was toward a global cueing effect), possibly suggesting that global 
processing passively interfered with local processing (e.g., Navon, 1977; Sanocki, 2001) 
or that local salience biased competition for selection between levels (Hommel et al., 
2001; Hommel & Akyürek, 2009; Pratt & Hommel, 2003) by attenuating the availability 
of the global level and/or by enhancing the availability of the local level. In any case, 
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these results indicate that a local-level entry point for visual processing is not obligatory, 
even under conditions in which it might be expected. This indicates that a local color 
singleton was not sufficient to produce the early and temporally stable local cueing effect 
with inconsistent cues in the local orienting task in Experiment 3. Thus, with inconsistent 
cues, a color singleton at the local level did not produce early local cueing effects 
(Experiment 4) unless the local level was task-relevant (Experiment 3). Similarly, with 
global-neutral cues, whereas there was no cueing effect in the global orienting task in 
Experiment 3, there was now a significant and temporally stable cueing effect. This 
suggests that the former was not due to the absence of a color singleton at the local level. 
Thus, these findings suggest that the effects of orienting task on the size of the cueing 
effects with inconsistent and global-neutral cues in Experiment 3 were indeed due to 
orienting task, not salience. Accordingly, it is concluded that the results of these 
experiments support a version of global precedence in which task set can either maintain 
the availability of the global level (evident by the absence of SOA effects on global 
cueing effects when the global level was task-relevant; Experiment 3) or attenuate the 
availability of the global level (evident by the absence of SOA effects on local cueing 
effects when the local level was task-relevant; Experiment 3). 
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CHAPTER 7: ROLE OF ATTENTIONAL FOCUSING AND ADJUSTMENTS 
7.0 Chapter Overview 
Eriksen and Rohrbaugh (1970) proposed that attention can be allocated selectively 
at a level of a hierarchical stimulus. The zoom-lens metaphor of spatial attention captures 
this idea (Eriksen & St. James, 1986; Eriksen & Webb, 1989; Eriksen & Yeh, 1985), 
where visual attention can be allocated to differently sized regions of the visual field. 
Changing the level attended, therefore, can be seen as a redistribution of resources over a 
region that is proportionally larger than the height of the level in the hierarchy (Castiello 
& Umiltà, 1990; Eriksen & St. James, 1986). Accordingly, it is possible that global-local 
response time differences reflect the time needed to refocus attention from the global to 
the local level. Support for this account is provided by studies showing that a tradeoff 
exists between the size of the visual field over which attention is distributed and its 
resolution (Eriksen & St. James, 1986; Eriksen & Yeh, 1985), and that the size of such 
attentional focusing plays an important role in attentional control (Theeuwes, 2004).  
So far, experiments using the compound arrow cueing procedure have required 
only simple detection responses to a 1° target (Experiments 1-4). It is possible that such a 
simple (coarse) judgement might have permitted what Theeuwes (2004; see also Gibson 
& Peterson, 2001; Theeuwes, Kramer, & Belopolsky, 2004; Belopolsky et al., 2007) has 
referred to as a wide attentional window. These studies suggest that the size of the 
attentional window is an important factor in determining whether an irrelevant color 
singleton will capture attention. For example, Belopolsky et al. (2007) manipulated the 
size of the attentional window by requiring observers to detect either a global or a local 
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shape prior to performing a search task. They found that attention was captured more 
often when the attentional window was induced to be wide (global shape detection) than 
when it was induced to be narrow (local shape detection). Accordingly, if detection 
responses to a 1° target permitted a wide attentional window, then the spatial cueing task 
may have introduced a top-down bias towards global processing across all conditions. 
This bias presumably would have an additive effect with the orienting bias manipulated 
with the secondary matching task in Experiment 3 and, therefore, may be overpowered 
by conditions conspiring to produce a local advantage. Though speculative, this overall 
top-down bias toward processing the global level might have manifested itself in the 
finding that when the cue was a global arrow composed of local rectangles (local-neutral 
cue) a cueing effect was observed even in the local orienting task (Experiment 3, Figure 
5.2). 
Though attractive, there are also at least three pieces of evidence that cast doubt 
on this hypothesis. First, there was a (global) cueing effect with local-neutral cues in the 
local orienting task (Experiment 3, Figure 5.2). As previous work has shown that top-
down attention to pop-out local items weakens global advantage (Han & He, 2003), it 
might be expected that a top-down bias towards global processing induced by a wide 
attentional window should be weakened in the local orienting task and, therefore, the 
local-neutral cueing effect to be smaller than in the global orienting task. However, no 
difference between tasks was found. Second, Lamb and Robertson (1988) found that 
responses to the local level of a central, hierarchical stimulus were longer when stimuli 
occurred randomly and were mixed with peripherally presented stimuli compared with a 
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condition in which all stimuli were always presented at central fixation. They suggested 
that with central presentation, a smaller focus of attention could be maintained, leading to 
enhanced local processing. As the present cues were presented at central fixation, it might 
be expected that no global advantage should result given that attention was consistently 
directed at a level (via task manipulation) within a block of trials. Finally, this possibility 
was considered in Experiment 1.3, where cue-target eccentricity was manipulated with 
the logic being that a wide attentional window would predict a cue-target proximity 
effect. None was found—eccentricity did not alter the pattern. Consequently, spatial 
uncertainty, presumably a condition of diffuse or wide attention, does not seem to affect 
the size of global advantage, at least not when cue processing is incidental and both levels 
are related to as objects. 
To examine the possibility that global-local response time differences reflect the 
time needed to refocus attention, Experiment 5 manipulated attentional focus (Figure 2.3) 
along the lines of previous work (Belopolsky et al., 2007; Hernandez, Costa, & 
Humphreys, 2007). If it is assumed that global and local levels are equated on salience, 
then the focused attention condition should prime a local advantage (because the effective 
visual field is smaller, potentially omitting grouping cues). This would be evident by 
larger local cueing effects (with inconsistent and global-neutral cues) in the focused 
versus diffuse attention condition. In contrast, the diffuse attention condition should 
prime a global advantage (because the effective visual field is larger, encompassing all 
the items). Thus, in the diffuse attention condition there should be a bias toward global 
processing, which would be evident by a larger global cueing effect (with inconsistent 
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and local-neutral cues) relative to the focused attention condition. However, if the local 
level contains a salient color singleton, then the focused attention condition should prime 
a local advantage (because the effective visual field is smaller, as well as because 
attention is allocated automatically to the singleton), and the diffuse attention condition 
should prime a local advantage commensurate with the focused attention condition 
(because, though the effective visual field may encompass the whole cluster of items, 
attention is allocated automatically to the singleton). 
7.1 Methods 
Participants 
Fifty-three undergraduates from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln participated 
in exchange for course credit. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
were naïve to the purpose of the experiment, and were informed of their rights of 
participation according to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln institutional review board. 
None of the participants took part in any of the previous experiments. 
Stimuli, procedure, and design 
The compound arrow cue stimuli were the same as those in Experiment 4, except 
that now on 25% of trials the local color singleton or the global shape was oriented 
vertically (no-go trials). The task was to press the spacebar when a target appearing either 
left, right, above, or below central fixation was detected. Participants were instructed to 
respond to the target as quickly as possible only when a go signal (which was the same 
for both attention conditions) was present and that they should withhold response when a 
target was preceded by a no-go signal. Participants were also informed that the location 
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of the target was random. The trial sequence consisted of a fixation cross (500 ms), 
followed by a compound arrow cue (250, 500, or 750 ms SOA), and then the target (to 
response). The intertrial interval was 1,500 ms. Before the start of the experiment, 
participants received a sample block of 12 practice trials for each of the attention 
conditions.  
The two attention conditions (focused and diffuse) were manipulated within 
subjects. The design was identical for each condition. Three types of cues were used 
(inconsistent, local-neutral, and global-neutral), which were presented with equal 
probability leftward (‘<’) or rightward (‘>’). Four target locations were used (left, right, 
above, or below fixation). A left or right target was presented with equal probability on 
90% of trials. In the focused attention condition, participants responded to the target 
when the local arrow/rectangle color singleton was horizontally oriented (go trials), and 
withheld their response when the local arrow/rectangle color singleton was vertically 
oriented (no-go trials). In the diffuse attention condition, participants responded to the 
target when the global arrow/rectangle was horizontally oriented (go trials), and withheld 
their response when the global arrow/rectangle was vertically oriented (no-go trials). No-
go trials occurred on 25% of all trials. In both attention conditions, the same exact 
displays were used, but the no-go signal (up or down local arrow/rectangle color 
singleton for the focused attention condition, and up or down global arrow/rectangle for 
the diffuse attention condition; Figure 2.3) was chosen randomly. Attention conditions 
were blocked and the order counterbalanced across participants. For each condition, all 
types of trials were mixed. The location of the local shape color singleton was chosen 
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randomly for each trial. There were 384 trials in each attention condition, of which 288 
were go trials and 72 were no-go trials, for a total of 768 trials. 
7.2 Results 
Prior to all analyses, RTs less than 100 ms or greater than 1.5*interquartile range 
above conditional means were removed (< 1%). No-go trials (25%), trials with no-go 
errors (i.e., erroneously responding to the target on no-go trials; 2.5%), and trials with go 
errors (i.e., failing to respond to the target on go trials; < 1%) were excluded from the 
analysis. Data were analyzed via linear mixed modeling with subjects and display items 
specified as crossed random effects (Baayen et al., 2008; Hoffman, 2015) and by-subject 
random slopes for within-subject manipulations (Barr et al., 2013). There was a main 
effect of SOA for inconsistent (M = -101.71, SE = 5.41, t = -18.80, p < .001), local-
neutral (M = -94.07, SE = 4.66, t = -20.20, p < .001), and global-neutral (M = -101.07, SE 
= 4.86, t = -20.81, p < .001) cue types, and which did not differ between cues F < 1. 
Regarding spatial cueing effects (Figure 7.1), there were significant main effects of 
validity for inconsistent (M = 12.28, SE = 5.41, t = -2.27, p = .02; the positive sign 
indicates that this cueing effect was due to the local level) and local-neutral (M = 9.16, SE 
= 4.66, t = -1.97, p = .05) cues, but not global-neutral cues (M = -2.60, SE = 4.86, t = -
.54, p = .59). Moreover, these effects did not vary significantly with SOA, attention 
condition, or their interaction. These findings are difficult to interpret but at the very least 
point to some interaction of salience and attention given that a local singleton led to an 
early local cueing effect when the compound arrow cue was task-relevant (demonstrated 
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here by the effect of validity at the 250 ms SOA for inconsistent cues) but not when it 
was task-irrelevant (Experiment 2). 
 
Figure 7.1. Mean spatial cueing effects (valid minus invalid or, for the inconsistent cue, 
global-valid minus local-valid) for each cue type and SOA in the focused (left) and 
diffuse (right) attention conditions in Experiment 5. For the inconsistent cue, negative 
values indicate a cueing effect due to the global level whereas positive values indicate a 
cueing effect due to the local level. Note that the global-neutral cueing effect was 
remapped (i.e., multiplied by -1) to reflect that this cueing effect was attributable to the 
local level. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
Finally, there was a significant cue type x SOA x attention interaction, F(2, 52.1) 
= 2.01, p = .04. With inconsistent cues, the effect of attention was greater at the 750 
versus 250 ms SOA, evident by a significant attention x SOA interaction (M = 19.98, SE 
= 9.82, t = 2.03, p = .05). This effect was also significant for local-neutral cues (M = -
16.40, SE = 8.31, t = -1.98, p = .05), but differed significantly form that for inconsistent 
cues (t = -2.55, p = .01) as it was in the opposite direction (Figure 7.2). As shown, 
whereas responses were speeded in the focused versus diffuse condition with inconsistent 
cues at only the 750 ms SOA, responses were speeded in the focused condition with 
local-neutral cues at only the 250 ms SOA. With global-neutral cues, the attention x SOA 
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interaction was smaller relative to inconsistent cues (t = -1.93, p = .052) and not 
significant (M = -8.19, SE = 9.71, t = -.80, p = .40). Thus, the effect of attention changed 
with SOA in opposite directions with inconsistent and local-neutral cues, and did not 
change with SOA with global-neutral cues. The finding with inconsistent cues is 
consistent with the idea that conflict pushes attention to more local levels. This possibility 
is tested directly next. 
 
Figure 7.2. Mean attention effect (focused minus diffuse) for each cue type and SOA in 
Experiment 5. Positive values reflect speeded responses in the diffuse attention condition, 
whereas negative values reflect speeded responses in the focused attention condition. 
Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
If conflict pushes priority to local processing, then the presence of conflict on trial 
N-1 might facilitate local processing on trial N in conflict (inconsistent) cues. If so, there 
should be larger local cueing effects on trial N conflict cues when trial N-1 was also a 
conflict cue (relative to a neutral cue). Furthermore, with inclusion of a local singleton, 
this conflict adaptation effect (i.e., enhanced conflict processing; Botvinick et al., 2001) 
might be enhanced by a manipulation that facilitates attention capture (i.e., diffuse 
attention condition), and thereby bias processing in favor of the local (arrow) level. If so, 
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the conflict adaptation effect should be larger in the diffuse versus focused attention 
condition. In line with these predictions, Figure 7.3 shows that when trial N-1 required 
resolution of conflict, trial N cueing effects with inconsistent (conflict) cues was larger 
(at the 250 ms SOA) than when trial N-1 did not require resolution of conflict. This 
conflict adaptation effect was enhanced in the diffuse relative to focused attention 
condition. Thus, there was greater impact of salience on trial N cueing effect when trial 
N-1 activated conflict resolution processes. 
 
Figure 7.3. Mean spatial cueing effects (valid minus invalid or, for the inconsistent cue, 
global-valid minus local-valid) for each cue type and attention condition as a function of 
trial N-1 cue (either a neutral—no-conflict—cue, or an inconsistent—conflict—cue in 
Experiment 5. For the inconsistent cue, negative values indicate a cueing effect due to the 
global level whereas positive values indicate a cueing effect due to the local level. Note 
that the global-neutral cueing effect was remapped (i.e., multiplied by -1) to reflect that 
this cueing effect was attributable to the local level. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard 
error. 
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7.3 Discussion 
The present experiment investigated the role of attentional focusing on selection 
of a spatially uninformative arrow at either the global or the local level of hierarchical 
structure. The pattern of results was complex and cannot be mapped neatly onto the 
expectations of a perceptual global precedence account (there was no evidence of global 
advantage) or an attentional focusing account (cueing effects did not differ between 
attention conditions). Of course, the cueing effects were also inconsistent with the pattern 
observed in nearly all of the previous experiments reported here, which only adds to 
difficulty with their interpretation. This difficulty notwithstanding, an important 
sequential effect was observed which supported the notion that conflict between levels 
pushes attention to more local levels. The implications of this finding are elaborated on in 
Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
8.0 Chapter Overview 
 Chapter 8 summarizes the main results of the experiments reported in the current 
thesis and relates these results to the primary research objectives presented in Section 2.1. 
In addition, a few methodological issues are mentioned and some recommendations for 
addressing these issues are offered. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the 
present findings relate to the current state of knowledge in the field. A number of 
practical, theoretical, and methodological implications are also considered and directions 
for future research prescribed. 
8.1 Summary of Experimental Results 
The essence of global precedence is the inevitability of global processing. 
According to Navon, global precedence occurs because identification of global 
information occurs first and constitutes an obligatory stage of perceptual processing. 
Despite this fact, little attention has been devoted to investigating whether global 
processing is in fact obligatory. Indeed, the standard global/local paradigm cannot even 
assess this issue given that participants are required to process the critical stimulus in a 
goal-directed manner via task and stimulus parameters that emphasize global or local 
characteristics. To determine whether a process is obligatory, however, requires equating 
each level in terms of its likelihood of processing. That is, the option to process either the 
global or local level in a given task is necessary but not sufficient. The option to process 
either level, in addition to the option to not process either level must also be equated. For 
instance, even if one finds evidence in a divided attention paradigm for obligatory global 
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processing, it may be that this evidence depended on the global level being task-relevant 
(not just task-relevant on a given trial, as any conclusion drawn is based on the whole 
task; Iglesias-Fuster et al., 2014). 
The main goal of the current thesis, therefore, was to investigate global and local 
processing in situations that do not require an observer to process a hierarchical stimulus. 
The current thesis refers to this sort of processing as incidental. Operationally, incidental 
processing was defined as processing of a hierarchical stimulus when information at 
different levels of structure was uninformative (did not aid task performance) and task-
irrelevant (did not need be processed to perform the task). Critically, as the hierarchical 
stimulus was irrelevant to the primary task and, therefore, could be ignored, the 
compound arrow cueing paradigm provides an opportunity to determine whether the 
global-to-local processing sequence is indeed obligatory, which, to this point, has been a 
difficult issue to address. The motivation for the paradigm is based on the argument that 
the most appropriate test of global precedence (specifically, its dispositional nature) 
requires that the critical compound stimulus be entirely task-irrelevant. A key 
manipulation was SOA, the rationale being that the priming potency of a level varies with 
SOA in correspondence with how early that level was processed or became available. 
The primary research question addressed in each of these experiments and their 
associated finding is summarized below and on Table P.2. In addition, a summary of the 
experimental conditions under which significant cueing effects were or were not 
observed is provided on Table 8.1. 
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Experiment 1 examined global and local processing in incidental perception of 
hierarchical structure. Results indicated that inconsistent cues induced a global cueing 
effect at short SOAs (target detection was faster when the global versus local level 
pointed toward the target), consistent with global advantage, whereas at long SOAs, a 
local cueing effect was observed (target detection was faster when the local versus global 
level pointed toward the target), indicative of a local advantage (Experiment 1.1). 
Importantly, global-neutral arrows (global rectangle comprised of local arrows) induced a 
local cueing effect even at short SOAs (Experiment 1.2), suggesting that the obligatory 
transition from early global advantage to late local advantage seen with inconsistent cues 
depended in some way on the presence of competitive interactions between global and 
local levels, competition that was absent in consistent and neutral cues given that 
responses available at global and local levels were compatible in consistent cues and did 
not conflict in neutral cues (because there was no response associated with the neutral 
level).  
Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1 except that SOA was 
manipulated along a broader time course. With inconsistent cues, a global cueing effect 
was observed for SOAs between 100 and 300 ms, whereas a local cueing effect was 
observed for SOAs between 400 and 900 ms. Thus, just as in Experiment 1, global 
advantage occurred early during processing and local advantage occurred later. This 
global-to-local temporal sequence observed for task-irrelevant compound arrows has 
since been independently replicated and extended to action planning (Chan, Gozli, & 
Pratt, 2014). Thus, taking Experiments 1 and 2 together, there seems to be fairly strong 
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evidence for the idea that different levels of hierarchical structure are processed with 
different latencies or are registered at different points during processing. 
Experiment 3 examined whether the influence of competing symbolic stimuli 
(arrows) at different levels of structure on attentional control depends on top-down 
selection processes. The results showed a clear task-compatible, level-specific cueing 
effect when there was conflict between the two levels of structure (i.e., inconsistent cue), 
congruent with a control setting account. Yet, when there was no such conflict, the results 
were compatible with a global precedence account: when the cue was a global arrow 
composed of local rectangles (i.e., local-neutral cue), a global cueing effect was observed 
regardless of orienting task. Similarly, when the cue was a global rectangle composed of 
local arrows (i.e., global-neutral cue), a local cueing effect was observed in the local 
orienting task but not in the global orienting task, findings compatible with some form of 
global precedence. In addition, though differential local salience between tasks does not 
impact the primary conclusions related to global precedence given that local salience 
cannot account for the absence of a cueing effect with global-neutral cues in the global 
orienting task, it does impact the conclusion that the task-compatible, level-specific 
cueing effects with inconsistent and global-neutral cues in the local orienting task are 
compatible with a control setting account. This is because the salience of the local arrow 
in this task could explain these cueing effects equally as well as orienting task, a 
possibility that was tested in Experiment 4. 
Experiment 4 examined the role of bottom-up salience in control of level-specific 
selection biases. Recent work has provided direct behavioral and neurophysiological 
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evidence that salient but irrelevant singletons can be actively suppressed when top-down 
guidance is deployed (Gaspelin, Leonard, & Luck, 2015). It is unlikely, therefore, that 
differential local salience between tasks was responsible for the differences between tasks 
and for the pattern of cueing effects in the local orienting task in Experiment 3. 
Nonetheless, to be sure, Experiment 4 tested this possibility. This experiment was a 
replication of Experiment 1.2—in which there was no secondary task (i.e., processing of 
the compound cue was incidental to the detection task)—with the exception that one of 
the local arrows was a color singleton. If the local color singleton captured attention, then 
participants should be faster to respond to targets appearing at the location indicated by a 
local singleton arrow relative to targets appearing at the mirror location (i.e., a local 
cueing effect). In the same vein, there should not be a cueing effect with cues in which 
the local color singleton was a rectangle (i.e., local-neutral cues). 
This prediction was not supported as there was, if anything, a global cueing effect 
with inconsistent cues at the 250 ms SOA (indicating that the local arrow color singleton 
did not capture attention and then shift attention to the local-valid location), as well as a 
significant cueing effect with local-neutral cues at short SOAs, indicating that the local 
rectangle color singleton did not capture attention and draw resources away from 
processing of the global arrow. However, a case for rapid-disengagement could be made, 
according to which spatial attention is initially captured by the singleton but rapidly 
disengages before the target appears (Theeuwes, 2010). In other words, this account 
suggests that top-down suppression occurs after an initial attentional shift to the local-
valid (inconsistent cues) and valid (local-neutral cues) location. This account is plausible 
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given that the target did not appear until at least 250 ms after the onset of the arrow cue, 
thereby providing ample time to disengage from the local singleton. The effect of SOA 
on the cueing effect with inconsistent cues (reduced global cueing or, equivalently, 
enhanced local cueing effect at longer SOAs) and with local-neutral cues (reduced cueing 
effect at longer SOAs), however, would imply a weakening of top-down suppression with 
processing duration, which would not be expected of top-down control processes. As 
such, it appears that the early global cueing effect with inconsistent cues was due to 
influence from the global level. Thus, a color singleton at the local level did not produce 
a rapid local cueing effect (Experiment 4) unless the local level was task-relevant 
(Experiment 3), suggesting that the effects in question were due to task, not salience. 
Taken together, it is concluded that the results support a version of global precedence in 
which task set can either maintain the availability of the global level (evident by the 
absence of SOA effects on global cueing effects when the global level was relevant to the 
task) or attenuate the availability of the global level (evident by the absence of SOA 
effects on local cueing effects when the local level was relevant to the task). 
Experiment 5 manipulated the scope of focal scope of attention (focused or 
diffuse), which led to a complex pattern of results. The redeeming quality of this 
cacophonous pattern is that a moment can be taken to reflect on the current limitations of 
the compound arrow cueing paradigm. Some of these limitations are weaknesses with 
cueing tasks themselves, such as the binary pairing of cue responses (orient left or right) 
with target locations (left or right), which lead to effects of polarity correspondence (i.e., 
effects driven by task structure; Proctor & Cho, 2006). Another unfortunate difficulty has 
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been determining a suitable method for designing experiments with a fully crossed 
factorial structure while maintaining a manageable number of trials. Finally, it is unclear 
what effect design-driven variables (e.g., blocked versus mixed cue types across trials, 
number of cue types, etc.), SOA-driven variables (e.g., fixed versus continuous SOAs, 
range and number of SOAs, etc.), and response-driven variables (e.g., number of target-
locations) might have on the pattern of cueing effects within the compound arrow cueing 
paradigm. 
Table 8.1. Summary of experimental conditions in which cueing effects were and were 
not observed. Significant effects are designated by ** (p < .05) and * (p < .10), otherwise 
the effect was not significant (designated by —). Continuous SOA values (Experiment 2) 
are designated by a c superscript, otherwise SOAs were 250, 500, and 750 ms (expect in 
Experiment 5 where only 250 and 750 ms SOAs were used). 
Exp. Cue Type 
Valid Cue 
Level 
Level Status w/ 
Respect to Task 
  Cueing 
Effect 
SOA 
  
1.1 Inconsistent Global Incidental  ** 250 
1.2 Inconsistent Global Incidental  ** 250 
1.3 Inconsistent Global Incidental  ** 250 
1.4 Inconsistent Global Incidental  * 250 
2 Inconsistent Global Incidental  ** c100-300 
3 Inconsistent Global Relevant  ** 250-750 
3 Inconsistent Global Irrelevant  — — 
4 Inconsistent Global Incidental  * 250 
5 Inconsistent Global Relevant  — — 
5 Inconsistent Global Irrelevant  — — 
       
1.1 Inconsistent Local Incidental  ** 750 
1.2 Inconsistent Local Incidental  ** 750 
1.3 Inconsistent Local Incidental  ** 750 
1.4 Inconsistent Local Incidental  ** 750 
2 Inconsistent Local Incidental  ** c400-900 
3 Inconsistent Local Relevant  ** 250-750 
3 Inconsistent Local Irrelevant  — — 
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4 Inconsistent Local Incidental  ** 500-750 
5 Inconsistent Local Relevant  ** 250, 750 
5 Inconsistent Local Irrelevant  ** 250, 750 
       
1.1 Local-Neutral    n/a n/a 
1.2 Local-Neutral Global Incidental  ** 250-750 
1.3 Local-Neutral Global Incidental  ** 250-500 
1.4 Local-Neutral Global Incidental  ** 250-750 
2 Local-Neutral Global Incidental  ** c400-550 
3 Local-Neutral Global Relevant  ** 250-750 
3 Local-Neutral Global Irrelevant  ** 250-750 
4 Local-Neutral Global Incidental  ** 250 
5 Local-Neutral Global Relevant  ** 250, 750 
5 Local-Neutral Global Irrelevant  ** 250, 750 
       
1.1 Global-Neutral    n/a n/a 
1.2 Global-Neutral Local Incidental  ** 250-750 
1.3 Global-Neutral Local Incidental  ** 250-500 
1.4 Global-Neutral Local Incidental  ** 250-750 
2 Global-Neutral Local Incidental  — c— 
3 Global-Neutral Local Relevant  ** 250-750 
3 Global-Neutral Local Irrelevant  — — 
4 Global-Neutral Local Incidental  ** 250 
5 Global-Neutral Local Relevant  — — 
5 Global-Neutral Local Irrelevant  — — 
       
1.1 Consistent Both Incidental  ** 250-750 
1.2 Consistent Both Incidental  ** 250-750 
1.3 Consistent Both Incidental  ** 250-500 
1.4 Consistent Both Incidental  ** 250-750 
2 Consistent Both Incidental  ** c100-900 
3 Consistent Both Global-Relevant  ** 250-750 
3 Consistent Both Local-Relevant  ** 250-750 
4 Consistent Both Incidental  ** 250 
5 Consistent    n/a n/a 
5 Consistent       n/a n/a 
 
8.2 Thesis Objectives Revisited 
 The primary objectives of the current thesis were 1) to examine global and local 
processing in incidental perception of hierarchical structure, and 2) to examine control of 
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level-specific selection (see Section 2.1). The primary conclusion bearing on these 
objectives is as follows: 1) there is strong evidence that global precedence (or something 
akin to it) guides perceptual microgenesis (i.e., the time course of development in the 
percept) in incidental perception of hierarchical structure, and 2) interactions between 
task demands and the structure of the input information selectively modulate the relative 
needs of visual information at different levels of stimulus structure. Importantly, it 
seemed that a global-to-local shift in advantage was obligatory when there was conflict 
between levels and processing was incidental (Experiments 1-2), as well as that 
processing could be restricted to a task-relevant global level but not to a task-relevant 
local level (Experiment 3). These findings suggest that level-specific advantages may not 
have been due to top-down task set per se but rather to conflict between levels, with the 
effect of task set serving to modulate the availability of level-specific information, 
effectively prolonging (in the case of task-relevant global information) or expediting (in 
the case of task-relevant local information) the advantage at a given level. To select 
symbols at different levels of structure, therefore, the current thesis concludes that at least 
two factors need to be considered: the observer’s current task, which specifies the 
demands of visual information from the input, and the globality of this visual information 
across the percept, which specifies the availability of the percept for selection. 
8.3 Relation to Current State of Knowledge 
8.3.1 Implications for global precedence in perception of hierarchical structure 
The present findings contribute to a greater understanding of visual perception by 
elucidating the source, nature, and time course of global/local processing under incidental 
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processing conditions. The present findings also establish important contextual conditions 
on how and when global- or local-level information is dominant, which has the potential 
to extend/constrain current knowledge to different kinds of people, stimuli, and task-
contexts, in addition to extending current knowledge to more ecologically valid stimuli in 
which information is contained at multiple levels of stimulus structure, as described 
below. 
Availability of global features varies over time, suggesting queued 
precedence. One of the main goals in Experiments 1-2 was to determine whether 
Navon’s (1977) notion of stationary global precedence holds under incidental processing 
conditions. A stationary global precedence account predicts that global advantage should 
be observed and should remain constant across SOA given that, not only is global 
information available earlier (which accounts for the global advantage), but also that its 
availability does not decline over time, not even when local information is being 
processed (which accounts for the obligatory nature of global advantage and the 
preponderance of asymmetric, global-to-local interference patterns in global/local tasks). 
The present finding that global advantage interacted with processing duration 
(Experiments 1-2 and 4) indicates that the availability of directional information at the 
global level was somehow modulated during incidental perception of hierarchical 
structure, consistent with previous findings (Kimchi, 1998). Although this pattern does 
not support a stationary global precedence hypothesis (Navon, 1977, 1991), it is 
consistent with a weaker version of global precedence whereby the availability of global 
information may modulated over time. Navon (1991) referred to this account as the queue 
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hypothesis. He speculated that such a shift in dominance may be indicative of a serial 
processor that operates on the local level after it operates on the global level and which 
stores in memory primarily information relevant to the current operation. The important 
point here is that global information is not lost but rather is somehow made less available. 
Of course, the present findings do not entirely support the queue account of global 
precedence either, at least not a queue account in which the activity of a serial processor 
is envisioned as containing purely effortful operations. According to Navon’s (1977) 
global precedence, global properties of hierarchical stimuli are more readily processed 
than local properties. In turn, greater effort in allocating attentional resources to local 
properties may be required. In support of this notion, Blasi et al. (2007) showed that 
relative to the global level, allocating attentional resources to the local level was 
associated with increased activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and parietal cortices, 
regions commonly linked to top-down modulation of stimulus processing (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller & Cohen, 2001). The present finding 
of an obligatory local advantage during later processing (Experiments 1-2 and 4), 
however, is inconsistent with this view. Instead, it may be that the system is predisposed 
to process not only global information, as suggested by Navon (1977), but is also 
predisposed to shift priority to local information. Because stimulus features vary across 
stimuli, and because local information is relative (i.e., its identity potentially changes 
over time), it is probably not advantageous for a system to be predisposed to process local 
information. However, it probably is advantageous for a system to be predisposed to shift 
148 
 
processing from global to local information at some point in time, suggesting queued 
precedence (i.e., obligatory global precedence, followed by obligatory local precedence).  
 Global-to-local shift in precedence requires cross-level conflict, suggesting 
contingent queued precedence. Critically, an obligatory global-to-local shift occurred 
only for conflict cues (in which the spatial meaning of global and local items conflicted—
i.e., the inconsistent cue type) and only in the absence of level-specific task demands. 
Accordingly, the current thesis hypothesizes that the obligatory shift in advantage during 
incidental perception of hierarchical structure depends on conflict between levels. Two 
strategies have been offered for the resolution of conflict by the cognitive control 
mechanism. One is to bias the task-relevant information (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Notebaert & Verguts, 2008) and the other is to bias the task-irrelevant information 
(Stoffels, 1996; Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schrӧter, & Sommer, 2002). Accordingly, 
the queued precedence account suggests that level-specific advantage is not due to task 
per se (i.e., top-down selection of a particular level) but rather to conflict between levels, 
with the effect of task serving to modulate the availability of level-specific information, 
effectively prolonging the advantage at a given level. In other words, the current results 
are more consistent with the idea of contingent queued precedence. It suggests that all an 
orienting task can achieve is to bias already prepared control operations (i.e., faster 
transition to local dominance) but not to trigger a new, task-independent operation (i.e., 
early local precedence). Thus, this account suggests that the reason why the SOA effect 
disappeared in Experiment 3 was because the task-relevancy of a particular level 
maintained the dominance of that level—only in the absence of task demands was there 
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an obligatory global-to-local change in advantage (Experiments 1-2), and even then, only 
in the presence of conflict. 
 The contingent queued precedence account makes a straightforward and testable 
prediction regarding effects of selection history: if conflict pushes priority to local 
processing, then the presence of conflict on trial N-1 should facilitate local processing on 
trial N in conflict cues. If so, there should be a larger local cueing effect on trial N 
conflict cues when trial N-1 was also a conflict cue (relative to a neutral cue). 
Furthermore, with inclusion of a local singleton (Experiment 4), this conflict adaptation 
effect (i.e., enhanced conflict processing) might be enhanced by a manipulation that 
facilitates attention capture (i.e., Experiment 5, diffuse attention condition), and thereby 
bias processing in favor of the local level. If so, the conflict adaptation effect should be 
larger when attention is diffuse relative to when attention is focused. In other words, the 
prediction is that interactions between task demands and the structure of the input 
information will selectively modulate the relative needs of visual information at different 
levels of stimulus structure. These predictions were confirmed in Experiment 5. To select 
symbols at different levels of structure, therefore, the contingent queued precedence 
account suggests that at least two factors need to be considered: the observer’s current 
task, which specifies the demands of visual information from the input, and the globality 
of this visual information across the percept, which specifies the availability of the 
percept for selection (see also, Morrison & Schyns, 2001, where an alternative factor—
the representation of that visual information across scale space—was suggested in place 
of the globality factor). 
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Gradual change in availability over time suggests obligatory content-to-level 
binding. Recent work suggests that attentional selectivity in global/local processing 
improves discretely (Hübner, 2014). This is consistent with the predictions of Hübner and 
Volberg’s (2005) content-to-level binding theory. According to this view, the contents of 
the different levels in a hierarchical structure are identified and represented independently 
of their respective level. Consequently, to obtain a complete object representation that 
can be used, for example, to resolve response conflicts, the contents must subsequently be 
actively linked or bound to their respective level. This account is supported by 
neuroscientific data demonstrating that the processing of information at early stages is 
affected by the output of processes at later stages. ‘Actively’ is the key word here—
meaning via a second, presumably post-perceptual process. Given the considerations 
discussed above in reference to Figure 1.1, however, it is not clear that a secondary 
process is necessary providing that levels and their content (i.e., identity, message, etc.) 
can be bound in the microgenesis of the percept via early perceptual organization 
mechanisms (e.g., grouping by shared or common function). In support of this, 
Experiment 2 observed gradual (as opposed to discrete) change in the size of spatial 
cueing effects over time. 
Reinforcing this single-process account, no evidence was found suggesting that 
level-specific information was necessarily integrated as neither congruency nor 
interference effects were observed (Experiment 1). In other words, symbolic information 
at different levels of structure was not necessarily integrated and had independent effects 
on behavior. This suggests that the purpose of a global-to-local processing scheme may 
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not be to facilitate recognition per se but rather to facilitate processes that constrain 
possible actions (where recognition is just one of the possible actions). For example, 
knowledge constrains identification of objects (e.g., knowing that blenders appear in 
kitchens means that the blender-like object in the bathroom probably is not a blender). 
Global-to-local processing might facilitate application of this knowledge (e.g., perception 
of a large room will enable access to a kitchen schema more readily than a bathroom 
schema given that kitchens tend to be larger than bathrooms). Similarly, symbolic cueing 
effects occur given knowledge that the direction of an arrow is usually indicative of 
important information in the real world. Global-to-local processing could facilitate 
application of this knowledge (e.g., perception of overall form may enable access to the 
appropriate behavior more readily because local forms may differ). 
8.3.2 Implications for attentional control in general and symbolic control in 
particular: Spatial constraints on selection differ across object classes 
The conclusion that the global-to-local sequence observed in Experiments 1-2 was 
obligatory is at odds with the prevailing view in which the processing sequence is thought 
to be more flexible (e.g., Morrison & Schyns, 2001). Global/local processing is typically 
examined with displays that emphasize local processing (e.g., central presentation of the 
imperative compound stimulus, fixed target locations, etc.). In contrast to local 
processing, the function of global processing is to provide a representation of the spatial 
layout and a representation of locations for possible action (i.e., affordances). Thus, just 
because the processing of spatial layout is flexibly global-to-local, this does not mean that 
the processing of affordances is. Moreover, although Schyns and Oliva (1997; Schyns & 
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Oliva, 1999) showed that the processing of scene-relevant affordances is flexible, there is 
reason to believe that the processing of behaviorally- and socially- relevant cues may not 
be as flexible. 
In particular, there are at least three reasons to suspect that temporal visual 
processing of symbolic stimuli may differ from other classes of objects. One reason is 
because there is evidence that temporal visual processing of objects and faces differs 
(e.g., Greene & Zaidel, 2012; Hill, Patel, Gu, Seyedali, Bachevalier, & Sereno, 2010; 
Zhao, Uono, Yoshimura, & Toichi, 2014). Similarly, there is evidence that gaze cues and 
arrow cues may differ (e.g., Frischen et al., 2007). A second reason is because there is 
evidence that expertise leads to automatic processing of subordinate level information, 
and people are arguably experts at processing arrows. Arrows, for example, might be 
categorized as simply a shape at a basic level. At a subordinate level, this might be 
categorized as a directional arrow. Accordingly, with expertise, global information is 
capable of activating subordinate level categorizations (Sigurdardottir, Michalak, & 
Sheinberg, 2014). Finally, orienting to behaviorally and biologically relevant cues, such 
as directional arrows and gaze, respectively, appears to be distinct from traditional 
conceptualizations of orienting as either exogenous or endogenous. In contrast to 
endogenous orienting (which occurs with intention and arises from deliberate resource 
allocation), and in contrast to exogenous orienting (which occurs without intention and 
arises from sensory stimulation), automated symbolic orienting occurs without intention 
but arises from the overlearning of the cue’s contingency over time (Dodd & Wilson, 
2009; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Hommel et al., 2001; Ristic & Kingstone, 2012; Van der 
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Stigchel, Mills, & Dodd, 2010; but see Sigurdardottir et al., 2014), and learned processes 
are not as flexible as biological processes. For example, learned processes are constrained 
by context, whereas biological processes are more context-independent. Taken together, 
these considerations suggest that spatial constraints on selection differ between object 
classes. Although this has been demonstrated repeatedly with single-level cues, the 
present findings are the first show an equivalent distinction for cues with hierarchical 
structure. 
8.3.3 Implications for theories of selectivity and target-distractor interactions 
To ensure efficient goal-directed behavior, the brain must not only focus visual 
processing on goal-relevant stimuli but also must exclude irrelevant, distracting 
information from processing. Distractor processing has important implications for daily 
functioning (e.g., educational achievement; driving safety; advertising strategies), and 
disproportionate distractor processing is associated with several psychopathologies (e.g., 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, schizophrenia). The question of how humans cope 
with distraction is therefore of central importance to psychological research. Navon’s 
work has been significant in this regard. Since Navon’s (1977) introduction of the 
compound stimulus paradigm for examining the nature of global and local processing in 
perception of hierarchical structure, global and local processing dynamics have been 
applied to a number of varied areas of research—including scene perception (Brockmole, 
Castelhano, & Henderson, 2006; Greene & Oliva, 2009; Joubert, Rousselet, Fize, & 
Faber-Thorpe, 2007; Loftus & Harley, 2004), face processing (Martin & Macrae, 2010; 
Perfect, Weston, Dennis, & Snell, 2008), emotional processing (Baumann & Kuhl, 2005; 
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Gasper & Clore, 2002; Tan, Jones, & Watson, 2009), reading, among others—and in turn 
have enhanced our understanding of individual differences in performance across culture 
(Davidoff, Fonteneau, & Fagot, 2008), age (Scherf, Behrmann, Kimchi, & Luna, 2009; 
Staudinger, Fink, Mackay, & Lux, 2011), race (McKone, Davies, Fernando, Aalders, 
Leung, Wickramariyaratne, & Platow, 2010), gender, and a variety of cognitive 
disorders. 
8.4 Action Addressability Principle 
The natural world continuously presents us with various opportunities for action. 
Because one cannot perform all possible actions at the same time, there must be 
mechanisms in place to reduce the number of options available to us at any given point in 
time. Such decisions are generally thought to be based on sensory information and 
constrained by effector systems (used to determine whether to look, reach or grasp). 
Constraints on visual acuity imposed by the optical limits of the eyes imply that the 
resolution of most stimuli in the visual field is low by default. Intuitively, it would seem 
that limited acuity of visual sensory mechanisms cause a deficiency in data quality that 
needs to be overcome. In fact, many researchers cite the need to overcome this deficiency 
as the primary function of saccadic eye movements (i.e., to re-orient the region of the 
eyes where acuity is highest—the fovea—to regions of the visual field where resolution 
is poor). Though the dependence of higher-order cognition on high-resolution visual 
input is incontrovertible (Henderson, 2003), it does not follow that low-resolution input is 
a problem to be overcome. Saccadic eye movements may indeed function primarily to 
enhance resolution in support of high-level cognitive processes (though, this assumption 
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is far from uncontested; e.g., Najemnik & Giesler, 2005, 2008); however, enhancing 
resolution does not amount to overcoming deficient resolution. For instance, enhanced 
resolution may simply lead to a more durable representation, as opposed to a higher-
quality one (e.g., flashbulb memory). 
A widespread idea is that visual processing is temporally structured—proceeding 
global-to-local—either because a) global information is more important early on, whereas 
local information is more important later, b) global processing constrains and therefore 
facilitates recognition, or c) global information is available to direct attention earlier than 
local information. The central idea put forward here is that perceptual processes are 
temporally organized in order to facilitate flexible, goal-directed action. More 
specifically, the current thesis argues that the function of the obligatory global-to-local 
processing sequence observed with conflict cues under conditions of incidental 
processing (Experiments 1-2) is to reduce the computational workload, though, not for 
perception but for action. In other words, the purpose of perception is to enable goal-
directed action. In this view, to the extent that perception brings one closer to realizing 
the goal of the system (think of the game 20 questions), then there would be no need for a 
method aimed at reducing the computational demands involved in processing scenes to a 
high-level to the limits of visual acuity because action does not always require high-level 
understanding. 
In light of the findings in Experiments 1-2 (i.e., default global-to-local temporal 
sequence in incidental perception of directionally relevant compound symbolic structure), 
the current thesis suggests that one reason why the entry point of visual processing 
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defaults to the global level for this class of stimuli may be to facilitate goal-directed 
action. Given that meaningful visual information can be extracted from global features 
(Beaucousin et al., 2011; Poirel, Pineau, & Mellet, 2008) and that the function of symbols 
is to convey meaningful information that is not inherent to its individual features, then a 
system that starts processing at the global level is immediately able to respond to relevant 
symbolic information and to ignore irrelevant perceptual information. Moreover, 
supposing information at the global level does not afford goal completion, then a system 
that starts processing at the global level is able to then immediately guide attention 
toward relevant local regions. For example, using a contextual cueing paradigm, 
Brockmole, Castelhano, and Henderson (2006) found that local contexts near the target 
were used to guide attention only when global information was non-predictive, 
suggesting that observers were biased to associate target locations with global contexts. 
Symbols are capable of producing automatic shifts of attention, a property acquired 
presumably through experience (Ristic & Kingstone, 2012). Given that symbolic material 
is, by definition, a psychological feature with no perceptual counterpart, symbolic 
representation must be abstract. According to the encoding specificity principle (Tulving, 
1972, 1983; Tulving & Thomson, 1973), performance is best when the type of processing 
performed during practice matches the type of processing performed during retrieval. 
Accordingly, if the communicative value of symbols is acquired and represented in 
memory in abstract format, then symbolic processing should be most efficient when 
processing is directed toward the more abstract, global properties of the environment. In 
support of this view, previous work has shown that memory for specific scene details is 
157 
 
better when the type of processing performed at study matches the type of processing 
performed at test (Reingold, 2002). Furthermore, face processing is more efficient with- 
than with-out global processing (Richler, Mack, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2011; Sekuler, 
Gaspar, Gold, & Bennett, 2004). 
In conclusion, it is argued that the temporal order of processing generally 
proceeds from global-to-local levels of structure in fixed fashion so as to ‘pick-up’ 
behaviorally relevant symbols capable of effortlessly guiding where processing should be 
directed (e.g., arrow and gaze cues). The idea is that global processing ensues until the 
perception of form matches an action scheme (if x, then move eyes to y). If no action 
scheme is found or if the action scheme did not bring about desirable consequences, then 
processing moves to progressively more local levels of stimulus structure for more 
elaborate processing. For example, imagine the fire alarm goes off and you have to locate 
a stairwell to leave the building. If unfamiliar with the building, you are probably 
searching for an EXIT sign that designates the stairwell (e.g., Figure 1.1). The question 
posed in the current thesis basically amounts to whether you are searching for the word 
‘EXIT’ or for a sign with red letters hanging over a doorway. It is hypothesized that you 
are searching for the latter. That is, the current thesis suggests that global processing 
precedes local processing in perception of behaviorally relevant hierarchical structure. 
This is because the level of encoding determines the level of retrieval (cf. encoding 
specificity principle; Tulving, 1972, 1983; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). If the global 
property is encoded, then global properties can be used to retrieve. If the local property is 
encoded, then the local properties can be used to retrieve. However, because local 
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properties can be retrieved via inference (e.g., stairwell is underneath the EXIT sign) of 
global properties (e.g., red blob above discrete segment of corridor), a stimulus is more 
efficiently dissected for use by processing global properties.  
8.5 Implications of Current Thesis 
As touched on in the preceding sections, the experimental findings reported in the 
current thesis have important theoretical and practical implications. In terms of 
intellectual merit, the use of an incidental processing procedure to measure precedence is 
important in that this procedure closely reflects the manner in which a great deal of 
information is processed in the real world (i.e., most items in the visual field are 
irrelevant and uninformative to one’s current task). Though attention, perception, and 
action can be strongly influenced by goals and intentions, processing of stimuli routinely 
occurs in a passive manner given the overwhelming number of inputs available at any 
given time. The current thesis may also establish important boundary conditions on how 
and when globality determines selection efficiency. Finally, the present thesis developed 
a method that combines two widely-used paradigms (spatial cueing and compound 
stimulus tasks) for implicitly probing observers’ perceptual representations in order to 
address fundamental issues of broad theoretical interest (selection of competing symbols 
at different levels of stimulus structure; entry point of visual perception and its 
flexibility). The results of this work make an important empirical and methodological 
contribution to the study of attentional control in general and symbolic control in 
particular, as well as global/local processing. For instance, the logic of the paradigm can 
be extended to versions in which all measurable dimensions (i.e., dimensions that 
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influence identification of features necessary for representing the form of an arrow, such 
as eccentricity and visual angle) and all task dimensions are independent, and thus, 
processing of measurable dimensions can still be incidental while processing of other 
dimensions is task-relevant. For example, if one’s task were singleton-search for a color, 
processing of form would be incidental (as in Experiment 3). As such, the current thesis 
enhances our understanding of perception and attention and, therefore, should be of broad 
theoretical interest given that the relation between levels of objects and selective attention 
is often of central interest beyond vision science, and may play a role in theorizing about 
other cognitive processes. 
In terms of broader impact, the current thesis has potential to benefit society and 
contribute to desirable social outcomes. Research investigating the processing of 
hierarchical structure has had a tremendous impact on educational and business-related 
practices, as well as on characterizing various psychopathologies. In education, canonical 
effects associated with global and local processing are often taken as an index of trait-
related processing style, which can be optimized by constructing learning environments 
and materials tailored toward a particular processing style. In business, such effects are 
often used to evaluate the fit between person and job. And in psychopathology, such 
effects are often used as diagnostic criteria, for instance, of Dyslexia and Dyscalculia 
(Rubinstein & Henik, 2006), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (Yovel, Revelle, & 
Mineka, 2005), and Autism (Frith, 1989; Gross, 2005; Happé & Frith, 2006; Hayward et 
al., 2012; Plaisted, Swettenham, & Rees, 1999). Thus, theories of hierarchical processing 
inform practices in some of the largest and most important institutions in society. The 
160 
 
current work, therefore, has the potential to lead to empirically-based practices for 
tailoring fit between person and environment in order to maximize performance. It also 
has the potential to reveal distinctions between ‘deficits’ and ‘biases’, which will be 
important to generation of effective treatment plans. 
8.6 Future Directions 
 The objectives of the current thesis relate to longer-term goals in three ways. First 
is the question of whether and how global precedence in the focal percept influences eye 
movements during scene viewing? Global/local research is rooted in a single paradigm 
far removed from natural viewing behavior, focusing almost exclusively on discrete 
processing episodes. The current experiments extend this behavioral work to more natural 
viewing conditions (i.e., incidental processing conditions). Future work will generalize 
the current work to continuous processing tasks (eye movement kinematics), as well as 
investigate neural correlates of continuous, global/local viewing behavior. 
A second relation between the objectives of the current thesis and longer-term 
goals is the question of how task-relevant information changes processing. It has been 
argued in the current thesis that the most appropriate test of global precedence requires 
that the critical compound stimulus be entirely task-irrelevant. Under such conditions, the 
current experiments obtained evidence supporting Navon’s (1977) perceptual account of 
global advantage, in which processing proceeds from global structuring to local detail. 
Considering that many studies have found evidence suggestive of a post-perceptual locus 
(e.g., Miller, 1981a; Oliva & Schyns, 1997), the present findings suggest that task-
relevant processing may substantively change the nature of processing relative to task-
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irrelevant processing. An important question, therefore, is what properties characterize 
task-relevant and task-irrelevant processing, and how do differences in these properties 
promote and/or cancel dispositional biases in perception? 
Third, studies investigating determinants of selection efficiency have identified 
several factors that may be crucial in determining whether selection is more or less 
efficient. Typically, such studies draw on tasks requiring selective attention to centrally 
presented local information while ignoring irrelevant peripheral information. Moreover, 
the stimuli used in these studies are generally perceptually simple, containing semantic 
information at only one level of stimulus structure (e.g., letters). Many structural 
differences exist between the stimuli presented in traditional studies of selectivity and the 
sort of stimuli found in the real-world. Considering that differences in stimulus structure 
are known to influence processing strategies (e.g., Garner, 1970, 1974), understanding 
the role of stimulus structure in information processing is crucial for understanding how 
various factors influence selective attention. Ignoring the nature of the stimulus, at worst, 
would lead to incorrect assessment of the nature of information processing, and, at best, 
an inadequate picture (Garner, 1970). A long-term goal of this research, therefore, is to 
develop an understanding of how other stimulus structures, such as a target’s location in 
depth on a three-dimension plane, contributes to selectivity. 
8.7 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, the experiments reported in the current thesis suggest that 
information at the global level is dominant in incidental perception of hierarchical 
structure, though, not necessarily always available (Experiments 1-2) as task set appears 
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able to modulate its availability. One way is through selective attention, implemented as 
control settings that allow relevant features to filter through to working memory 
(Experiment 3). Another way is through focusing of attention, implemented as a zoom-
lens that trades scope for detail (Experiment 5). More speculatively, this might suggest 
that flexible use of levels is achieved through processes that control where in the 
hierarchy an observer needs to be and how efficiently they get there. Task set seems a 
likely candidate for specifying where in the hierarchy processing needs to be (or the level 
of organization required to perform a task; e.g., Forester & Lavie, 2009), and stimulus-
stimulus and stimulus-response compatibility seem likely as candidates for governing 
how easily one traverses the hierarchy. It is important to note that the present use of an 
incidental processing paradigm is important in that it closely reflects the manner in which 
a great deal of information is processed in the real world. Though attention, perception, 
and action can be strongly influenced by goals and intentions, processing of stimuli 
routinely occurs in a passive manner given the overwhelming number of inputs available 
at any given time. The present results suggest that under such conditions the perceptual 
system is more prepared to process global versus local information. 
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APPENDIX A: MODEL PARAMETERS FOR EACH EXPERIMENT 
Table A1. Parameter estimates, standard errors, and p-values for Experiment 1.1. SOA 
was centered at 750 and validity was effect coded (-.5 = valid or global-valid, and .5 = 
invalid or local-valid). 
Model Parameter 
Consistent   Inconsistent 
Est SE p   Est SE p 
Fixed Effects        
Intercept 299.61 5.96 .00  295.97 6.06 .00 
S250 50.29 3.08 .00  54.00 3.45 .00 
S500 7.01 3.07 .02  14.28 3.44 .00 
Vald 13.92 3.53 .00  -10.00 3.55 .00 
Vald*S250 2.59 4.92 .60  25.74 4.98 .00 
Vald*S500 -1.76 4.91 .72  7.21 4.97 .15 
Random Effects        
Subject Intercept 1506.34 323.81 .00  1505.33 327.68 .00 
SOA Slope 83.22 33.35 .01  138.87 41.77 .00 
Vald Slope 7.02 41.27 .43  5.26 72.96 .47 
Residual 5579.06 107.56 .00   5712.39 109.63 .00 
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Table A2. Parameter estimates, standard errors, and p-values for Experiment 1.2. SOA was centered at 750 and validity was 
effect coded (-.5 = valid or global-valid, and .5 = invalid or local-valid). 
Model Parameter 
Consistent   Inconsistent   Local-Neutral   Global-Neutral 
Est SE p   Est SE p   Est SE p   Est SE p 
Fixed Effects                
Intercept 327.4 10.0 .00  324.4 8.8 .00  325.2 9.4 .00  320.5 9.6 .00 
S250 41.5 4.1 .00  46.3 3.6 .00  48.1 3.7 .00  51.8 3.9 .00 
S500 11.1 4.0 .01  9.5 3.6 .01  8.5 3.7 .02  13.2 3.9 .00 
Vald 18.9 4.3 .00  -10.1 4.3 .02  6.9 4.5 .13  16.8 4.3 .00 
Vald*S250 -4.3 6.0 .47  28.1 5.9 .00  2.0 6.1 .74  2.6 5.9 .66 
Vald*S500 -1.3 5.9 .83  9.1 5.8 .12  4.8 6.0 .42  -2.3 5.8 .70 
Random Effects                
Subject Intercept 4035 898 .00  3149 703 .00  3718 824 .00  3780 841 .00 
SOA Slope 165 56 .00  96 44 .01  97 45 .02  150 53 .00 
Vald Slope     35 63 .29  64 73 .19  28 61 .32 
Residual 7403 150 .00   7187 145 .00   7682 155 .00   7212 146 .00 
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Table A3. Parameter estimates, standard errors, and p-values for Experiment 1.3. SOA was centered at 750, validity was effect 
coded (-.5 = valid or global-valid, and .5 = invalid or local-valid), and proximity was effect coded (-.5 = outside, .5 = inside). 
Model 
Parameter 
Consistent   Inconsistent   Local-Neutral   Global-Neutral 
Est SE p   Est SE p   Est SE p   Est SE p 
Fixed Effects                
Intercept 299.0 6.02 .00  301.1 6.1 .00  294.6 6.2 .00  296.9 5.9 .00 
S250 47.8 3.43 .00  45.8 3.1 .00  53.8 3.2 .00  45.8 3.3 .00 
S500 11.4 3.4 .00  11.9 3.0 .00  13.6 3.2 .00  5.0 3.3 .13 
Vald .3 3.8 .93  -8.8 3.6 .01  4.0 4.2 .35  .9 3.6 .81 
Vald*S250 7.7 5.2 .14  17.1 5.2 .00  8.6 5.2 .10  11.7 5.1 .02 
Vald*S500 11.7 5.2 .03  6.1 5.1 .23  .6 5.2 .91  3.7 5.1 .47 
Prox 1.2 4.6 .79  7.7 3.7 .04  8.5 3.9 .03  .3 3.6 .94 
Prox*S250 -9.0 5.2 .08  -11.9 5.2 .02  -18.2 5.2 .00  1.0 5.1 .85 
Prox*S500 5.9 5.2 .25  -6.9 5.1 .17  -8.7 5.2 .10  -4.7 5.1 .36 
Prox*Vald 3.2 7.4 .67  9.7 7.2 .18  2.8 7.4 .71  -1.4 7.2 .85 
Prox*Vald*S250 -8.5 10.5 .41  -.3 10.3 .98  8.7 10.5 .41  12.1 10.2 .24 
Prox*Vald*S500 -.2 10.4 .99  -8.8 10.2 .39  -9.6 10.5 .36  -1.4 10.2 .89 
Random Effects                
Subject Intercept 1062 274 .00  1128 286 .00  1171 298 .00  1026 264 .00 
SOA Slope 86 35 .01  46 27 .05  55 30 .03  75 32 .01 
Vald Slope 26 45 .28      148 74 .02     
Prox Slope 256 100 .01  9 39 .41  60 53 .13     
Residual 5523 113 .00   5312 109 .00   5672 115 .00   5329 108 .00 
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Table A4. Parameter estimates, standard errors, and p-values for Experiment 3. SOA was centered at 750, validity was effect 
coded (-.5 = valid or global-valid, and .5 = invalid or local-valid), and task was effect coded (-.5 = local orienting task, .5 = 
global orienting task). 
Model Parameter 
Consistent   Inconsistent   Local-Neutral   Global-Neutral 
Est SE p   Est SE p   Est SE p   Est SE p 
Fixed Effects                
Intercept 406.6 12.8 .00  413.3 14.1 .00  358.7 10.4 .00  358.8 10.5 .00 
S250 46.3 2.5 .00  53.1 2.5 .00  48.5 2.8 .00  50.9 2.7 .00 
S500 -17.6 2.6 .00  -19.4 2.5 .00  -16.6 2.8 .00  -21.2 2.7 .00 
Vald 15.3 3.6 .00  3.2 3.6 .37  11.9 3.9 .00  7.4 3.8 .05 
Vald*S250 .0 5.1 .99  -7.2 4.9 .15  5.4 5.5 .33  -4.2 5.3 .43 
Vald*S500 2.7 5.2 .60  -1.6 5.1 .75  1.0 5.6 .86  4.3 5.4 .43 
Task -8.8 3.6 .02  -15.3 3.6 .00  -7.0 3.9 .08  -.2 3.8 .97 
Task*S250 -8.9 5.1 .08  -15.6 4.9 .00  -7.4 5.5 .18  -.9 5.3 .86 
Task*S500 -4.7 5.2 .36  .3 5.1 .95  1.4 5.6 .81  -4.1 5.4 .45 
Task*Vald 8.9 7.3 .22  26.5 7.1 .00  -7.2 7.9 .36  -9.6 7.7 .21 
Task*Vald*S250 -8.0 10.1 .43  -6.2 9.9 .53  -4.0 11.0 .72  10.4 10.6 .33 
Task*Vald*S500 -10.2 10.3 .32  2.9 10.1 .78  5.4 11.2 .63  -6.2 10.8 .57 
Random Effects                
Subject Intercept 5955 1436 .00  7214 1731 .00  2915 828 .00  2979 843 .00 
Residual 16967 335 .00   16383 324 .00   10665 291 .00   9811 269 .00 
192 
 
Table A5. Parameter estimates, standard errors, and p-values for Experiment 4. SOA was centered at 750 and validity was 
effect coded (-.5 = valid or global-valid, and .5 = invalid or local-valid). 
Model Parameter 
Consistent   Inconsistent   Local-Neutral   Global-Neutral 
Est SE p   Est SE p   Est SE p   Est SE p 
Fixed Effects                
Intercept 328.4 11.1 .00  331.5 12.7 .00  331.1 13.0 .00  331.9 11.6 .00 
S250 60.5 5.9 .00  47.3 7.2 .00  73.9 7.4 .00  62.0 5.6 .00 
S500 7.4 6.0 .22  12.5 7.1 .08  13.9 7.3 .06  13.8 5.7 .02 
Vald 10.2 7.9 .20  -13.1 8.9 .14  2.1 9.4 .82  6.1 7.0 .39 
Vald*S250 9.2 10.3 .37  24.4 12.5 .05  27.5 12.8 .03  9.9 9.8 .31 
Vald*S500 .6 10.5 .95  -6.4 12.3 .60  11.0 12.6 .38  6.1 9.9 .54 
Random Effects                
Subject Intercept 4194 1004 .00  5448 1314 .00  5683 1368 .00  4760 1127 .00 
SOA Slope 167 112 .07  260 164 .06  272 172 .06  153 101 .07 
Vald Slope 323 238 .09  70 251 .39  241 294 .21     
Residual 28364 509 .00   40337 722 .00   42036 752 .00   25470 456 .00 
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Table A6. Parameter estimates, standard errors, and p-values for Experiment 5. Effect coding was used for the SOA (-.5 = 250, 
.5 = 750), validity (-.5 = valid or global-valid, .5 = invalid or local-valid), and attention condition (-.5 = focused, .5 = diffuse) 
factors. 
Model Parameter 
Inconsistent   Local-Neutral   Global-Neutral 
Est SE p   Est SE p   Est SE p 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept 412.7 20.9 .00  393.3 16.0 .00  394.1 16.5 .00 
SOA -102.6 13.2 .00  -93.9 9.1 .00  -100.3 9.2 .00 
Vald -11.6 5.8 .05  -9.1 5.4 .10  -2.3 5.5 .68 
Vald*SOA 14.5 12.7 .26  -5.5 9.2 .55  -2.4 9.5 .80 
Attent 7.3 11.9 .54  11.1 7.8 .16  4.1 9.7 .68 
Attent*SOA 20.6 10.5 .05  -16.5 9.6 .09  -6.8 9.5 .48 
Attent*Vald -8.7 10.5 .41  -13.9 9.3 .14  -6.2 12.1 .61 
Attent*Vald*SOA 12.7 20.9 .54  2.3 18.3 .90  -14.4 19.0 .45 
Random Effects            
Subject Intercept 22886 4560 .00  13357 2675 .00  14180 2840 .00 
SOA Slope 7710 1798 .00  3309 870 .00  3254 874 .00 
Vald Slope 347 355 .16  404 299 .09  406 315 .10 
Attent Slope 6036 1471 .00  2089 630 .00  3801 981 .00 
Vald*SOA Slope 2659 1666 .06         
Attent*Vald Slope     161 917 .43  2914 1513 .03 
Attent*SOA Slope     400 958 .34     
Residual 69539 991 .00   53091 759 .00   57245 815 .00 
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